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ABSTRACT
This paper is intended to be used as a guide by personnel
at the Navy Finance Center (NFC) , Cleveland, Ohio in de-
veloping an Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Security Plan.
An effort has been made to combine the requirements for an
ADP security plan established by OPNAVINST 5239. 1A with per-
tinent information from other selected readings.
The importance of the devotion of personnel, time and
funds to ADP security planning has been emphasized. Indi-
vidual chapters have been devoted to the elements that must
be considered when developing an ADP security plan. They
include risk assessment, physical security, systems security,
contingency planning and the managerial procedures necessary
for the implementation of an ADP security plan.
This paper, used in conjunction with OPNAVINST 5 239. 1A,
should provide ample guidance for the development of an ini-
tial ADP security plan for NFC, Cleveland.
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I. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE
The purpose of this paper is to provide a guide that
will assist the staff of the Navy Finance Center (NFC) in
Cleveland, Ohio with the preparation of a realistic automatic
data processing (ADP) security plan. The requirement for the
development of an ADP security plan by all Department of the
Navy sponsored ADP activities will be explained. The need
for a workable ADP security plan will become evident as the
Navy's personnel and pay (PERSPAY) phasing plan is detailed.
The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel
and Training) /Navy Comptroller (DCNO (MP&T) /NAVCOMPT) Brand X
Site Study was conducted collectively by representatives of
the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy Finance Center and Naval
Data Automation Command. Its results were published on 15
February 1979. "The purpose of this study was to conduct an
economic analysis of four alternatives for the site selection
of the ' Erand X' computer equipment for the Navy Finance Cen-
ter (NAVFINCEN) , Cleveland, Ohio and the Bureau of Naval Per-
sonnel (BUPERS) , Washington, D.C. Work began in May 1978
with completion scheduled for July 1978 then rescheduled for
January 1979" [Ref. 1: p. 1-1].
Why was the Brand X study conducted?
Both BUPERS and NAVFINCEN are receiving computer support
from computer centers with hardware authorized by interim
delegation of procurement authority (DPA) from the General
14

Services Administration (GSA) . The BUPERS interim DPA
expires in April 1979 and the NAVFINCEN interim DPA ex-
pires in January 1979. In July 1978, an extended DPA was
granted for continued use of the BUPERS 370/165 computer
and NAVFINCEN 1 s IBM dual 370/158 computer system through
February 1982. BUPERS and NAVFINCEN have been directed by
GSA to replace their present computer systems through the
competitive procurement process. BUPERS and NAVFINCEN will
procure these replacements through a single joint effort,
which will be referred to as the "Brand X" computer pro-
curement. The determination of the ultimate site/sites of
the "Brand X" computer equipment will be the purpose of
this economic analysis. [Ref. 1: p. 1-2]
When the results of the Brand X study were published on
15 February 1979, the recommendation was that the BUPERS and
NAVFINCEN Brand X computers be co-located at the Navy Finance
Center (Bratenaal Annex) in Cleveland, Ohio [Ref. 1: p.
1-4] .
"In March 1978 the Navy initiated the PERSPAY project to
t'o combine the ADP procurement offorts of DCNO(MPST) and
NAVCOMPT" [Ref. 2: p. 1]. The primary purpose of the
PERSPAY project is to lower costs by initiating one instead
of two separate competitive procurements and to provide a
formal management discipline by employing the Commander,
Naval Data Automation Command (NAVDAC) as the project mana-
ger. For the purpose of this paper, the PERSPAY project is
best viewed as an opportunity to facilitate the interface of
pay and personnel information systems [Ref. 2: p. 2].
The culmination of efforts to join pay and personnel sys-
tems will be the dedication of a consolidated data center in
Cleveland, Ohio during March, 1987, but the phasing-in pro-
cess of this major merger is already underway.
15

Large volumes of information have become easier to store
as computer technology has been improved. As people have
become more familiar with computers, the information stored
in the computer has become more easily accessible to more
people. The advent of remote terminals has made information
stored in computers more readily accessible to more people
than ever before. The purpose of this paper now becomes
clear. Information that used to be locked in a file cabinet,
in a locked office with a guard at the main entrance of the
building, was considered secure. Unless there were signs
of forced entry, you could be reasonably certain that the
information in the locked file cabinet had not been compro-
mised in your absence. Much of the same information that
used to be stored in the locked file cabinet is now stored
in computers. With remote computer terminals being readily
accessible, can the same feeling of security be maintained
about the information stored in the computer as there was
when it was stored in a file cabinet? Obviously not. In-
formation security is no longer a simple matter of locking
papers in a drawer.
A security plan is needed at NFC Cleveland because of the
type of data that is stored in their ADP facility. As we can
best determine, the information that is presently stored in
the computer at NFC Cleveland and the information that will
be stored in the computer when the consolidated data center
evolves will be information protected by the "Privacy Act of
16

1974." More specifically, the "Privacy Act of 1974" states
the following:
(a) The Congress finds that:
(1) the privacy of an individual is directly af-
fected by the collection, maintenance, use, and
dissemination of personal information by Federal
agencies;
(2) the increasing use of computers and sophisticated
information technology, while essential to the
efficient operations of the Government, has
greatly magnified the harm to individual privacy
that can occur from any collection, maintenance,
use, or dissemination of personal information;
(3) the opportunities for an individual to secure
employment, insurance, and credit, and his right
to due process, and other legal protections are
endangered by the misuse of certain information
systems
;
(4) the right to privacy is a personal and funda-
mental right protected by the Constitution of the
United States; and
(5) in order to protect the privacy of individuals
identified in information systems maintained by
Federal agencies, it is necessary and proper for
the Congress to regulate the collection, main-
tenance, use, and dissemination of information
by such agencies.
(b) The purpose of this Act is to provide certain safe-
guards for an individual against an invasion of per-
sonal privacy by requiring Federal agencies, except as
otherwise provided by law, to:
(1) permit an individual to determine what records
pertaining to him are collected, maintained, used,
or disseminated by such agencies;
(2) permit an individual to prevent records pertaining
to him obtained by such agencies for a particular
purpose from being used or made available for
another purpose without his consent;
(3) permit an individual to gain access to informa-
tion pertaining to him in Federal agency records,
17

to have a copy made of all or any portion there-
of, and to correct or amend such records;
(4) collect, maintain, use, or disseminate any record
of identifiable personal information in a manner
that assures that such action is for a necessary
and lawful purpose, that the information is cur-
rent and accurate for its intended use, and that
adequate safeguards are provided to prevent mis-
use of such information;
(5) permit exemptions from the requirements with re-
spect to records provided in this Act only in
those cases where there is an important public
policy need for such exemption as has been de-
termined by specific statutory authority; and
(6) be subject to civil suit for any damages which
occur as a result of willful or intentional ac-
tion which violates any individual's rights
under this Act. [Ref. 3: p. 1]
The Commanding Officer or any person associated with ADP
may, now, be held more directly responsible for his actions.
It means that the Commanding Officer and any other person
that works at the data center can be subject to a civil suit
for any damages which occur as a result of willful or in-
tentional action which violates any individual's rights under
the "Privacy Act of 1974." This means that the Commanding
Officer can be held financially liable from his personal
funds for improper actions by himself concerning Privacy Act
information. Military and civilian government employees have
had to spend personal funds because of improper action con-
cerning computer security.
As could be expected in any area with such possible far-
reaching impact as computer security, the Department of the
18

Navy (DON) has issued OPNAVINST 5239. 1A dated 3 August 1982
that requires all DON automatic data processing (ADP) acti-
vities to submit a copy of their activity ADP security plan
(AADPSP) to the Commander, Naval Data Automation Command
(COMNAVDAC) for approval within nine months of the date of
this instruction [Ref. 4: p. 3]. The objectives of the in-
structions are much farther reaching than merely imposing a
requirement on all DON ADP activities. The stated objectives
are to:
a. Provide centralized guidance and uniform policy on all
known and recognized aspects of ADP security.
b. Provide a graduate program of ADP security which is re-
sponsive to the security requirements and needs of ADP
systems and networks commensurate with their data sen-
sitivity and mission criticality.
c. Provide for operational reliability and asset integrity
for all ADP systems and networks.
d. Provide realistic guidance and generalized procedures
to ensure that all data handled by ADP activities and
networks are adequately protected against accidental or
intentional destruction, modification, and disclosure,
and users are protected against denial of service which
may result from events such as fraud, misuse, espion-
age, sabotage, malicious acts, natural hazards, or
fire. [Ref. 4: p. 2-3]
The fact that the instruction exists and imposes a re-
quirement for an activity ADP security plan (AADPSP) shows us
that the Navy recognizes the seriousness of the situation.
The value of this instruction is increased drastically be-
cause it describes "how to" develop each part of a total ac-
tivity ADP security program. It is stated in the instruction
that an AADPSP should address the following areas:
19

(1) Scope of the activity ADP security program.
(2) Commanding Officer's policy statement.
(3) ADP security organization and assignment of
responsibilities
.
(4) Objectives for implementing the DON ADP security pro-
gram at the activity.










(8) Provisions for ADP security in life cycle management.
(9) Provisions for ADP security in hardware and software
configuration control.
(10) Activity accreditation schedule identifying all ADP
elements and a plan of action and milestones (POA&M)
for completing the following:
(a) Risk assessments;
(b) Security tests and evaluations (ST&Es)
;
(c) Contingency planning and testings;
(d) Accreditations.
Updating the AADPSP should be a principle of the execution
of the plan. The AADPSP should be a living document for
baselining, updating, improving, developing, maintaining,
and managing ADP security requirements within the DON ADP
activity. The AADPSP should serve as a comprehensive
20

document of security posture and plans for the Commanding
Officer and ADPSO. The ADPSO is responsible for develop-
ing, implementing, and updating the AADPSP. [Ref. 4: pp.
H-l - H-2]
Although OPNAVINST 5239. 1A imposes the requirement for an
AADPSP and gives good guidance on how to develop the plan, it
is the purpose of this paper to amplify the most important
areas of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A while introducing some areas that
are not mentioned in OPNAVINST 5239. 1A and should possibly be
included in NFC's AADPSP. It is intended that this paper be
used as a working tool to help NFC personnel develop an
AADPSP that not only satisfies OPNAVINST 5239. 1A requirements
but will be a legitimately useful document for ensuring and
safeguarding the efficient running of the NFC.
Before the section on plan development is begun, a few
additional comments about OPNAVINST 5239. 1A and the specific
situation at the NFC are appropriate. It should be under-
stood that an AADPSP that is developed for the current situa-
tion at the NFC will have to be under a continuous review and
modification as the facility changes and it gets closer to
the dedication date for the consolidated data center. This
does not mean that less effort should be put into the initial
draft of the AADPSP. A good initial AADPSP will serve as a
sound base from which to improve the security posture.
OPNAVINST 5239. 1A addresses the subject of an activity
ADP security staff. From our research we have ascertained
that most Navy ADP facilities do not have a formal security
21

staff as described in OPNAVINST 5239. 1A. In most cases ADP
security has been assigned as a less important collateral
duty to one or at most two persons. It is understood that
the assignment of ADP security staff duties to the present
staff at most commands without additional personnel would
cause an undue hardship on personnel and possibly endanger
the command's mission. It is therefore recommended that
duties be assigned to current personnel only until permanent
positions can be requested, approved and filled. The initial
personnel assigned to the ADP security staff must move for-
ward in the development of an AADPSP and therefore it is
recommended that members of this staff be carefully reviewed
and selected from all volunteers. The implementation of a
viable ADP security plan will require significant increases
in staff, time and money.
The remainder of this paper will be devoted to the ampli-
fication of subjects on how to best develop and implement an
AADPSP. The following subject areas will be addressed: de-
velopment of a plan of action and milestones (POA&M) ; types
of ADP security; risk assessment; physical security; mana-
gerial procedures; systems security; contingency plan de-
velopment; procedures for handling security violations; ADP




II. SECURITY STAFF ORGANIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF A PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES (POAM)
A. INITIAL ORGANIZATION
The first step in the development of an ADP security plan
will be the organization of an ADP security staff. While
conducting research for this paper, it was noted that the
majority of governmental ADP organizations in which we made
contact do not have formal staffs devoted to ADP security.
In most cases, the responsibility had been delegated to one
person as a collateral duty. Most command representatives
interviewed recognized the need for a full time ADP security
staff but, because of manning allowances, the movement has
been slow. The advent of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A has imposed the
requirement for an ADP security staff and defined each mem-
ber's responsibility. The existence of OPNAVINST 52 39. 1A
should provide the much-needed formal justification for com-
mands to obtain the manning for a proper ADP security staff.
The implementation of a proper ADP security staff may not
happen immediately, but should be phased in during the near
future
.
B. TYPES OF DATA
The responsibilities of the Commanding Officer must ini-
tially be defined when organizing an ADP security staff, and
23

the type of data to be protected must be determined because
the Commanding Officer's responsibilities will vary depending
on the type of data to be safeguarded. At NFC Cleveland, it
has been determined that the highest data type of information
to be safeguarded will be Level II as defined by OPNAVINST
5239. 1A. The definitions of the different levels of data
classification are as follows:
Level I. Classified data;
Level II. Unclassified data requiring special protection,
e.g., Privacy Act, For Official Use Only, etc.;
Level III. All other unclassified data. [Ref. 4: p. 1-2]
C. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER
When the type of data to be protected has been properly
classified into the appropriate level, the responsibilities
of the Commanding Officer can be defined. The Commanding
Officer of NFC Cleveland, where Level II data will be the
most highly classified data, will be the Designated Approving
Authority (DAA) for the accreditation of his ADP facility.
As DAA for NFC Cleveland, the Commanding Officer's responsi-
bilities will be as follows:
1. Develop an AADPSP and submit it to COMNAVDAC for ap-
proval (see Appendix H of Ref. 4);
2. Conduct a risk assessment (see Chapter 5 and Appendix
E of Ref . 4)
;
3. Develop a Security Test and Evaluation (ST&E) Plan and
conduct a ST&E (see Chapter 6 of Ref. 4)
;
4. Document the ST&E results (see Appendix H of Ref. 4);
24

5. Develop a contingency plan (see Chapter 7 of Ref. 4) ;
6. Prepare the accreditation support documentation (see
Appendix H of Ref . 4)
?
7. Issue a Statement of Accreditation as described in
paragraph 3 . 3C of Ref. 4;
8. Forward information copies of the accreditation sup-
port documentation and Statement of Accreditation to
COMNAVDAC
;
9. Provide logistic and administrative support to the
ST&E test team as appropriate (if external from
activity)
10. Fund technical assistance if local assistance is re-
quested from COMNAVDAC. [Ref. 4: pp. 3-6-3-7]
The Commanding Officer, who is also the DAA for his ac-
tivity, has the responsibility to declare his activity as
either accredited or not accredited. He must declare one or
the other. Accreditation is defined as the DAA's formal
declaration that appropriate ADP security countermeasures
have been properly implemented for the ADP activity. ADP
activities not accredited may operate if the appropriate DAA
has issued an interim authority to operate . Interim authori-
ty to operate is granted for a fixed period of time, gener-
ally a year, and is usually contingent upon certain conditions
being met. Interim authority to operate is not a waiver of
the requirement for accreditation. [Ref. 4: p. 3-1]
D. RESPONSIBILITIES OF STAFF MEMBERS
The importance of the Commanding Officer as an integral
part in the development of a viable and successful ADP se-
curity plan cannot be overemphasized. A task that the
25

Commanding Officer should undertake as soon as possible is
the organizing of a good ADP security staff, defining their
responsibilities and establishing a Plan of Action and Mile-
stones (POAM) for the implementation of a successful security
plan. The positions that are recommended on an ADP security
staff are as follows:
• ADP Security Officer (ADPSO)
;
• ADP Systems Security Officer (ADPSSO)
;
• Network Security Officer (NSO)
;
• Terminal Area Security Officer (TASO)
• Office Information System Security Officer (OISSO) [Ref.
4: p. A-2]
.
The responsibilities of the ADPSO, ADPSSO, NSO and TASO
are clearly defined in Chapter 2 of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A. Like-
wise, the responsibilities of the OISSO are defined in Chap-
ter 4 of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A and Chapter III of this thesis.
It would normally be expected that there would be only one
ADPSO and ADPSSO at each command. As the PERSPAY project
becomes more fully developed and staffed, it may be necessary
to provide assistants to the ADPSO and ADPSSO as required.
The number of NSO ' s , TASO * s and OISSO ' s will be dictated by
the size of the operation, availability of personnel for
assignment and the importance that the command places on ADP
security. The command importance is reflected directly from
the Commanding Officer. It is suggested that as many people
as possible be aware of ADP security. This will facilitate
26

communication and training in ADP security areas while em-
phasizing the importance placed on ADP security by the Com-
manding Officer.
E. INITIAL STAFF MEETINGS
After the initial ADP security staff requirements have
been made, an initial meeting of all staff members should be
called. In this meeting, the Commanding Officer should com-
municate his opinions and priorities concerning ADP security
while tasking the group to develop a feasible ADP security
plan. The Commanding Officer should not be a normal partici-
pant at security staff meetings but should participate ran-
domly at selected meetings in order to re-emphasize his
opinions about ADP security and ensure the meetings are con-
ducted in an appropriate manner. Communication of the Com-
manding Officer's seriousness about ADP security and a
general awareness of basic steps that must be followed to
ensure ADP security should be the initial assignment of the
ADP security staff. The development of an ADP security plan
in writing is only as good as it is communicated to the per-
sonnel that must implement the plan.
The first assignment of ADP security staff members, in
addition to basic communication, should be for each of them
to fill out the Security Checklist Assessment that is con-
tained in Appendix A. This checklist is taken from OPNAVINST
5239. 1A and will serve as a reference point from which the
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second meeting can be developed. By filling out the check-
list, it will cause the members of the security staff to
become more familiar with ADP security at their own command.
During the second meeting, which should be held as soon as
practical, but allowing sufficient time for the Security
Checklist Assessment to be properly reviewed, the results of
the Security Checklist Assessment can be used for a basis to
develop a Plan of Action and Milestones for the development
of the ADP security plan. As the PERSPAY project is de-
veloped and the facility grows, a routine review of security
using the checklist in Appendix A would keep the organization
moving in the right direction. After the plan has been ap-
proved and the facility has received certification, the plan
must be constantly reviewed to ensure that it continues to
warrant accreditation. A review must be made at least every
five years to verify that accreditation is still merited
[Ref . 4: p. 5-1]
.
The results of the security checklist assessment in con-
junction with the initial risk assessmenr as prescribed by
OPNAVINST 5239. 1A will serve as the basis for a realistic
POAM in the development of the security plan. Before making
assignments and establishing milestones, a careful review of
the chapters discussing risk assessment, physical security,
administrative security, system security and disaster re-
covery/contingency plan development would be appropriate.
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The organization of a dedicated professional security
staff with a realistic POAM is a necessary requirement. NFC
Cleveland has the beginnings of a good security staff and
the NFC Bratenahl Annex Security Manual discusses physical
security and disaster recovery in some depth. With a little
effort and time, NFC Cleveland could have an effective se-
curity staff and a viable security plan. The development of
an efficient security plan that is constantly reviewed and
updated must be the goal of NFC Cleveland.
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III. TYPES OF SECURITY
A. OVERVIEW
Within the scope of this paper, two major topics per-
taining to security will be discussed as being essential for
an automatic data processing (ADP) security program at the
Navy Finance Center. The first topic is referred to as com-
puter security and includes the following major subtopics.
1
.
Physical Security of Plant and Equipment
Included under this subtopic are the physical mea-
sures
—
guards, fences, locks, etc.—which are used to control
entrance to the computer facility, and measures taken to pro-
tect the computer from damage— fire extinguishers, sprinkler
systems, etc.
2 Management Practices
This includes administrative, organizational, and
personnel procedures designed to promote security within the
activity. Examples are segregation of duties between systems





Hardware, software, communication, and data controls






This area is concerned with backup systems which will
allow a unit to accomplish its mission even though there is a
failure or disruption of the primary system. This is done
through the use of alternate facilities and methods which
help to minimize the effects of a disruption in the system.
These areas will be more fully discussed in Chapters
5 through 8 of this paper.
The other major topic is office information system
(OIS) security. Since OIS security has been included as a
requirement in accordance with Reference 4 and has been put
under the purview of the ADP Security Officer, it has been
included in Section B of this chapter.
B. SECURITY OF OFFICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS
As previously mentioned, Reference 4 directs that se-
curity procedures will be implemented for office information
systems. To clarify exactly what should be classified as an
OIS the following definition is provided.
Office Information System (OIS) . Any electronic system
which is designed specifically for the purpose of and is
being used primarily for office information applications.
Office information applications are those functions nor-
mally performed in an office environment dealing with docu-
ments— including reports, memoranda, notes, correspondence,
letters, messages, files, records, forms, working papers,
and other textual information. Office information applica-
tions include document preparation (word processing) , docu-
ment storage, document retrieval, document manipulation
(sorting, indexing, etc.), and distribution (electronic
mail) . Office information system equipment (OISE) excludes
typewriters, office copy machines, and other devices which
have no text editing capability as well as general purpose
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and specially designed ADPE which is designed primarily to
be applied through the internal execution of a series of
instructions—not limited to specific key-stroke functions,
but controlled by a general purpose data processing lan-
guage—to process a variety of applications such as finan-
cial management, logistics, scientific, communications, and
the like. (Department of the Navy Definition) [Ref. 4: p.
A-13]
Because of the similarities between ADP equipment and
OISE, CNO in Chapter 4 of Reference 4 sets out the following
policy guidelines for OIS security:
1. OIS will be considered a subset of ADP systems and
therefore the ADP Security Officer (ADPSO) will have cogni-
zance over the security of the office information systems;
2. The ADPSO will ensure that an Office Information
Security Officer (OISSO) is assigned to each OIS;
3. OIS security violations will be handled in the same
manner as for any ADP system with the OISSO reporting viola-
tions to the ADPSO;
4. The ADPSO will maintain an inventory of all OIS '
s
which will include, as a minimum, the following information:
a. Identification of OIS;
b. Location of OIS;
c. Name of OISSO;
d. Data sensitivity level authorized for system (see Chap-
ter II) ;
e. System type;
f. Type of media;
g. Security mode authorized for operation.
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5. The ADPSO will ensure that there is a written securi-
ty operating procedure for the OIS and that it is available
to systems users;
6. Because the Navy Finance Center handles only Level II
data (Privacy Act or For Official Use Only data) or Level III
data (all other unclassified data) , it has the option of
either securing its OISs as it does its ADP systems or it can
apply the minimum appropriate countermeasures to achieve the
security requirements outlined below [Ref. 4: p. 4-2]:
a. Steps will be taken to prevent loss of the OIS from
natural hazards, fire, theft, and/or malicious acts;
b. Whenever possible, the manufacturer's specifications
for temperature and humidity will be followed;
c. A contingency plan for each OIS will be prepared or,
when applicable, a group of OISs can be covered by a
single plan;
d. If Level II data is processed in an OIS the following
additional requirements must be met:
1. Countermeasures, including hardware, software, and/
or administrative procedures, will be used to pre-
vent unauthorized disclosure, modification or de-
struction of data;
2. Audit trails which will include identification of
the user, date and time accessed, and file(s) ac-
cessed or created will be included;
e. If Level I data is ever entered into an OIS the securi-






ADP risk assessment is a method for quantifying the im-
pact of potential threats on organizations supported by auto-
matic data processing [Ref. 5: p. 5]. Basically, it is a
method where risks are identified and quantified as to possi-
ble dollar impact over a special period. This allows the
activity to determine if it will be cost effective to imple-
ment countermeasures to reduce the risk. In this respect, it
is much like an auditor dollarizing potential loss areas so
that he can focus on the areas that appear to have the great-
est amount of possible benefit. Risk assessment is the mid-
dle phase in the Risk Management Program consisting of
(1) Development of an automatic data processing activity
plan, (2) risk assessment, and (3) countermeasure imple-
mentation and effectiveness review. The activity ADP securi-
ty plan was discussed in Chapter II. This chapter will
discuss the final two steps of the Risk Management Program.
Basically these steps consist of determining what the risks
are, the countermeasures available to limit the risks, and
the cost effectiveness of implementing these countermeasures.
As is pointed out in this chapter, a number of personnel
will be needed on the risk assessment team with the result
that the cost of risk assessment may be quite high, and
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therefore the activity should budget sufficient dollars for
manpower and material for the ADP staff. An additional con-
sideration during risk assessment is that if security mea-
sures are too restrictive processing costs may rise and the
system may prove cumbersome to the user.
B. BENEFITS
There are three major benefits that an agency receives
from performing risk assessment [Ref. 6: p. 9]:
• It provides a basis for deciding whether additional
security safeguards are needed;
• It ensures that additional security safeguards will help
to counter all the serious security risks;
• It saves money that might have been wasted on safeguards
which do not significantly lower the overall risks and
exposures.
C. ROLE OF MANAGEMENT
In accordance with Reference 4, a risk analysis must be
conducted at each ADP activity. The success of the risk
analysis could very well be dependent on top management sup-
port. The four following items are needed to ensure the suc-
cess of the risk analysis [Ref. 5: pp. 5-6]:
• Management support of the project expressed to all
levels of the organization;
• Management explanation of the purpose and scope of risk
analysis to the team and other applicable members of the
organization;
• Management selection of qualified team and formal dele-
gation of authority and responsibility
r
• Management review of the team's findings.
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As an expression of management interest and to document
objectives, responsibilities, and a plan of action and mile-
stones (POAM) for conducting the risk assessment, and to en-
sure departmental support, Reference 4 recommends that a
Risk Assessment Team Charter be issued as an activity notice.
A sample Risk Assessment Team Charter is included in Appendix
B.
D. COMPOSITION OF TEAM
The third element above, a selection of a qualified team,
calls for more elaboration. Just as in an organization where
the quality of the people can mean the difference between
success or failure of a unit, the same is true of the success
or failure of the risk assessment program. The team at a
minimum should consist of at least one experienced repre-
sentative from each of the following functions [Ref. 6: p.
9]:
• The operating unit supported by or having jurisdiction
over the data under consideration
;
• The programmers responsible for support of the operation
or function under consideration;
• The unit responsible for managing ADP operations;
• The system programmers— if the agency has this as a
separate function;
• The person assigned the responsibility for overseeing
or auditing systems security;
• Those responsible for physical security.
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Members do not have to be limited to just these functions.
The team may well include participants from the legal and
personnel departments or at least consultations with these
people about different aspects of security and risk be held.
The team leader should be knowledgeable in security and
should understand the relationship of systems in the overall
organization. Additionally, he should not be the sole repre-
sentative from his function. He should not have to fill both
the role of team leader and function representative as this
may bias him on certain issues and interfere with the objec-
tivity he needs to oversee the complete risk assessment pro-
gram. FIPS Pub 6 5 recommends that the team leader be
selected from either ADP operations, systems programming
(analysis) or internal auditing [Ref. 5: p. 6]. Passages
from Sawyer indicate that the internal auditor has to be very
careful and can not appear to be "authorizing" a system or
dictating controls [Ref. 7: pp. 353-393]. Therefore, it is
recommended that the internal auditor not be the team leader,
nor a "voting member" of the risk assessment team, as it may
well affect his impartiality when it comes time to evaluate
the system. However, his insights and expertise are needed
in the risk assessment and therefore he should be included
for all sessions as a non-voting member. His role should be




In the literature of risk assessment a number of words
arise frequently that will be defined here for clarification
purposes. These words are threat, vulnerability, and
countermeasure
.
Threat. Any circumstance or event with the potential
to cause harm to the ADP system or activity in the form of
destruction, disclosure, and modification of data, or de-
nial of service. A threat is a potential for harm. The
presence of a threat does not mean that it will necessarily
cause actual harm. Threats exist because of the very
existence of the system or activity and not because of any
specific weakness. For example, the threat of fire exists
at all facilities, regardless of the amount of fire pro-
tection available. (DON Definition) [Ref. 4: p. A-17]
Vulnerability. A weakness in the physical layout, or-
ganization, procedures, personnel, management, administra-
tion, hardware, or software that may be exploited to cause
harm to the ADP system or activity. The presence of a
vulnerability does not in itself cause harm; a vulnera-
bility is merely a condition or set of conditions that may
allow the ADP system or activity to be harmed by an attack
(DON Definition) [Ref. 4: p. A-17]
Countermeasure (Also called Safeguard). Any action,
device, procedure, technique, or other measure that re-
duces the vulnerability of an ADP system or activity to the
realization of a threat. (DON Definition) [Ref. 4: p.
A-6]
Particular note should be taken of the four types of pos-
sible harm mentioned under threat—destruction, disclosure,
and modification of data, or denial of service. These four
types of harm are commonly referred to as impact areas and
are a key to the way the Navy performs risk assessment.

F. RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
As discussed earlier, risk assessment is a crucial step
in the evaluation of an ADP security system. While OPNAVINST
5239. 1A lists the three phases of the program as (1) de-
velopment of an activity ADP security plan, (2) risk assess-
ment, and (3) countermeasure implementation and effectiveness
review, it goes on further to list the six actions necessary
to satisfy the DON requirements as:
Step 1. Development of an Activity ADP Security Program
(AADPSP) which includes a risk assessment plan of action
and milestones (POAM)
;
Step 2. System User and Software Development Participa-
tion. This can be accomplished by proper selection of the
risk assessment team.
Step 3. Conducting the Risk Assessment. Selection of the
proper risk assessment methodology and implementing it;
Step 4. Countermeasure Selection. Using cost-benefit
analysis, select and implement countermeasures until fur-
ther implementation would produce a negative return.
Evaluate the effectiveness of the countermeasures after
implementation
;
Step 5. Risk Assessment Documentation. Ensure there is
complete documentation for the first four steps;
Step 6. Proceed with accreditation process. [Ref. 4:
pp. 5-1 - 5-5]
Steps 3 through 5, which occasionally are collectively
called risk assessment in some Navy publications, will be
discussed in the following sections of this chapter. Steps
1 and 6 have already been discussed in Chapter I. Step 2
was discussed in Section D of this chapter.
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G. PRELIMINARY SECURITY EXAMINATION
Before the actual risk assessment methodology is under-
taken, a preliminary survey examination should be conducted.
The results of this survey will help determine the scope of
the risk assessment effort. Using this information, the
designated approving authority (DAA) will then determine
which of the two basic risk assessment methodologies will be
employed [Ref. 4: p. E-l] . Included in Appendix B is a
sample format for an ADP security survey.
During the preliminary survey, the following four steps
should be taken [Ref. 5: pp. 7-8].
1
.
Listing of Asset Costs
A determination should be made of the replacement
cost of computers, related equipment, buildings, data, etc.
In instances where the risk analysis is being done in the
systems design phase, both the increased value of data in the
complete system and the probable increase in the cost of ac-
quiring it should be considered. Included in Appendix B is
a partial list of assets that should be considered under the
seven categories that must be considered in ADP security.
2 Listing of Threats
A list should be compiled of threats to the ADP fa-
cility and its resources. This list should include any
threat that has a realistic probability of occurring. For
example, a hurricane would not be a threat to an activity in
the midwest because there is almost no chance (nor past
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experience) of one coming that far inland. However, a
tornado would be a realistic threat in the midwest. If the
risk analysis is being done in the system design phase, an
effort should be made not only to identify existing threats
but also to predict any future ones which might result from
the implementation or operation of the system. The following
areas should be surveyed for threats [Ref. 5: pp. 7-8]:
• Personnel—hiring and termination procedures, scope and
amount of training, quality of supervision at all
levels;
• Physical Environment—neighborhood, quality and relia-
bility of utilities, building design, operation and
maintenance, physical access controls;
• Hardware /Software Systems—operational availability,
change controls, software features, documentation;
• Data Communications—hardware and transmission circuits,
procedures to validate and control distribution of
messages;
• ADP Applications—technical design, documentation,
standards;
• Operations— standards and procedures for source document
protection, information dissemination, I/O control, tape
library, forms, computer room processing, user inter-
face, housekeeping and maintenance, production control,
contingency planning.
3 . Listing of Existing Security Measures
A listing of all security measures currently in ef-
fect should be made. Next to the security measure should be




4 . Management Review
Upon completion of the above three steps, the re-
sults should be immediately presented to management. Using
this information, management can install temporary safe-
guards, if needed, until permanent countermeasures can be
effected. Additionally, by using the information in the pre-
liminary security survey, management can direct either of the
two methods to be used. Method I is the standard method for
use in most Navy ADP environments. Method II is for use in





This method is more detailed than Method II, provides
greater detail, and provides for the interaction of threats
and the evaluation of threats by impact areas. The major
steps to Method I are:
1. Asset Identification and Valuation,
2. Threat and Vulnerability Evaluation,
3. Computation of the Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE),
4. Evaluation and Selection of Additional Countermeasures,
and





a. Asset Identification and Valuation
For each asset, fill out a copy of the Asset
Valuation Worksheet (Appendix B) . When trying to determine
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how to differentiate between assets it is helpful to break








Guidance concerned with breaking assets down into
component parts is given in the following passage. "For each
asset defined, all components should be in the same physical
area, protected in the same manner and subject to damage by
the same threat. If one component of the asset is damaged
either all other components should be highly likely to be
damaged in a similar manner, or the entire asset should be
rendered unusable" [Ref. 4: p. E-4]. The four impacts a
threat can have are discussed below.
(1) Modification . This is an unauthorized
change. When determining a value for the modification of
software or data, the value should be based on the cost to
correct the consequences of the modification. Or the value
could be based on the cost of locating or recovering from
the modification. The value of hardware, administrative,
physical or communication assets should be the total cost to
detect, locate, and correct the modifications.
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(2) Destruction . This involves the loss of the
asset. Two costs should be totaled to obtain this value.
They are the cost to reconstruct or replace the asset and
the costs incurred by the denial of service due to the de-
struction of the asset. Included in the costs to reconstruct
should be appropriate labor charges.
(3) Disclosure . This pertains to the unauthor-
ized release of information to people without the need to
know. Classified and Privacy Act data have been assigned a
recommended impact value for the effects of disclosure.
TABLE I
GUIDELINES FOR IMPACT OF DISCLOSURE OF SENSITIVE DATA*





*These values are provided for determining the impact of
disclosure of sensitive data. For example, the impact of
disclosure of a SECRET data file is assigned a value of
$100,000, which corresponds to an impact value rating of 5.
These values are only guidelines. The impact of disclosure
of classified data, Privacy Act data, and all other data is
up to the judgement of the functional user. [Ref. 4: p.
E-44]
(4) Denial of Service . This is where users are
denied service although there has been no destruction of any
assets. An example would be a power outage. In cases of
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denial of service, asset impact values should be based on
additional costs incurred and penalties assessed due to de-
lays in job completion.
After determining the estimated dollar loss
for each of the four impact areas, determine the impact
value ratings from the table in section H.2.c of this
chapter and enter them in the appropriate boxes at the bottom
of the asset valuation worksheet.
b. Threat and Vulnerability Evaluation
In this step the asset valuation worksheets pre-
pared in the previous step are examined and a determination
is made as to which threat (s) could cause the impacts indi-
cated. Upon identification of a threat, a threat and vul-
nerability evaluation worksheet (Appendix B) is completed in
the following manner:
• The threat is listed by name;
• The threat is described in general terms;
• Examples of how the threat can exploit current vulnera-
bilities in the ADP environment are cited. Additionally,
existing countermeasures to the threat are listed;
• Using the threats and their impact table from Appendix
B as a general guideline, an evaluation is made of which
of the four impact areas could be affected by the
threat;
• After estimating the frequency of a successful attack
for each impact area, use the following figure to de-
termine the ratings to enter in the applicable boxes at
the bottom of the threat and vulnerability evaluation
worksheet. On the same form, describe the circumstances
and vulnerabilities of the ADP activity which permit the
threat to exist and document how the frequency of suc-
cessful attack was estimated.
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c. Computation of Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE)
The annual loss expectancy (or exposure) is sim-
ply a valuation of the average yearly dollar loss to the ac-
tivity caused by attacks against its assets. To calculate
the ALE, simply take the product of the dollar value loss of
a successful attack by a threat and the frequency of occur-
rence of the threat. The following formula can be used to
compute the annual loss expectancy.
10 (f + i + 3)
ALE = —
3
where f = frequency of a successful attack by a threat
i = estimated cost impact of a successful attack
[Ref. 5: p. 10]
f and i are determined from the following table.
TABLE II
TABLES FOR SELECTING OF VALUES OF i AND f [Ref. 5: p. 10
If the estimated cost impact of the event is
$10, let i = 1
$100, let i = 2
$1,000, let i = 3
$10,000, let i = 4
$100,000, let i = 5
$1,000,000, let i = 6
$10,000,000, let i = 7
$100,000,000, let i = 8
If the estimated frequency of occurrence is
Once in 300 years, let f = 1
Once in 30 years, let f = 2
Once in 3 years, let f = 3
Once in 100 days, let f = 4
Once in 10 days, let f = 5
Once per day, let f = 6
10 times per day, let f = 7
100 times per day, let f = 8
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To simplify calculations, these arguments can
be used to enter the following matrix and determine the an-
nual loss expectancy.
FIGURE III
COMBINED MATRIX OF i , f AND ALE
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$300 $3,000 $30k$300k $3M
$300 $3,000 $30k $300k $3M $30M
$300 $3,000 $30k $300K $3M $30M
$300 $3,000 $30k $300k $3M $30M$300M
$3,000 $30k $300k $3M $30M $300M
$30k $300k $3M $30M $300M
$300k $3M $30M $300M
[Ref 11]
As can be seen, calculation of the ALE is relatively simple.
Problems arise, however, because one threat may have differ-
ent impacts on a number of assets. To help simplify the data
and arrange it for easier analysis, ALE computation work-
sheets are used. For each of the four impact areas, a
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separate ALE computation worksheet is made out by completing
the following steps:
• Identify the impact areas for which the ALE is being
computed by marking the appropriate box;
• List the assets and asset impact value ratings (taken
from the asset valuation form) across the top of the
ALE computation worksheet;
• List threats and successful attack frequency (taken from
the threat and vulnerability worksheets) down the left
side of the ALE computation worksheet;
• Use the above annual loss expectancy matrix to obtain
an ALE for each asset/threat intersection. Enter this
ALE;
• Sum the asset columns down and the threat rows across.
Ensure total threat and asset values are equal and enter
that total in box 8
.
Upon completion of the ALE computation worksheet
for each of the four impact areas, add their totals to derive
the activities' total ALE.
d. Evaluation of Additional Countermeasures
In the evaluation of countermeasures a cost bene-
fit model is used. The cost of installation and implementa-
tion of the countermeasures must be less than the decrease in
the ALE due to the reduced vulnerabilities. The following
steps should be performed to accomplish this evaluation.
Take the completed computation worksheet and lo-
cate those threats with the highest values for individual
threat ALE— the largest values in the far right column.
Starting with the threats with the highest ALE,
identify countermeasures which might be able to substantially
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reduce the vulnerabilities which these threats seek to ex-
ploit. (Note: Appendix F of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A provides a
partial list of countermeasures listed by category.)
For each countermeasure offering a substantial
reduction in vulnerability, prepare an additional counter-
measures evaluation worksheet (Appendix B) by doing the fol-
lowing steps:
1. Enter countermeasure name in section 2 and description
of countermeasure in section 3;
2. Estimate the annual cost of implementing the counter-
measure. In instances where there is a one-time cost
only, divide that cost by the anticipated life (in
years) of the countermeasure. Enter in Section 2;
3. Identify the vulnerabilities that the countermeasure
would reduce if implemented. Determine which threats
would be reduced because of the lower vulnerability.
Enter these in column form in section 4;
4. Take the current ALE for each threat off of the ALE
computation worksheet and enter in section 5a next to
the appropriate threat. This value should be the sum
of the ALEs for all four impact areas of the threat
being examined;
5. Using new ALE computation worksheets determine and
enter new successful attack frequency ratings for the
threats for each impact area and calculate new ALEs.
Sum these for all four impact areas and enter in sec-
tion 5b.
6. Subtract the projected ALE from the current ALE and
enter in section 6;
7. Sum all of the AOE savings in section 6 and enter the
total in section 8
;
8. Divide the total in section 8 by the sum of all the
figures in section 5b. This is the expected return
on investment (ROD and should be entered in section 7;
9. In section 9 list any proposed countermeasures that may
overlap the particular countermeasure under evaluation.
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e. Selection of Additional Countermeasures
Now that the additional countermeasures have been
evaluated individually, it is necessary to determine what
effects the implementation of one countermeasure will have
on the effects of the other countermeasures. As a starting
point, the countermeasure with the highest ROI is assumed to
be implemented and then the effects on the ROIs of the other
countermeasures are calculated. To compute these effects,
the following steps should be followed.
(1) Sort the additional countermeasure evalua-
tion worksheets, completed in the previous section, by de-
scending order of ROI. List on the additional countermeasure
summary listing (Appendix B) the original ROI, annual cost,
original ALE savings, and countermeasures in sections la, 2,
3a, and 4, respectively. In section 5 make a notation if any
of the countermeasures are required by higher authority.
(2) Assume the first countermeasure is in effect
and reevaluate the effects of the next countermeasure based
on this assumption. Adjust the ALE Savings and ROI as neces-
sary. These figures should be entered in sections 3b and lb.
If the adjusted ROI of the second countermeasure is still
greater than the ROI of the third countermeasure, assume that
both the first and second countermeasures are in effect and
reevaluate the effects and ROI of the third countermeasure.
If the adjusted ROI of the second countermeasure is not
higher than the ROI of the third countermeasure, evaluate the
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effects of the first countermeasure * s implementation of the
effectiveness and ROI of the third countermeasure. Compare
the adjusted ROIs of the second and third countermeasures
with the ROI of the fourth countermeasure. Continue in this
manner until one adjusted ROI is greater than all of the
other adjusted and unadjusted ROIs. Assume this counter-
measure is in effect and proceed to reevaluate all other
countermeasures based on this assumption. Continue in this
manner, always selecting the highest adjusted ROI for imple-
mentation, until the ROI or adjusted ROI (whichever is lower)
is less than 1 for all remaining countermeasures. At this
point a negative return is being obtained for each additional
countermeasure. Since the countermeasures are now costing
more to install and implement than they are accomplishing in
risk reduction, it is not advisable to install any of them.
The one exception to this would be those countermeasures that
are required by higher authority. All countermeasures that
fit into this category should be assigned the highest possi-
ble priority regardless of ROI.
(3) A plan of action and milestones for imple-
menting the selected countermeasures should be developed.
Using available funds, all countermeasures that have been
made mandatory by higher headquarters or that have an ad-
justed ROI greater than 1 should be implemented. For all
unfunded countermeasures with an ROI greater than 1 , addition-
al funds should be sought through normal budget channels.
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(4) After reviewing the documentation generated
during the risk assessment overview, the Designated Approv-
ing Authority (DAA) will either grant accreditation, issue
an interim authority to operate, or order operations to
cease. [Ref. 4: p. 3-1]
I. METHOD II
This method incorporates the same essential steps as
Method I, but it does not go into as great a detail nor does
it provide for interaction in the impact areas. Therefore,
its use is limited to less complex ADP environments. The
following procedures should be followed when using Method II.
1
.
Asset Identification and Valuation
Assets are identified and evaluated in the same man-
ner as in Method I, but the information is entered on a risk
assessment matrix (Appendix B) instead of an asset evaluation
worksheet
.
2 Threat and Vulnerability Evaluation and ALE
Computation
To complete this step:
• List the threat by name on the left side of the risk
assessment matrix;
• Assign a threat value of low, medium, or high by the
guidelines set forth in Table IV. Enter this value in
the space marked 'TV;
• To compute the ALE, multiply the asset value by the mul-
tiplier corresponding to the threat value (determined in
previous step) . Enter this value in the risk assessment
matrix;
• Sum the rows across and the columns down and record this







Moderate (M) .0 33
High (H) .33
Definitions:
LOW--The risk of a given threat to a specific asset is as-
sessed as having little or no significant impact on that as-
set as a result of destruction, modification, or disclosure
of data, or denial of service. This assessment is made when
the threat is considered to be : (1) very unlikely to occur;
(2) not applicable; (3) to have low impact on that asset if
it does occur; or (4) the threat is controlled by existing
countermeasures
.
MODERATE—The risk of a given threat to a specific asset is
assessed as having a moderate impact on that asset as a re-
sult of destruction, modification, or disclosure of data, or
denial of service.
HIGH--The risk of a given threat to a specific asset is as-
sessed as having a very significant impact on that asset as
a result of destruction, modification, or disclosure of data,
or denial of service. This assessment is made when the
threat is considered to have a reasonable likelihood of oc-
currence and, if it occurs, the impact to that asset would
be significant. [Ref. 4: p. E-4]
3 . Selection of Additional Countermeasures
Method II also uses a cost benefit model for deter-
mining which countermeasures should be installed. The one
fallacy of this model is that all vulnerabilities are treated
as if they are mutually exclusive. It does not account for
the fact that one countermeasure may help to reduce a vul-
nerability and therefore lower the ROI for another
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countermeasure . To determine the countermeasures to employ,
complete the following steps.
Identify the threats that have the most potential
for damage based upon their ALEs and then determine counter-
measures which have the most promise of substantially re-
ducing the vulnerabilities which these threats seek to
exploit. Enter these countermeasures in column A of the
additional countermeasure selection worksheet in Appendix B.
List the threats acted on by the countermeasure in
column B with the original ALE for each threat in column C.
Assign a new threat value with the assumption that
the countermeasure has. been installed. Use this to compute
a new ALE which is then entered in column D.
Subtract the revised ALE from the original ALE and
enter in column E. This is the annual savings.
Estimate the annual cost for installing and maintain-
ing the countermeasure. Any one-time cost should be amor-
tized over the useful life of the countermeasure. Enter this
cost in column F.
Divide column E by column F to obtain the ROI which
is entered in column G.
Assign countermeasure priorities based on mandatory
requirements by higher authority and by descending order of
ROI.
Implement all countermeasures with an ROI greater
than 1 or those made mandatory by higher authority. If
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sufficient funds are not available, request more in the bud-
get cycle.
The Designated Approving Authority (DAA) , using the
documentation generated, will grant accreditation, issue
interim authority to operate, or order operations to cease.
J. RISK ASSESSMENT DOCUMENTATION
Copies of the risk assessment documentation will be main-
tained to support the budget requests, help document the
activity ADP security plan, and provide references for future
risk assessment documentation. It is important to note that
all reports, worksheets, and other documentation pertaining
to risk analysis are highly sensitive and should be marked
and stored as such. [Ref. 5: p. 15]
Frequency of risk assessment documentation will be kept
updated and repeated:
a. At least every five years.
b. When any change is made to the facility, ADP equipment,
system software, or application software which affects
the overall ADP security posture.
c. When any change is made in operational configuration,
data sensitivity, or classification level.
d. When any change is made which appears to invalidate the
original conditions of accreditation. [Ref. 4: p.
E-17]
K. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
1 . Accuracy of Calculations
Because there are so many variables in determining
the frequency and impact of threats, calculations are
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usually rounded off to the nearest factor of 10. When try-
ing to dollarize the impact or calculate the frequency of
occurrence, it is up to the team to use a combination of his-
torical data, their knowledge of the system and their own
expertise and judgment. A lot of time should not be wasted
trying to make calculations down to the nearest dollar. As
is pointed out in FIPS Pub 65, "There will be no significant
difference in the overall exposure whether the damage from a
certain event is estimated at $110,000 or $145,000" [Ref. 5:
p. 9] .
2 . Human Frailty
When determining countermeasures , do not count per-
sonal integrity as a factor contributing to security. Indi-
viduals are under different pressures, both financial and
emotional, at different times and therefore their resistance
to temptation may be weakened [Ref. 5: p. 14]. Donn B.
Parker points out several generalized conclusions about com-
puter crime:
• Employers are more likely to be defrauded by their own
employees than by outsiders;
• Generally, employees who defraud their employer do so by
using resources to which they have access in their jobs;
• The best way to curtail white collar crime is to remove
opportunity and incentives;
• The second best deterrent is the fear of getting caught.
[Ref. 8: p. 7]
56

3 . Additional Information
More detailed information concerning risk, analysis
can be obtained from FIPS Pub 41, which deals with computer
security guidelines for implementing the Privacy Act, and
from FIPS Pub 65, which is a guideline for ADP risk analysis
in the federal government. It should be noted that OPNAVINST
5239. 1A is based on the latter reference. Additionally, FIPS




Physical security is an important part of any ADP se-
curity plan. Additionally, it has been made a mandatory part
of all ADP security plans, as indicated by the following
quote: "The ADP activity or network will be externally pro-
tected against unauthorized access to entry points, access
to data, or damage to the activity" [Ref. 4: p. 1-2]. Phy-
sical security is defined as follows:
Physical Security is the protection of a material entity
(property) from disruption of its safe and secure state
and is concerned with physical measures designed to safe-
guard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equip-
ment, facilities, material, and documents, and to safeguard
them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.
a. The use of locks, badges, and similar measures to
control access to the central computer facility.
b. The measures required for the protection of the
structures housing the central computer facility from
damage by accident, fire, environmental hazards, loss
of utilities, and unauthorized access. (DON) [Ref.
4: p. A-14]
During the assessment of the need for physical security
controls, the risk assessment principles of Chapter IV should
be used. When determining whether to implement physical se-
curity controls, except those controls required by higher
authority, calculations should be performed to determine if
the annual cost of the proposed control is less expensive
than the reduction in the annual loss expectancy achieved.
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There would be no reason to implement a non-mandatory con-
trol that cost more than it could save.
A. THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES
As indicated in the preceding definition, physical se-
curity measures are installed to lessen the risk of damage
from unauthorized access, accidents, fire and environmental
hazards, and loss of utilities. Some of the actual physical
threats and hazards pertaining to each of these classifica-
tions are indicated below.
Deliberate Intrusions
• Theft of physical assets















Natural or Man-made Hazards
• Fire • Explosion
• Windstorm • Flood
• Hurricane • Water damage
• Tornado • Snow and ice
• Lightning • Rain and mud
• Earthquake
Utility Outages or Breakdowns
• Power • Water
• Communications • Steam
• Air conditioning • Sewer [Ref. 9: p. 29]
Browne also stated that an agency's susceptibility to
physical threats may actually be increased if any of the fol-
lowing conditions are present.
• Intense external competition, with high risk of indus-
trial or national espionage and theft of data.
• Intense internal competition, with resultant high turn-
over in jobs and even reduction in employment force.
• Low employee morale, with tendency toward disgruntlement
• Centralization of the DP workload in one data center,
with increased exposure to a single disaster.
• Access to the central computer from physically insecure
remote locations. In the case of dial-up accessibility,
either the capability must be severely restricted by
hardware /software controls, or the remote sites must be
made physically secure. Direct access by personnel of
other departments whose functions involve the use of the
computer means that security controls for those depart-
ments must be in force.
• Widespread negative visibility of the organization.
Certain companies have been targets of antiwar demon-
strations or environmentalist protests. Even government
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units are susceptible to protests involving privacy,
social responsibility, or welfare. Being a sociological
phenomenon, this threat is quite variable over time.
• Location of the data processing operation in a high risk
enviornment. [Ref. 9: p. 30]
The control measures used to implement physical security
can be divided into four major areas. These areas are de-
scribed in the following four sections by the threats that




Access controls are defined as "procedures to limit
access to sensitive areas" [Ref. 10: p. 83]. When deter-
mining which physical access controls to employ, the optimum
strategy is to control access at each point from the outer
perimeter all the way down to subdividions of the ADP opera-
tion. To implement this strategy it is convenient to con-
sider the following four points at which access can be
limited [Ref. 9: pp. 30-31].
a. External Perimeter
The first line of defense for a computer facility
is usually the fence that separates the ground on which the
computer facility is sited from the outside world. In in-
stances where a computer operation shares a building with
other activities, a fence at the external perimeter may not
be possible nor desirable. The external perimeter helps
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deter trespassing and funnels employees, visitors, and the
public to selected building entrances [Ref. 10: p. 48].
b. Building Access
The external perimeter funnels all persons to
the building entrances, where another screening process
should occur. Again, as in the case of the external perime-
ter, many times when a computer facility is colocated with
other activities, screening at this point is limited.
c. Area Access
After an individual is in the building he can
still be prevented access to the areas surrounding the data
processing function by measures such as badges, locked
stairwell doors, elevator restrictions, CCTV, alarmed doors,
signs, and guards.
d. Computer Room Access
If an unauthorized individual makes it through
the first three barriers, he still has to negotiate access
to the computer itself. Devices similar to those used to
control area access can be implemented. Additionally, door
locks might also be used to limit access. Even within the
computer room, access to different functions should be
limited—this would especially include access to the tape
library. As a minimum, the following areas should be ana-
lyzed to determine individuals that should be allowed access
• Computer room;
• Data storage library;
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• Input /output area;
• Data conversion area;
• Programmer areas/ file;
• Document library;
• Communications equipment area;
• Computer maintenance room;
• Mechanical equipment room;
• Telephone closet;
• Supplies storage. [Ref. 10: p. 50]
2 . Procedures for Determining Necessary Access Controls
When trying to determine which access controls best
permit access to the facility by authorized personnel while
denying access to others, it is helpful to think about the
problem in the following three dimensions:
People—Specific controls are required for different
classes of individuals, such as management personnel, pro-
grammers, operators, service engineers, janitors, and
others.
Areas—Access points all the way from the outside perime-
ter of the building into the computer room must be identi-
fied and controlled; remote terminal areas also must be
controlled.
Time—The above two aspects must be considered in terms of
the time of day, e.g., business hour versus non-business
hour controls. [Ref. 9: p. 31]
An additional consideration is that the protective
measures should be strong enough to achieve stated goals but
not so restrictive that they are overly expensive or cumber-
some. Any measure so restrictive as to cause a large im-
pediment to work flow may be thwarted by the operating
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personnel. For example, a security door which requires com-
plicated opening procedures may soon be left slightly ajar
by operating personnel. As previously mentioned, to deter-
mine the protection measures needed, the risk assessment
methodology outlined in Chapter IV should be employed. The
first step in doing this is basically the preliminary se-
curity examination. Asset costs should first be listed.
Then, all threats that can be lessened by physical access
controls should be listed. These threats might include
common criminals, political activists, vandals, disgruntled
employees, etc. After the threats are listed, all areas
within the facility should be defined and tabulated. The
tabulation would include a statement of the location, func-
tion, access requirements (which people at what times), and
criticality (contents or activities which may be targets for
wrongdoers) for each area. Upon completion of this step, an
assessment of the current security measures should be made by
completing the following survey.
Instructions for the Facility Physical Security Survey
A. Obtain a current floor plan which depicts all areas
within the facility to include all access points and
any adjacent areas belonging to the facility, such as
parking lots and storage areas.
B. Begin the survey at the perimeter of the facility and
note the following:
1. Property line to include fencing, if any, and type.
Condition, number of openings as to type and use,




2. Outside parking facilities. Is this area enclosed
and are there any controls? Is the parking lot
controlled by manned posts or are devices used?
3. Perimeter of facility. Note all vehicular and
pedestrian entrances and what controls are used,
if any. Check all doors—number, how secured, any
controls or devices, such as alarms or key card
devices. Check for all ground floor or basement
windows—how secured; screening, bars, etc., and
vulnerability. Check for other entrances such as
vents, manholes, etc. Are they secured and how?
Check for fire escapes—number and location and
accessibility to interior of facility from fire
escape (windows, doors, roof). How are access-
ways secured?
4. Internal security. Begin at the top floor or in
the basement. Check for fire alarm systems and
devices noting the type, location, and number.
Where does the alarm annunciate? Check telephone
and electrical closets to see if they are locked.
Are mechanical and electrical rooms locked or se-
cured? Note any existing alarms as to type and
number. Where do the alarms annunciate? Deter-
mine number and location of manned posts, hours,
and shifts.
5. Monitoring facility. Location, who monitors, who
responds, type, and number of alarms being
monitored.
C. The following questions should also be included in a
physical security survey:
1. Is the installation/building protected by alarm
system (s)
?
2. How many zones of protection are within the pro-
tected building?
3. Is the alarm system adequate and does it provide
the level of protection required?
4. Are there any vulnerable areas, perimeter, or
openings not covered by an alarm system?




6. Is the alarm system inspected and tested occa-
sionally to insure operation?
7. Is the system backed up by properly trained, alert
protection officers who know what steps to take in
case of an alarm?
8. Is the alarm system regularly inspected for physi-
cal and mechanical deterioration?
9. Does the system have tamper-proof switches to pro-
tect its integrity?
10. Do system (s) have environmental or protective
housing or covers?
11. Is there an alternate or separate source of power
available for use on the system in the event of
external power failure?
12. Where is the annunciating unit located— local,
central station, etc.?
13. Who maintains the equipment and how is it main-
tained (contract, lease equipment, force account
personnel)
?
14. Is the present equipment outdated?
15. Are records kept of all alarm signals received to
include time, date, location, action taken, and
cause of alarm?
16. Are alarms generated occasionally to determine the
sensitivity and the capabilities of systems?
[Ref. 10: pp. 46-47]
After completion of the above steps, risk assessment
methodology I should be employed to aid in choosing appro-
priate countermeasures . The following four subsections con-
tain a discussion of countermeasures currently available for
each access point.
3 . External Perimeter
There are four main methods for limiting access at
the boundary of the ADP site. Each of these has certain
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advantages and disadvantages. It may well be that a combina-
tion of methods will be needed to provide proper security.
[Ref. 10: pp. 47-48]
a. Fences or Other Barriers
These measures will provide crowd control, deter
casual trespassers and help in controlling access to en-
trances. Disadvantages include cost, unsightliness , in-
ability to use in certain areas (such as around the Federal
building) and the fact that a determined individual can pene-
trate it. Additionally, a response force is needed to handle
any individuals penetrating the barrier.
b. Intrusion Detectors
Intrusion detectors are usually infrared or
microwave beam devices which, when interrupted by an in-
truder, will result in an alarm sounding. They are cheaper
than fences, but are not effective in crowd control, can be
circumvented by a determined intruder, and are subject to
nuisance alarms caused by unintentional trespassers or false
alarms. Additionally, an immediate response force is re-
quired upon the sounding of an alarm.
c. Patrol Forces
Patrol forces are most often used when a number
of Federal buildings are colocated in the same area but
fencing or other barriers are impractical. Patrol forces
can provide immediate response, aid in crowd control, and
their presence is usually a deterrent to intruders. However,
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their cost is prohibitive and intruders can slip in while the
force is making its rounds.
d. Closed-Circuit Television System (CCTV)
CCTV allows an individual stationed in a command
post to monitor a large area and is usually less expensive
than a roving patrol. Additionally, it can aid in crowd con-
trol by allowing the individual in the command post to moni-
tor the crowd and send the reaction force to the point
needed. Some of its disadvantages are that it is suscepti-
ble to electrical failure unless a back-up generator is
provided, an inattentive monitor can allow access to go un-
noticed, and it requires a response force.
4 . Building Access
One of the purposes of the external perimeter is the
funneling of persons desiring access to entrance doors where
the screening process can occur again. However, an indi-
vidual desiring unauthorized access is more likely to try an
unguarded door, window or other opening instead of going
through a door where further screening is required. There-
fore, in this section both entrance door controls and perime-
ter intrusion controls will be discussed.
a. Entrance Door Controls
At an entrance door, personnel can be screened
either by a guard or by the possession of a suitable device
to unlock the door. The guard, when following strict en-
trance procedures, constitutes a more effective screening
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procedure. A guard does not have to be a uniformed person.
It may be a receptionist, clerk, or anyone else who requires
an individual to provide identification before permitting
entrance. One disadvantage of guards is that often they can
be talked into allowing an individual without proper identi-
fication entrance if that person can provide a plausible
reason. However, guards are especially useful in preventing
tailgating. Tailgating occurs when an intruder enters im-
mediately after an authorized entrant. There are three basic
methods that can be used for establishing identity for the
purpose of admittance [Ref. 11: pp 8=12].
(1) Something Known to an Individual . This
refers to a combination that must be entered to obtain ac-
cess. A disadvantage of this system is that it may be com-
promised without people being aware of it. There are two
types of combination locks currently in use:
Mechanical push button combination locks
restrict entrance by allowing access to only those persons
who press the correct combination. However, this system does
not allow for an audit trail of who entered or the time en-
tered. If there are a number of authorized entry points,
either one combination will open every door or individuals
may have to memorize a different combination for each door.
This reduces the effectiveness of separating ADP functions
by different doors and locks. Another disadvantage is that
combinations must be changed often and personnel informed of
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the new combination. The major advantages to the system are
that it is relatively inexpensive and easy to implement.
Electronic combination locks restrict en-
trance to those persons who key in the correct combination.
A number of models with varying capabilities can be obtained
These capabilities range from simple machines that allow ac-
cess in the same manner as mechanical combination locks to
more complicated systems where each individual has his own
combination. Through individual combinations the system can
lock out specified combinations, limit access to specified
times, log all entrances and exits, and control a number of
different doors. This overcomes most of the shortcomings of
mechanical combination locks but it is much more expensive
[Ref. 10: p. 49]
(2) Something Possessed "by an Individual . This
type of system allows entry to any individual that has a key
The advantage to this system is that only individuals with
keys can be admitted. The main disadvantage is that anyone
who can obtain a key can enter. There are three basic key
and lock systems.
Conventional key and lock sets operate as
simply as a regular lock on a door. Advantages are that it
is very inexpensive. Disadvantages include the following:
locks can be picked; keys can be duplicated; there is no
record of who entered or exited; and materials can be taken
by anyone possessing a key. [Ref. 10: p. 49]
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Pick resistant lock sets have the same ad-
vantages and disadvantages as conventional locks except that
they are several times more expensive, the keys are harder
to duplicate and the locks are harder to pick. [Ref. 10:
p. 49]
Electronic key systems consist of encoded
cards that actuate electric doors. They can be simple or
complex and have many of the same advantages and disadvan-
tages of the electronic combination lock. The various types
of electronic key systems are explained in Appendix A to FIPS
Pub 83 [Ref. 12] . Pages 13-15 of the same reference detail
considerations for badge formatting, preparation, and
updating.
(3) Something about an Individual . There are a
number of features peculiar to each individual that can be
used for identification. Those items currently being used or
considered are faces, signatures, fingerprints, hand geome-
try, voiceprints, ear features, dental characteristics,
prints from the bottom of the feet and patterns on the
retina of the eye. Of these, only face (appearance), signa-
ture, fingerprints, hand geometry and voiceprints are prom-
ising as convenient identification techniques at this time
[Ref. 11: pp. 10-12]. Appearance would usually be checked
by a guard, either in person or through CCTV, who would com-
pare the face of the individual seeking admission to a file
picture or identification card. The other devices that use
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physiological attributes for identification usually operate
in the following manner.
• The individual seeking entrance identifies himself by
keying his name or inserting a magnetic card with this
information on it.
• The device then pulls from memory a reference profile
of the attribute of that individual who is seeking
access.
• The measured profile of the applicant is compared to the
reference profile and the degree of correlation is
obtained.
• The degree of correlation is compared to a preset
threshold and a decision to accept (allow entrance) or
reject (deny entrance) is made. [Ref. 11: pp. 12-13]
The advantages of this system is that it is
flexible enough to allow entrance at selected doors and
during certain time intervals, and it is not necessary to
remember combinations for doors. Even if a key is stolen
and/or duplicated, entrance should be denied. Also a single
guard can regulate entry at a number of different entrances
by CCTV and remote control. Disadvantages are that it is
both expensive and time-consuming. During shift changes de-
lays could be encountered as individuals try to enter the
working area [Ref. 10: p. 49]. Another disadvantage is
that the accept and reject criteria are complementary. If
the accept criteria (degree of correlation) is established
at a high enough level to minimize the probability of ac-
cepting an imposter (Type II error) , the system will reject
a high number of authorized individuals (Type I error) . How-
ever, if the criterion is lowered to reduce the number of
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Type I errors, a larger number of unauthorized persons will
be allowed access [Ref. 11: p. 13].
An excellent discussion of the evaluation
criteria to be considered when selecting a personal identi-
fication system is contained in Reference 11.
b. Perimeter Intrusion Controls
All possible entry points of the building—win-
dows, transformer vaults, air conditioning louvres, roof
hatches, etc.— should be physically secured or have an in-
trusion alarm installed. Physical security devices include,
but are not limited to, break resistant glass or plastic,
metal bars, and screens. In areas where physical security
devices are impractical or where an intruder would be able
to negate a physical security device unobserved,- considera-
tion should be given to installing special intrusion sensors
Examples of common sensors are discussed below [Ref. 10:
pp. 49-50]
.
(1) Window Foil . This is a metallic tape that
is attached to glass doors and windows. When the glass is
broken, the foil breaks and an alarm sounds. A disadvantage
of this method is that a scratch in the foil will also ac-
tuate the alarm.
(2) Wire Lacing and Screen . Wire lacing and
screen works on the same principle as window foil. Fine
wires are laced across door panes, floors, walls and
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ceilings. Forced entry through the wire will break a strand
and set off an alarm.
(3) Taut Wires . This method is designed to
protect internal openings from intruders. A fine strand of
wire is strung across internal openings, such as air ducts
or utility tunnels, and then tension is applied to the wire.
Any change in tension will set off an alarm.
(4) Intrusion Switch . This can be either a mag-
netic or mechanical device used to protect doors, windows,
skylights, and other accessible openings. These devices can
be recessed to avoid detection and thus are harder to thwart
(5) Average Penetration Times . Besides trying
to control entrance through already existing openings, con-
sideration should be given to the probability that a deter-
mined intruder would be willing to go through a wall,
average time needed to go through walls are indicated below:
Wall Construction
2"x4" studs with 1"
siding both sides
8" cinder block wall
8" cinder block wall





























It should be noted that all of these methods
are extremely noisy and an attentive security force strate-
gically placed should be able to hear the intruder (s) at-




Area access control methods are the same as those
measures used to control building access. These methods are
designed to control access to the area surrounding the data
processing function. [Ref. 9: p. 31]
6 Computer Room Access
Within the computer center, access to a number of
areas should be restricted to all personnel except those
needing access for the performance of their duties. The
areas previously mentioned in Section B.l.d should be ana-
lyzed to determine which personnel should be authorized
access. Most of the devices and systems discussed in
Section B.4 under the topic of "Building Access" can be used
to control access to different areas within the computer
center. Additionally, a number of detection devices can be
used with the computer center to determine access to or oc-
cupancy of critical areas during periods when they should
be vacant. Two of these items—CCTV and intrusion switches
—
have already been discussed. Instead of use as a detection
device, CCTVs are best used to determine if an intruder is
present after an alarm system has registered [Ref. 10: p.
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51]. The rest of the detection systems can be divided into
the following four classifications.
a. Photometric Systems
These systems detect a change in the level of
light in the area which can be caused by an additional
lighting source or the absorption of existing light. These
systems can only be used in windowless areas or where win-
dows have been covered.
b. Motion Detection Systems
There are three types of these systems, all of
which work on the Doppler effect. Waves (sound, ultrasonic
or microwave) are emitted and receivers monitor them. When
an intruder enters, the frequency changes and sets off an
alarm.
(1) Sound . These systems operate in the audi-
ble range and at a high decibel which makes it annoying to
most humans.
(2) Ultrasonic . These systems operate at a
high frequency which is inaudible to most humans, but other-
wise is identical to the sound system.
(3) Microwave . This system is similar to the
above two systems. The major differences are that micro-
waves are high frequency radio waves and that by using dif-
ferent antennae, the size of the area to be surveyed can be
varied. Also, microwave systems can be used in conjunction




(1) Acoustical (Audio) . This system uses micro-
phones to listen for intrusion sounds. When an intrusion
sound is heard the alarm is set off. Because of its sensi-
tivity to sound it can not be used in buildings which are
directly under an airport approach or where new construction
is taking place. However, cancellation and discrimination
units, which can be added to the system, help reduce nuisance
alarms due to airplanes, thunderstorms and other similar
noises.
(2) Vibration (Seismic) . This system is similar
to the acoustical system except microphones are attached to
objects such as safes, filing cabinets, windows and walls.
Vibration of these objects sets off an alarm. Discrimination




This classification includes a number of systems
that detect the approach of a person or object. Basically,
this is accomplished by the creation of an electric field
which, when broken, causes an alarm to be sounded. The
proximity system is easily disturbed by mops, pails, or
fluctuations in electric current and therefore is subject to
numerous nuisance alarms. Because of this, it is usually




7 . Mandatory Access Controls
The following access controls are mandatory in ac-
cordance with Reference 4.
a. Level III Data Access Controls
The controls necessary for protection of all
Level III data are:
Physical Protection. Activities will provide physical
security for their ADP facilities. The degree of physical
security required will vary depending on the physical
characteristics of each location, its vulnerability within
the ADP environment, and the level of data being processed.
A minimum physical security program will address the four
basic considerations below. For further guidance and as-
sistance refer to OPNAVINST 5510. 45B (NOTAL)
.
(1) Physical security protection will be provided by
implementing a series of physical barriers and pro-
cedures, including continual surveillance of the
controlled area.
(2) Physical access controls will be implemented to
prevent unauthorized entry into the central computer
facility and remote terminal areas.
(3) Physical access to data files and media libraries
will be restricted to individuals requiring access
to perform official duties. [Ref. 4: p. J-3]
b. Level II Data Access Controls
The controls necessary for processing Level II
data include those from the preceding paragraph and all of
the following:
a. Central Computer Facility
(1) Physical security requirements for the central
computer facility area will be commensurate with
the highest level and type of data being handled.
(2) If two or more ADP systems are located in the same
controlled area, the equipment comprising each
system may be located so that direct personnel
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access, if appropriate, will be limited to a
specific system.
b. Remote Terminal Areas
(1) While the physical and personnel security require-
ments for the central computer facility area are
based upon the overall requirements of the total
ADP activity, remote terminal area requirements
will be based upon the highest level and type of
data which will be accessed through the terminal.
(2) When a peripheral or remote device is to be con-
nected to an ADP system or network processing
Level I or II data and is to be operated or used
by personnel of an activity that is not responsi-
ble for the security of the host ADP system or
network, the security measures for the peripheral
or remote device and its controlled area will be
prescribed by the activity responsible for the
security of the host ADP system or network whether
or not the peripheral or remote device is approved
for handling Level I, II, or III data. Such se-
curity measures will be agreed to, formally docu-
mented, and implemented before the peripheral or
remote device is connected to the ADP system or
network
.
c. Adjustment of Area Controls
(1) When appropriate, provision will be made to permit
adjustment of area controls to the protection re-
quired for the level and type of data actually
being handled in the ADP system, except that the
central computer facility and those components ap-
proved for the storage and processing of classi-
fied material will not be downgraded below the
level required to protect secure communications
equipment, to maintain the reliability and se-
curity of the ADP system, and to protect essen-
tial hardware or software components of the ADP
system. [Ref. 4: pp. J-4 - J-5]
C. FIRE CONTROLS
"According to the literature, the biggest threat univer-
sally faced by computer facilities is fire. The 1959 Penta-
gon fire, for example, destroyed $6.7 million worth of
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equipment and over 7,000 reels of magnetic tape" [Ref. 9:
p. 31] . The threat is twofold to the computer facility,
either or both of the computer and building are susceptible
to fire. The Design Manual: Fire Protection Engineering
(NAVFAC DM-8) prescribes design criteria for fire protection
engineering applicable to Naval shore facilities. The
Standard Practice for the Fire Protection of Essential Elec-
tronic Equipment Operations (RP-1)
,
published by the U.S.
Department of Commerce National Fire Prevention and Control
Administration, provides guidance to reduce damage caused by
fires to computer equipment. This section is based primarily
on RP-1, FIPS Pub 31, and those portions of NAVFAC DM-8 that
are applicable to electronic equipment and systems. Those
portions of the references dealing strictly with the building
will not be repeated here.
1 . Overview
Fire security is more than just trying to prevent
fires from occurring. It includes the measures to detect
and extinguish fires before serious damage can occur. When
planning fire security the following elements should be
included:
• Location, design, construction and maintenance of the
ADP facility to minimize the exposure to fire damage.
• Measures to insure prompt detection of and response to
a fire emergency.




• Provision of adequate means and personnel to limit
damage and effect prompt recovery. [Ref. 10: pp. 15-
16]
2 . Facility Fire Exposure
When determining which fire controls should be in-
stalled, it is necessary to know the susceptibility of the
facility to fire. This is known as the facility fire ex-
posure and is based on the following five variables. [Ref.
10: pp. 16-17]
a. Occupancy
Occupancy refers to the type of organization in
the building. For instance, facilities housing organizations
that process textiles, chemicals, or paints are much more
susceptible to fires. Therefore, the probability of a fire
occurring is usually directly related to the facility
occupancy.
b. Fuel Load
Fuel load relates to the probable severity of
the fire based on the contents of the building and is a mea-
sure of the material burning capability expressed in equiva-
lent units of wood. This is due to the fact that different
materials burn for different lengths of time and at different
intensities based upon this fuel load. The following table
indicates fire severity based upon fuel load.
For typical offices with metal furniture and
storage cabinets the fuel load will range from 5 to 15 lbs
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punch cards, or a magnetic tape library will have fuel loads
of 50 to 80 lbs per square foot,
c. Construction Type
Construction types affect both the intensity and
duration of the fire and relate to the facility's resistance
to structural damage. The five basic types of construction
are given in order of preferability
.
(1) Fire Resistive . In this type of construc-
tion the structure of the building is made of noncombustible
materials which are further insulated to protect against loss
of strength due to a fire.
(2) Heavy Timber . Exterior walls are noncom-
bustible while columns and beams are heavy timber. Since





(3) Noncombustible . The structure is noncom-
bustible but is not protected from the effects of heat.
While the building materials will not provide fuel for the
fire, the heat from the fire may collapse the structure.
(4) Ordinary Construction . Similar to heavy
timber except smaller. The lumber is of smaller proportions
and therefore will burn more readily.
(5) Wood Frame . This is normal residential con-
struction using 2" boards for the framework and 1" boards for
the sides. This type of facility catches fire readily and is
easily destroyed.
d. Construction Details
A number of structural details may be in use in
the building which will help retard the spread of a fire.
(1) Fire Walls . These help to divide a struc-
ture into separate buildings when calculating fire
susceptibility.
(2) Fire Rated Partitions . Fire rated parti-
tions are designed to retard the spread of a fire within a
building.
(3) Fire Rated Stairwells , Dampers or Shutters .
These items will help to stop fire and smoke from spreading
from room to room and floor to floor.
(4) Use of Low Flame Spread Materials . These




e. Operation of Building
Improper storage of flammable materials and the
accumulation of debris, trash or paper allow fire a greater
opportunity to occur and spread. Efforts should be made to
keep the building well policed.
3 . Fire Detection
In spite of all efforts to limit a facility's sus-
ceptibility to fire, there is still the possibility of a
fire occurring. It is therefore imperative to have a fire
detection system that will allow the fire to be controlled
before serious damage is done. Most fires go through three
stages— ignition (which is often marked by smoldering) , the
open flame stage, where the fire is spread by direct flame
contact only, and finally to the flammable gas stage, which
occurs when the air is hot enough to cause adjacent combusti-
ble materials to give off flammable gases. The third stage
is marked by rapid spreading of the fire and the ignition of
nearby materials due to heat radiation. Since it is best to
discover and treat the fire before it reaches the third
stage, fire detection equipment that works on the principle
of raised air temperature is not recommended [Ref. 10: pp.
17-18]. In fact, RP-1 makes automatic smoke detection sys-
tems meeting the requirements of NFPA No. 72E, Automatic
Fire Detectors , mandatory for equipment, record storage, and
raised floor areas [Ref. 13: p. 30]. In order to design an
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effective detection system, the following items should be
considered [Ref. 10: p. 18]
a. Location and Spacing of Smoke Detectors
As mentioned before, smoke detectors are manda-
tory in all equipment, record storage and raised floor areas.
Consideration should be given to any other potential fire
sites including air conditioning ducts and above hung ceil-
ings. When locating smoke detectors, take into consideration
the direction and velocity of air flow and the presence of
areas with stagnant air.
b. Detection Control Panel
The design of the detection control panel should
facilitate the identification of the detector that has
sounded. This could be accomplished by a separate light for
each area or smoke detector on the control panel. Additional
considerations include a secure system that will actuate a
trouble alarm if any part of the system fails or in the
event of a power outage and prevention of human deactivation
of the system. Several fires in computer facilities appear
to have been deliberately set and the fire detection system
was deactivated prior to the start of the fire [Ref. 10: p.
18] .
c. Human Response
Meaningful human response to the alarm is neces-
sary to determine if there is an actual fire, take steps to
control/extinguish it, and evacuate the building. Therefore,
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there should be provisions for monitoring of the alarm sys-
tem by someone from the ADP facility or guard force. Addi-
tionally, the detector system must be connected to an alarm
which will sound locally and also relay the alarm automatic-
ally to the local fire department or to an approved central
station supervisory service [Ref. 13: p. 25]. Standard
Operating Procedures (SOP) should be written which designate
functions, and those personnel to perform them, during a
fire alarm.
d. Maintenance of System
Smoke detectors are very sensitive and can be ac-
tivated by dust' or other foreign agents. As a result, the
sensitivity of the system is often reduced to limit the
nuisance alarms. This may result in delayed detection of an
actual fire. It is important that smoke detectors be ser-
viced annually by qualified personnel to ensure they are set
to the proper sensitivity level and that they are operating
satisfactorily. Any system that is not working properly
should be corrected immediately.
4 . Fire Extinguishment Methods
After the detection of the fire, it is important that
it be extinguished quickly to minimize damage. This section
contains a discussion of the types of fire-fighting equipment
available. There are five basic methods for fire extinguish-




Portable or hand extinguishers can be used by
agency personnel to control the fire before it gets out of
hand. [Ref. 10: p. 18]
b. Automatic Sprinkler Systems
Automatic sprinkler systems can be used to auto-
matically release water from one or more sprinkler heads when
the air temperature reaches the design temperature of the
head. Heads can be designed to release water anywhere from
135° to 280°F [Ref. 10: p. 19]. Since the sprinkler head
works on the principle of heated air, it is mainly a back-up
system which is designed to prevent major damage to an ADP
installation. Each automatic sprinkler section covering
either electronic equipment or record storage areas must in-
clude a water flow alarm which will sound locally and shall
also sound at the local fire department or at an approved
central station supervisory service [Ref. 13: p. 23], All
automatic sprinkler equipment should be installed in accor-
dance with NFPA No. 13, Sprinkler System .
c. Carbon Dioxide Systems
Sufficient carbon dioxide hose reels should be
included to reach all ADP equipment. Additionally, all
raised floors not exceeding 2,000 cubic feet in capacity
should be capable of being flooded with carbon dioxide by
these reel hoses. All raised floors exceeding 2,000 cubic
feet in capacity should have the capability of being flooded
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with carbon dioxide by manually operated' fixed pipe systems
with underfloor nozzles [Ref. 14: pp. 8-5-13 - 8-5-14].
d. Hose Lines
Hose lines are used by professional fire fighters
to attack the fire with water. [Ref. 10: p. 19]
e. HALON 1301
HALON systems will only be used in addition to
automatic sprinklers, automatic smoke detection equipment,
portable fire extinguishing equipment, and manual response
[Ref. 13: p. 26]. A detailed discussion of HALON systems is
contained in Paragraph 706 of that reference and Paragraph
2.1.3 of FIPS Pub 31. It should be noted that at the time of
this writing NAVFAC had not approved use of the HALON system.
5 . Mandatory Requirements
The mandatory requirements for fire prevention, de-
tection, and extinguishment are as quoted below.
Fire safety. Guidelines concerning fire safety practices
are provided by NAVFAC DM-
8
, Design Manual for Fire Pro-
tection Engineering (NOTAL) . Employees will receive pe-
riodic training regarding emergency actions. Training will
include at least power shutdown and startup procedures, use
of emergency power, fire detection and alarm systems, use
of fire extinguishers, and building evacuation procedures.
(1) Master control switches that shut off all power to
the ADP equipment will be installed to override all
other electrical controls used during normal opera-
tions. Facilities with air-conditioning systems not
designed for smoke removal may include their air-
conditioning system on the same master control
switches. These switches will be located near the
main entrance to the ADP equipment area and ade-
quately labeled to prevent accidental shutoff.
Master control switches for systems processing
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critical applications will be equipped to require a
sequential shutdown routine.
(2) Each controlled area will have a sufficient number
of portable fire extinguishers. Each extinguisher
will be prominently displayed in an unblocked,
easily accessible area, no more than 50 feet from
ADP equipment. Only carbon dioxide or halon fire
extinguishers will be used on electrical fires. All
fire extinguishers will be regularly inspected and
properly maintained. The number and types of fire
extinguishers on hand will be in accordance with
local activity fire regulations.
Smoke Detection. Automatic smoke detection capable of
early warning will be installed in all areas as required
by appropriate instructions.
Cleanliness. Routine cleaning procedures and schedules
will be established and adhered to. Personnel assigned
to clean around ADP equipment should only be permitted to
do so after receiving proper training. An authorized ADP
facility representative will be present during the clean-
ing operation.
(1) Noncombustible wastebaskets with self-closing or
tight-fitting covers will be provided in each ADP
equipment area. Burn bags required for classified
material will be either retained in safes or stored
in metal bulk-refuse containers approved by OPNAVINST
5510. IF.
(2) Contributors to dust, lint, and static electricity,
such as outer coats, Venetian blinds, and throw
rugs, will not be permitted in the ADP equipment
area.
(3) Air-conditioning filters will be regularly checked,
cleaned, and replaced.
(4) Floors will be kept polished, and, if necessary,
buffed to a hard finish. Waxes which powder or flake
and steel wool buffing pads should not be used.
Exercise extreme care when damp-mopping or waxing to
avoid seepage of liquids through joints or raised
floors
.
(5) Carpeted areas will be vacuumed frequently to pre-
vent accumulation of dust. Antistatic carpeting or
spray will be used to reduce static electricity.
[Ref. 4: pp. J-l - J-6]
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The guidelines from DM-8 that were referred to in
OPNAVINST 52 39. 1A are:
a. Construction. New structures built to house electronic
systems should be of fire-resistive or noncombustible
construction and cut off from other occupancies by
fire-rated walls or partitions. Existing combustible
construction should be replaced with noncombustible
construction wherever practical and should be cut off
from other occupancies by fire-rated walls or parti-
tions. Additional guidance for construction will be
found in NFPA 7 5 Electronic Computer/Data Processing
Equipment / NAVFAC DM- 2 3 Communications, Navigational
Aids, and Airfield Lighting
, and Federal Fire Council
Recommended Practices No. 1 Fire Protection for Essen-
tial Electronic Equipment .
b. Protection. Electronic systems shall be protected in
accordance with NAVMAT INSTRUCTION 11320.8 and the
following:
(1) Manually controlled carbon dioxide hose reel sys-
tems should be provided in accordance with the
requirements of NFPA No. 12, Carbon Dioxide Ex-
tinguishing Systems , except as modified herein.
(2) Systems should be two-shot type with minimum of
300 lbs. CO2 for primary supply and 300 lbs. for
reserve. Where the volume of the largest indi-
vidual cabinet, console, or equipment item re-
quiring protection exceeds 100 cubic feet,
additional CO2 (both primary and reserve) should
be provided in accordance with the assumed volume
method outlined in NFPA Standard No. 12.
(3) C0 2 hose shall be 3/4 inch and should be limited
to 75 feet per reel. Sufficient numbers of hose
reels shall be provided to reach all electronic
equipment components with one hose giving con-
sideration to equipment layout, aisle arrange-
ments, and other obstructions. Minimum pipe size
supplying hose reels should be 3/4 inch. Hose
nozzles should be designed for discharge rate of
approximately 100 pounds per minute.
(4) Raised floor spaces, not exceeding 2,000 cubic
feet in volume, should be protected by total CO2
flooding utilizing hose reel systems described in
the preceding paragraph but with both the primary
and reserve supplies of CO2 increased by not less
than 225 pounds each.
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(5) Raised floor spaces exceeding 2,000 cubic feet in
volume should be protected by two-shot total CO2
flooding utilizing manually operated fixed pipe
systems with underfloor nozzles. CO2 supply
should be independent of the hose reel system
with capacity of both primary and reserve
supplies
.
(6) High pressure 75 lb. cylinders should normally be
used to supply hose reel systems and fixed pipe
underfloor systems. Beam scale, designed for use
with cylinder rack should be provided to permit
weighing of cylinders without removal from racks.
Where large quantities of CO2 are required, low
pressure storage may be utilized, provided that
the installation and maintenance costs are lower
and a resupply of low pressure CO2 is readily
available
.
(7) Quick-opening valves should be provided in the
supply pipes to hose reels and in the supply
pipes to underfloor systems. Separate primary
and reserve releases should be located adjacent
to quick-opening valves. Primary and reserve
supplies should not be interconnected, and cas-
cading type activation of cylinders should not be
used. Mechanical releases may be cable-type or
pressure operated type. Electrical type releases
may be used where emergency power is provided.
(8) Operating instructions should be posted at each
pair of releases indicating that both the quick-
opening valve and a release must be operated in
order to deliver CO2 to hose nozzle or underfloor
system. Primary and reserve releases shall be
separately labeled. Where underfloor spaces are
used as air plenums, instructions should indicate
that air supply fans should be shut down prior to
the application of CO2
.
(9) Smoke detection systems should be provided in
areas where electronic equipment is operated or
remains energized without continuous supervision
by personnel. Associated underfloor spaces
should be similarly protected, except where such
spaces are used as air plenums. Detection de-
vices should be of the type which respond to both
gaseous products of combustion and smoke and
shall be listed by UL, Inc. Alarms should be
transmitted to a central location where personnel




(10) Provision should be made to transmit alarm sig-
nals from all CO2 and smoke detection systems to
the fire department via the station fire alarm
system. [Ref. 14: pp. 8-5-10 - 8-5-13]
Figure 1, adapted from RP-1 and referred to in DM-8,
is an easy reference for determining fire detection and ex-
tinguishment needs. These are recommendations .
D. UTILITIES
The modern conveniences that allow for and help support
computer facilities also are potential hazards for these same
systems. This section contains a discussion of electric ser-
vice, heating and air conditioning, communications circuits,
and water and sewage. An assessment of the effects of the
loss of or the damage to each of these should be made during
the risk assessment phase.
1 . Electric Service
Electric service can affect ADP operations through
quality—the absence of variations from the normal wave-
length, or reliability—the number and duration of occasions
when the line voltage departs from nominal for periods too
long to be considered transient. A variation is considered
to be transient when the line voltage is 90% or less of
nominal for more than 4 milliseconds or 120% or more of
nominal for more than 16 milliseconds. Transients often oc-
cur in the morning as energy demands build up. Measurements




























XO< 2 • • •
u
2Z I Boo £ ^ ^

















5 oa iR 2 <ui '




























/ — — z _ '"> — ! —





































































































number of transients and outages that occur. This informa-
tion should be used in the risk assessment.
2
.
Air Conditioning and Heating
As most ADP people know, computers need to operate
in a regulated temperature and environment. Heating and air
conditioning can help by accomplishing the following things.
• Maintaining the temperature within fairly close limits.
Temperatures above 30° Centigrade can cause permanent
damage to hardware
.
• Maintaining the proper humidity for ADP operations. Ex-
cessive humidity can cause computer cards to swell and
feed erratically. Low humidity can affect tape hand-
ling, line printers and ADP hardware.
• Maintaining contamination free air. Contamination in
the air can cause the heads to crash on a disk drive.
[Ref. 10: p. 34]
A complete review of the facility's air conditioning
and heating system should be made. Pages 34-39 of FIPS Pub
31 outline procedures for doing this. For those facilities
using steam heat, consideration should be given to a system
for detecting breaks in a steam pipe as a leak could cause
damage by both heat and humidity.
3. Water Supply and Sewage
Water is needed for fire fighting, sanitation and
drinking. Considerations should be given to the probability
of a broken water pipe that could cause water to get into the
computer. Additionally, drains should be equipped with check
valves to keep water from backing up out of the sewer system





For any system heavily dependent on remote terminals,
an analysis should be made of the reliability of the communi-
cation system linking the terminals and computer. Specific
guidelines are outlined on pages 39-42 of FIPS Pub 31. Com-
munications security also concerns the safe transmission of
information so that unauthorized individuals can not obtain
access to it. Further discussion of this topic is presented
in Chpater VII of this thesis.
5 Mandatory Requirements
The following requirements are mandatory in accor-
dance with OPNAVINST 5239. 1A.
(1) Lighting and Electrical Service. Adequate lighting of
the central computer facility and remote terminal
areas will be provided and maintained. Emergency
lighting will be provided to ensure safe exit in emer-
gencies. Reliable electrical power will be provided.
An uninterruptible power source may be required if the
facility criticality requires constant ADP support.
Voltage regulators or other electronic devices may be
necessary to reduce or prevent serious fluctuations
in current. Periodic checks will be made of the emer-
gency lighting and the auxiliary power to ensure per-
formance and operability.
(2) Temperature and Humidity. Whenever possible, ADP
equipment will be operated within the manufacturers'
optimum temperature and humidity range specifications.
To prevent excessive temperature and humidity fluctua-
tions, all doors and windows to the central computer
facility and remote terminal areas should be kept
closed, and only key designated individuals should be
permitted to regulate the environmental controls. To
maintain a constant record of the temperature and hu-
midity, a recording instrument should be installed and
placed where it can monitor the air leaving the ADP
equipment area. As a safety feature, an adequate
warning system should be installed and maintained to
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warn of near-limit conditions , so that prompt action
can be taken to prevent ADP equipment damage
.
(3) Precautionary Measures Against Water Damage. False
ceilings that conceal steam and water pipes will be
checked frequently, and any irregularity will be re-
ported immediately. Work scheduled for the ceiling
and raised flooring areas will be coordinated to en-
sure maximum safety and minimal disruption. Plastic
sheets will be readily available to cover the ADP
equipment units highly susceptible to water damage.
Equipment exposed to water will not be activated
until completely dry. [Ref. 4: pp. J-l - J-2]
E. NATURAL DISASTERS
Natural disasters consist of those elements of nature
that may cause damage to an ADP facility. The four that





The ADP security team should analyze the suscepti-
bility of the facility to flooding. FIPS Pub 31 states that
the following areas are most susceptible to floods:
• Riverine flood plains;
• Coastal flood plains;
• Stream areas at the base of a mountain.
If none of the three apply, but the area has a history of
flooding, then considerations should still be made to in-
stall sump pumps, drains with check valves and other devices




The two most common windstorms for the United States
are hurricanes and tornadoes. While the possibility of a
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hurricane doing wind damage to NFC is very remote, the pos-
sibility of tornado damage is real. Past experience indi-
cates that several tornadoes are sighted in Ohio each year.
The local weather bureau should be contacted to determine
the annual probability of a tornado or other high winds in
the Cleveland area. This information should be used to de-




Thunderstorms often have an effect on the reliability
of the electrical service. Calculations should be made of
the frequency of thunderstorms and the per cent of times that
they rupture electrical service. This information should be
included when computing electrical outages. An assessment
of the damage to facilities and computer that could be caused
by a lightning bolt should also be included.
4 Earthquakes
Earthquakes can cause severe damage to the ADP fa-
cility. Figure 3 on page 25 of FIPS Pub 31 indicates that
Cleveland is in a zone where only minor damages usually oc-
cur. However, it is just a few miles from a zone where major
damage is probable. The National Geological Service should
be consulted to determine the past occurrence and severity of




There are no mandatory requirements concerning na-
tural disasters exceot for the following:
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The effects of natural disasters will be prevented, con-
trolled, and minimized to the extent economically feasible
by the use of detection equipment, extinguishing systems,





There are a number of security measures necessary for an
ADP facility that should be performed as part of the manage-
ment function. These measures can be broadly classified
into the categories of personnel and administrative se-
curity. These types of measures are not unique to ADP fa-
cilities but should be installed for most profit or nonprofit
organizations
.
A review conducted by Carroll indicates that up until
1977 there have been three distinct phases of criminally mo-
tivated computer loss incidents. The first was the assault
phase, which mainly involved bombing and arson. Damage re-
sulting from these threats peaked around 1970 and has been
declining since that time due to the hardening of computer
facilities. The second phase emphasized penetration. This
phase consisted of attempts by outsiders to acquire ADP as-
sets by false input documents or falsely obtaining access
to time-sharing systems. Losses due to this phase appear
to have peaked in the 1972-73 time frame. At the writing
of the book (1977) by Carroll the third phase, involving the
defection or subversion of employees, was occurring. "These
attacks include sabotage as well as theft of every conceiva-
ble kind of asset, both by employees and by conspiracies in-
volving employees and outsiders. Embezzlements by insiders
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are clearly the leading source of criminal loss today" [Ref.
15: p. 67]
.
The effective countermeasures to the first phase are
primarily the physical security controls discussed in the
preceding chapter. The effective countermeasures to the
second phase are those physical security measures limiting
access to the facility and the systems security measures to
be discussed in the following chapter. Damage due to the
defection or subversion of employees can be reduced by both
physical security measures (limiting movement within the
computer facility) and systems security measures. However,
management practices consisting of personnel and administra-
tive security are the most effective countermeasures to the
defection or subversion of employees.
A. PERSONNEL SECURITY
The importance of personnel controls can not be over-
emphasized. As one author states:
All physical, technical, or administrative security mea-
sures implemented within a computer system may be rendered
ineffective by certain dishonest or careless individuals.
It is axiomatic that people represent a company's greatest
asset, but from a security point of view they are the big-
gest liability. The potential threats involving personnel
are multifold; they include not only espionage, fraud, em-
bezzlement, and theft, but also inadvertent acts of inex-
perienced, poorly trained, and careless personnel. [Ref.
9: p. 70]
Personnel security is defined as, "the procedures established
to ensure that each individual has a background which indi-
cates a level of assurance of trustworthiness which is
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commensurate with the value of ADP resources which the indi-
vidual will be able to access" [Ref. 4: p. A-14]. The per-
sonnel program of an organization should work to reduce the
two vulnerabilities of inconsistent personnel policies re-
sulting in poor employee morale, and a low level of employee
training and development [Ref. 9: p. 70].
1
.
Classification of Personnel Controls
There are three distinct functions that a comprehen-
sive personnel program must address. These functions are
personnel selection, personnel training, and supervision of
employees [Ref. 10: p. 55]. Each of these functions is
critical to a successful program and is the subject of
lengthy discourse in the Federal Personnel Manual . Only
those parts of the manual pertaining explicitly to ADP func-
tions will be discussed.
2 Personnel Selection
When selecting personnel to fill vacancies, a deter-
mination of the candidate's qualifications regarding train-
ing, talent and experience to perform the assigned duties
should be made. Additionally, when filling sensitive ADP
positions, verification of the trustworthiness of the candi-
date should be made [Ref. 10: p. 55]. The Federal Personnel
Manual classifies ADP positions into three categories. Both




(1) Critical-sensitive positions—ADP-I positions. Those
positions in which the incumbent is responsible for
the planning, direction, and implementation of a com-
puter security program; has a major responsibility for
the direction, planning, and design of a computer sys-
tem, including the hardware and software; or, can ac-
cess a system during the operation or maintenance in
such a way, and with a relatively high risk for caus-
ing grave damage, or realize a significant personal
gain.
(2) Noncritical-sensitive positions—ADP-II positions.
Those positions in which the incumbent is responsible
for the direction, planning, design, operation, or
maintenance of a computer system, and whose work is
technically reviewed by a higher authority of the
ADP-I category to insure the integrity of the system.
(8) Nonsensitive positions—ADP-III positions. All other
positions involved in computer activities. [Ref. 16:
p. 732-4.01]
These classifications are elaborated on in subsection
6 of this section. When determining which positions are
sensitive, the guidelines from FIPS Pub 31 are useful.
...generally these (sensitive positions) will include com-
puter operations, data control, management, auditing and
programming (including acceptance testing and maintenance)
of critical applications and systems. The risk analysis
for fraud will usually identify critical interface points.
Wherever a critical interface involves a single individual,
the position is probably sensitive. [Ref. 10: p. 55]
3 . Personnel Training
A surprising number of operations problems and security
breaches result from promoting an individual into a posi-
tion beyond his competence. Rather than admit defeat, such
people have been known to destroy source documents or
falsify reports in an attempt to conceal shortcomings.
[Ref. 10: p. 55]
In addition to adequate job training, security train-
ing should be continuous. "The purpose of this training is
to insure that each individual recognizes his vital role in
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installation security and does not—through familiarity
—
become careless" [Ref. 17: p. 33]. One key to security
training is ensuring that personnel are always aware of se-
curity considerations. This security consciousness can be
transmitted to all personnel by the following devices [Ref.
10: pp. 74-75]:
• Position Descriptions. All ADP position descriptions
should contain a detailed list of responsibilities re-
garding ADP security.
• Employee Orientation. All new employees should receive
an ADP security orientation.
• Bulletin Board. A special security bulletin board
should be installed on which all new security regula-
tions will be posted. Employees would be expected to
initial the regulations after reading.
• Posters. A number of posters concerning ADP security
are available. These can be used to serve as a constant
reminder.
• News Media. If the organization has a newspaper or cir-
cular, articles concerning ADP security should be
included.
• How-to-do-it Instructions. Instructions for implement-
ing ADP security plans can be used for training. An
example of this might be the written instructions of
what each individual is to do in the event of a fire
alarm.
• Training. Regular training classes using films, lec-
turers, seminars, and similar devices should be held to
maintain employee awareness of security and to inform
them of new threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures
As part of the training plan, all employees should
be aware that if any of the following conditions occur, it
should be reported immediately to the ADP security officer
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[Ref. 15: p. 76]. A discussion of ADP security training is
presented in Chapter X of this thesis.
4 . Supervision
Supervisors can make strong contributions to the
security program in the following three ways [Ref. 10: p.
55] :
• He can set the example by complying with security direc-
tives and can also ensure his staff complies.
• He can maintain close effective communications with his
staff to both identify and reduce the number of dis-
gruntled employees.
• Finally, he can ensure that his subordinates are proper-
ly trained and competent.
In addition to the above, there are several other
steps that supervisors can take to reduce the opportunity for
employee fraud. First of all, supervisors can help control
vacations and job rotations. Not only can vacations help
reduce errors by maintaining morale and reducing fatigue but
they also help deter fraud because the probability of dis-
covery is increased when the perpetrator's job is performed
by someone else, even if for only a short period of time.
Job rotation reduces risk by improving the level of cross-
training. It also helps deter fraud because personnel real-
ize that the next individual who performs that function
might discover the fraud. The second step that supervisors
can take to reduce employee fraud is to restrict employees
from handling their own accounts. When an employee handles
his own account he is presented with an unnecessary
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temptation. One method of reducing fraud is by removing
the opportunity to easily perform a fraudulent act [Ref. 18:
pp. 8-9]
.
5 . Termination Procedures
An often overlooked facet of personnel security is
the procedures for handling terminated employees. Employees
who are terminated, voluntarily or involuntarily, are much
more likely to be disgruntled and therefore present a threat
to the system. To minimize the vulnerability to the threat,
the following steps, if applicable, should be performed.
1. Collect all identification including badges, ID, and
business cards (new business cards and ID cards indi-
cating retired status may be considered for retiring
employees)
.
2. Revoke all powers of attorney including bank signature
cards. Change or revoke all codes or passwords to
which the employee was privy (note that the requirement
to be able to do this must be considered when selecting
the strategy for assigning passwords)
.
3. Collect all keys (including magnetic stripe cards),
signature plates, and other evidences of authority.
4. Settle all accounts including expense accounts and
courtesy accounts.
5. Reconcile accounts of any resource over which the em-
ployee had control, such as petty cash, parts inven-
tory, or tape library. Where indicated for the
protection of the employee who will assume accounta-
bility, an audit should be considered.
6. Reclaim all proprietary information in the custody of
the employee.
7. Remind the employee of any ongoing contractual obliga-
tions to you, including restrictions on use of data to
which the employee has become privy in the course of





The Federal Personnel Manual has issued the following
policy for screening Federal personnel associated with the
design, operation or maintenance of Federal computer systems
and personnel having access to data in these systems. These
procedures require that:
(1) In accordance with paragraph 732-1-3 and paragraph
732-A-4 of the Federal Personnel Manual , ADP positions
be classified as category I, II, or III;
(2) Personnel be screened in accordance with Chapter 736
of the Federal Personnel Manual and paragraph 16-214
of OPNAVINST 5510. IF, which require that a National
Agency Check and Inquiry (NACI) be required for em-
ployment in noncritical-sensitive and nonsensitive
positions and a pre-appointment full-field investiga-
tion be required on applicants for critical-sensitive
positions;
(3) That personnel in ADP-I positions be reinvestigated
every five years in accordance with paragraph 736-2-6
of the Federal Personnel Manual ; and
(4) For all ADP positions a continuing assessment of the
trustworthiness and reliability of the incumbents be
made by system managers. [Ref. 16: pp. 732-4.01 and
732-A-l - 732-A-2]





The AFIPS System Review Manual on Security contains
an audit checklist on pages 16-24 that can serve as a guide
for evaluating the personnel program. It was compiled prior
to the publication of the ADP position classification scheme,





Elaborate security measures designed into the hardware or
software of a computer system will not prevent the computer
operator from putting two-part paper on a printer and keep-
ing one copy of classified output for himself or herself,
nor will they keep an intruder out of the tape library.
Basic administrative controls are an integral part of in-
formation security in a data processing environment...."
[Ref. 20: p. 51]
The preceding quote stresses the need for administrative
security controls in an ADP security program. Administrative
security is defined as "the management constraints, opera-
tional procedures, accountability procedures, and supplemen-
tal controls established to provide an acceptable level of
protection for sensitive data. Synonymous with procedural
security" [Ref. 21: p. 4], The proper design and implemen-
tation of administrative controls can reduce the following
vulnerabilities
.
• DP standards are non-existent, or those that exist re-
late mainly to documentation.
• Security and control standards are poor, unenforced, or
do not exist.
• There are no policies, standards, or procedures in re-
lation to protection of privacy in systems which pro-
cess personal data.
• Controls for data entry and output are not viewed as a
challenge by systems people and users. Systems are de-
signed with little consideration of edit checks to pre-
vent data pollution.
• Data entry personnel are not trained or are not evaluated
on their ability to catch mistakes and control their own
errors
.
• There are no controls over the submission, receipt, and




1 . Principles of Security Management
There are three major principles that should be kept
in mind during the design of administrative controls. These
principles are separation of duties, the never alone princi-
ple, and the limited tenure principle [Ref. 15: pp. 46-47].
a. Separation of Duties
The purpose behind the separation of duties prin-
ciple is best expressed by Enger and Howerton who write, "The
responsibilities of users and staff should be divided in such
a way that collusion between entirely separate groups—an
unlikely circumstance— is necessary in order to compromise
the system. Knowledge of the system must be divided and re-
stricted so that few people have enough knowledge to carry
out a successful compromise" [Ref. 22: p. 27]. Within this
principle there are three subprinciples that should be fol-
lowed. They are the separation of ADP from the users, the
separation of duties within the data processing function, and
the maintenance of traditional separations.
(1) Separation of ADP from Users . The data pro-
cessing function should not be directly responsible to its
customer functions but to a common level of management. Ad-
ditionally, no transactions should originate in the data pro-
cessing function but should come from the using departments.
Finally, the data processing manager should be able to show
that all work done by the data processing function and all of
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resources consumed by that function were authorized by, and
on behalf of, an independent customer [Ref. 18: p. 7].
(2) Separation of Duties Within the Data Pro-
cessing Function . Within the data processing activity, cer-
tain functions should be performed by separate individuals to
prevent fraud, or at least to make collusion a necessary con-
dition for the perpetration of fraud. If the organization
is large enough, each of the following functions should be
performed by a separate person.




• Operation—data input (e.g., tape mounting);
• Operation—data output (e.g., printer operation);
• System programming;









• Management [Ref. 18: p. 7],
In the event that the data processing or-
ganization is not large enough to warrant different
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individuals for each of these above functions and it is
necessary to assign several duties to the same individual
or group, then no individual or group should be allowed to
perform both functions of any of the following pairs.
1. Computer operations and computer programming.
2. Data preparation and data processing.
3. Data processing and EDP quality control.
4. Computer operations and custody of EDP media.
5. Receipt of sensitive or valuable material and trans-
mittal of same.
6. Reproduction, issue, or destruction of sensitive in-
formation and the granting of authorization for these
acts.
7. Applications programming and systems programming.
8. Applications programming and data-base administration.
9. Design, implementation, and modification of security
software and any other function .
10. Control of access credentials and any other function .
[Ref. 15: p. 47]
One way to help achieve this separation of
duties is by developing an organizational chart reflecting
the division of duties and position descriptions that detail
what tasks are to be performed by each individual filling a
position. Figure 2 is an organization model which demon-
strates the principle of separation of duties.
(3) Maintenance of Traditional Separation . Long
before the recent emphasis on computer security, auditors had































































in any organization. Arens and Lobbecke list six elements
of internal control, the second of which is the adequate
segregation of duties. They further break this classifica-
tion down into the following four categories [Ref. 23: pp.
216-221]
.
Segregation of the Custody of Assets from
Accounting. Any person who has custody of an asset should
not also have controls over the records of that asset. Arens
and Lobbecke continue:
In an EDP system, any person with custody of assets should
be prevented from performing the programming function, and
be denied access to punched cards or other input records.
As a general rule it is desirable that any person perform-
ing an accounting function, whether it be in an EDP or in
a manual system, be denied access to assets that can be
converted to personal gain. [Ref. 23: p. 219]
Separation of the Authorizaiton of Transac-
tions from the Custody of Related Accounts. If possible, the
person who has control over the assets should not be allowed
to authorize transactions concerning the related assets. For
example, when preparing a paycheck, the individual who either
determines or can change the amount to be paid to an employee
should not also be able to sign the check.
Separation of Duties Within the Accounting
Function. No individual should be able to enter a new em-
ployee's name, check mailing address, pay rate or other vital
information without some control for verifying the informa-
tion being entered. This is for two reasons. First, the
control measure will help discover unintentional errors and
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secondly, it reduces the chance of an employee entering
fraudulent information into the system and collecting the
resultant paycheck.
Separation of Operational Responsibility
from Record Keeping Responsibility. Record keeping should be
performed as a separate function to ensure that departments
do not bias the results to show better performance than what
was actually attained.
There are two main things that can be done
to implement the principle of separation of duties: physical
barriers can be erected and rules can be made. The essential
physical barriers are:
1. An EDP media ("tape") library must exist in a secure
location contiguous to but separate from the computer
room.
2. Data preparation (e.g., card punching) must be done in
a secure area close to but separate from the computer
room.
3. Programmers' offices must be physically separate from
the computer
.
4. The security office must be a restricted area to all
personnel except those directly connected with security
5. The computer room itself must be a secure area re-
stricted to operators actually on duty or other author-
ized persons (e.g., maintenance technicians) working
under strict supervision.
6. Sensitive waste material awaiting destruction must be
stored in a secure area well away from the computer
room. [Ref. 15: p. 48]
The methods for making these areas secure
have previously been discussed under the topic of access
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controls in Chapter V and the section concerning the handling
of classified material in Chpater VII. The administrative
rules needed to implement separation of duties are:
1. Programmers shall not operate EDP equipment.
2. Operators shall neither write nor submit programs.
3. Implementation and upkeep of security features (that
is, modifications to computer operating systems that
are intended to enhance EDP security) shall be a
separate, distinct duty.
4. Quality control and audit shall exist as functions
separate and distinct from EDP production operations.
[Ref. 15: p. 49]
b. The Never Alone Principle
This principle helps deter fraud by making it
mandatory that two or more individuals attest to or approve
certain actions. Based upon the personnel resources of the
ADP facility and consistent with the threat evaluation, two
or more people should witness certain security-relevant ac-
tions. All individuals capable of witnessing the actions
should be designated by the Commanding Officer in writing.
After witnessing, the individuals should attest to it by
signing a memorandum or log. Consideration should be given
to applying the Never Alone principle to each of the follow-
ing actions.
1. Issue and return of access-control items or
credentials
.




3. Systems initialization and shutdown.
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4. Processing sensitive information.
5. Hardware and software maintenance.
6. Test and acceptance of hardware.
7. Modification of hardware.
8. Permanent systems reconfiguration.
9. Design and implementation of data bases.
10. Design, implementation, and modification of applica-
tions programs.
11. Design, implementation, and modification of operating
systems
.
12. Design, implementation and modification of security
software
.
13. Changes to documentation.
14. Changes to emergency or contingency plans.
15. Declaration of a state of emergency.
16. Destruction or erasure of important programs or data.
17. Reproduction of sensitive information.
18. Changes to EDP operating procedures.
19. Receipt, issue, or shipment of valuable material.
[Ref. 15: pp. 46-47]
c. Limited-Tenure Principle
This is simply a repeat of the job rotation
principle discussed in the personnel section. To reiterate,
...crews should be randomly rotated among shifts, indi-
viduals should be randomly rotated among crews, mandatory
vacation periods should be enforced, and provision should
be made for cross-training so that the practice of limited





Figure 2 indicates that each of the three major di-
visions—applications programming, systems programming, and
data processing services—has its own security representa-
tive. Although this is preferable, it is not mandatory.
OPNAVINST 5239. 1A requires only the following four types of
security positions on the security staff.
• The ADP Security Officer;
• Network Security officer;
• ADP Systems Security Officer;
• Terminal Area Security Officer.
These positions are the subject of further discussion
in both section 2.3 of Reference 4 and Chapter II of this
thesis. Therefore, their importance and duties will not be
repeated here. It is sufficient to note that they represent
administrative controls.
3 Auditing of System
Another form of administrative control is the act of
auditing the ADP system. Several auditing establishments are
available to perform this function. The first of these is
the activity internal review function. By properly conduct-
ing internal reviews of ADP functions, internal review offi-
cers can spot potential problem areas and allow the Commanding
Officer to take appropriate actions to correct the discrepan-
cies. Additionally, if the review is properly documented,
Naval Audit Service personnel can use the internal review as
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a basis for performing their audit. In accordance with
OPNAVINST 5239. 1A, internal auditors should place emphasis
"on the use of valid audit trails and other management con-
trols in the design and installation of financial and ac-
counting systems. At the local activity level, these
functions also include the responsibility to review unique
or critical areas related to the safeguarding of resources
such as physical security, hardware and software security,
and prevention of theft or fraud" [Ref. 4: p. 9-2].
Besides performing audits, the Naval Audit Service is
also a valuable source of information on current literature,
directives, and events concerning ADP security. Therefore,
the ADP security officer should maintain close liaison with
the local Naval Audit Service.
4
. Administrative Controls
The principle of administrative security has been
discussed but specific controls have not been mentioned.
This is because they are too numerous to mention. These
controls can be generally classified as those that are ap-
plied during the various stages of data processing and those
that apply to the documentation of systems and programs. The
Systems Auditability and Control Study [Ref. 24] and IBM Sys-
tems Management: Management Controls for Data Processing
[Ref. 25] provide a description of the former controls, and
Sawyer provides a listing of documentation requirements for




5 . Mandatory Requirements
Appendix I to OPNAVINST 5239. 1A outlines the security
and audit controls applicable to the life cycle of ADP sys-
tems. Additional mandatory controls are published in




The purpose of this chapter will be to discuss systems
security development and techniques for hardware, software,
data, communications and emanations. Some systems will be
combined for ease of discussion in certain areas.
Certain controls cannot be meaningfully discussed or
evaluated separately but must be considered as part of an
overall system. The hardware, software, data and communica-
tions should be considered together when evaluating a se-
curity program. For example, hardware and software controls
are combined together when processing information to restrict
data input and inquiry to authorized individuals. Communica-
tions devices, which are used to link hardware components,
use software and hardware security controls to provide se-
curity. Data is an input to the system, is processed by the
hardware using software programs, is transmitted through the
communication devices and is an output of the system. There-
fore, most hardware, software, communication and security
controls should aid in protecting data and thus are also data
controls. Although these controls are broken down into dif-
ferent subheadings within this chapter, the reader should be
aware that the controls overlap and the implementation of one




A. HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE CONTROLS
Most of the current literature on computer controls dis-
cusses hardware and software features together. That proce-
dure will be followed in this section. Hardware security is
defined as "computer equipment features or devices used in
an ADP system to preclude unauthorized, accidental, or in-
tentional modification, disclosure, or destruction of ADP
resources" [Ref. 4: p. A-8]. Software security is the soft-
ware routines which manage system resources, supervise ac-
tions within a system, limit access to files, provide audit
trails and achieve other similar security measures [Ref. 9:
pp. 92-93]
.
1 . Control Objectives
Mair, Woods, and Davis list four objectives of hard-
ware and software controls. They are as follows:
a. Detection of Errors
Hardware and software controls should be able to detect
the following three types of errors:
(1) Errors Generated by the Hardware System . Process-
ing errors can be caused by computer malfunctions,
interference, worn out parts, electrical irregu-
larities and other similar incidents.
(2) Errors Within Applications Programs or System
Software .
(3) Clerical-Type Errors . These errors are usually
made by computer operators or data librarians and
involve improper console instructions or the
mounting of incorrect files on peripherals.




c. Recording of Activities Performed Within the Informa-
tion Processing Facility.
d. Supporting Effective Utilization of the Computer.
In modern systems, the scheduling and allocation of
equipment and jobs is often determined automatically. It is
essential that the effectiveness of these hardware and soft-
ware functions be determined. [Ref. 27: pp. 334-335]
2 . Isolation in a Computer System
According to Carroll, the amount of security in an
operating system is largely dependent on the isolation of
that system. System isolation, in turn, is dependent on the
processing mode of that system. The processing mode is de-
pendent on the hardware and software configuration and is
determined by the following four attributes.
a. Remote Versus Local
The local processing mode takes place in a
secure, controlled access environment for which there is a
physically controlled point of access adjacent to the com-
puter. Remote processing consists of all other access en-
vironments, including use of remote terminals.
b. Serial Versus Multiprogramming
In serial processing, one job is processed to
completion before another job is started. In multiprogram-





c. Batch Versus On-Line
For batch processing, all data and instructions
are submitted to the computer before any job is run. On-
line processing allows data and/or instructions to be sub-
mitted while the job is running.
d. Programming Versus Nonprogramming
In the programming mode, the user may execute
any utility or permanent library program supported by the
system. The nonprogramming mode, however, constrains the
user to the context of specific programs or pre-established
instructions only.
e. Ranking of Processing Modes
Following is a ranking of the processing modes
from most secure to least secure:
1. Local, serial, batch, nonprogramming;
2. Local, serial, batch, programming (conventional over-
the-counter submission for batch processing)
;
3. Local, serial, on-line, nonprogramming;
4. Local, serial, on-line, programming;
5. Local, multiprogramming, batch, nonprogramming;
6. Local, multiprogramming, batch, programming;
7. Local, multiprogramming, on-line, nonprogramming;
8. Local, multiprogramming, on-line, programming;
9. Remote, serial, batch, nonprogramming;
10. Remote, serial, batch, programming (an RJE terminal
on a serial batch system)
;
11. Remote, serial, on-line, nonprogramming;
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12. Remote, serial, on-line, programming;
13. Remote, multiprogramming, batch, nonprogramming;
14. Remote, multiprogramming, batch, programming (usual
RJE mode encountered today)
;
15. Remote, multiprogramming, on-line, nonprogramming
(remote terminal operation as found in NCIC, CPIC,
etc.
)
16. Remote, multiprogramming, on-line, programming. [Ref.
15: pp. 225-227]
3 . Hardware Security Measures
a. Applications
Hardware controls are applied by the equipment
manufacturer and therefore vary with the type of equipment
and manufacturer. They are designed to ensure that data will
be read and recorded accurately by the computer peripherals
and that errors will not be caused by flaws in any of the
hardware. Mair, Wood, and Davis list the following four ways
in which hardware controls can be applied.
(1) In the Design of Equipment Elements. Examples of this
type of control would be a write protect ring that
protects magnetic tapes from being unintentionally
overwritten and circuit breakers that would prevent
damage due to power surges.
(2) The Testing of Equipment Configurations Before Use.
Manufacturers should ensure compatibility of their
equipment with the system being used.
(3) Extensive Preventive Maintenance. Regularly scheduled
contractor maintenance can help produce a high level
of hardware reliability.
(4) Field Replacement of Parts or Components Which Prove
Troublesome. With the advent of miniaturization and
microchips, on the spot replacement of component parts
has become easier. [Ref. 27: p. 336]
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b. Hardware Features that Aid Security
NBS Special Publication 500-33 lists the follow-
ing hardware features that will help achieve system security.
• Positive, unique device identification—devices attached
through the switched telephone network which offer the
"hard-wired" self-identification capability or the
equivalent. Other devices may be identified through
cabling addresses, "station ID" addressing protocols,
and so on.
• Devices which offer positive verification of mechanical
operations (e.g., seek verification in disk devices).
• A print/display inhibit capability for interactive ter-
minals—automatically controlled by the system.
• Devices to clear the residual contents of buffers,
electronic storage areas, and all, or portions, of
portable I/O media.
• Processing units which offer read and write protection
and two or more privilege states.
• External storage devices designed so that there is no
possibility of an "undetected mount" situation.
• External storage devices which offer key-operated locks
that prevent unauthorized removal of portable media.
• A line-break sensing capability for all communications
equipment. All conditions of potential disconnect /re-
connect (such as transient noise or other switched-
network disturbances) should be made known to the system
so that the system will then be able to invoke device-ID
reverification procedures.
• A key-operated power on/off switch for remotely-located
devices. Certain devices (particularly intelligent ter-
minals and communicating typewriter devices) may have
major functions (such as transmit, receive, typewriter
only) controlled independently by key-operated switches




4 . Software Security Measures
Software controls can be broken down into two basic
classifications—application programs and operating systems.
Enger and Howerton also include data base management soft-
ware in their discussion of software security. That topic
will not be discussed in this thesis, however. If the reader
is interested in this topic he is referred to Chapter 7 of
Reference 22.
a. Application Program Controls
The following exerpt from FIPS Pub 31 provides a
thorough discussion of programming controls.
6.5. Programming Controls
In line with the recognized objective of generating
technically sound programs, the ADP security program should
include controls in the areas of program design, acceptance
testing and standards. Each of these topics is discussed
in t he following sections.
6.5.1. Program Design
There are five major program areas in which design
can contribute to security. First is the inclusion of au-
dit trails in the programming process. The basic objective
is to make it possible at any point in time to determine
the status of a given piece of data. In most cases the
systems analysts and system designers will want to involve
the auditor in the design phase as he will be able to
postulate the optimum placement of audit trails and
controls
.
The second is the development of a test plan that
will consider all possible elements of input, and the in-
terfaces and operational aspects of each new program as
part of the program design effort rather than as an after-
thought. It is not enough to test a program for ranges of
likely input; it should also be tested for improbable, il-
legal and impossible input. In addition, stand-alone tests
usually are not sufficient to establish the adequacy of a
given program or module. Not all programs need to meet the
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same test criteria; the stringency of the testing should
be a function of importance, complexity and sensitivity.
Development of written testing guidelines tailored to the
needs of the ADP facility is an important step in achiev-
ing good control.
The third control area is program change. Pro-
grams should be designed to simplify installation of future
changes. Every change, even those involving only one
statement, should be authorized, approved, and documented
with no exceptions. Otherwise, control is lost and the
programming process becomes anarchistic. Program library
maintenance packages, as mentioned previously, can help in
the control and maintenance of program changes. Naming
conventions are essential to program change control. The
current trend is toward integrated data definitions for
all ADP applications, so that every element will be unique.
Controls on the accuracy of data records are the
fourth design objective. There are a wide range of possi-
ble checks including keypunch verification, computer match-
ing against predetermined legal values for fields,
self-checking digits and control fields. Standard de-
sign criteria should include the qualitative controls to
be included in any new application or any revision of an
old application.
Finally, quantitative controls where feasible
should also be installed during the design process. These
could include control totals, run-to-run counts (hash
totals), trailer records, dollar controls, automatic check-
points/interruption routines, verification of the output
and input record counts and the like. Violation of quali-
tative and quantitative controls should cause error notifi-
cations maintained as an error suspense file.
The need for quantitative and qualitative controls
should be determined by the risk analysis. If the applica-
tion is of high value, high risk, or consumes a great deal
of ADP resources, these controls should receive more atten-
tion than low risk, low visibility applications.
6.5.2. Program Installation
One of the most sensitive points in the programming
process is the release of an application to the production
system, and its operation against a live data base. In-
stallation of a new program should occur only after thorough
program system tests have been completed and approved. The
more organizational entities participating in this approval,
the better the control. The programmer, a testing or
126

quality control function, operations, and users should
all participate in getting the program from design to final
acceptance test and into the live system. However, care
should be taken to see that approval does not become a mere
ritual. Each program should receive detailed, independent
review. Larger ADP facilities may want to consider estab-
lishing a separate program test and control group. Smaller
ADP facilities would probably be served adequately by de-
fining specific procedures for the installation process to
be carried out by an existing group but with as much re-
view and separation of responsibilities as is possible.
Again, no program should be accepted without adequate and
complete documentation which has been reviewed and approved
by an independent body. In case of disaster or non-
availability of key programmers, the ADP facility could
find itself quite vulnerable to loss if the documentation
is inadequate.
6.5.3. Documentation of Controls
The procedural controls over data, operations, sys-
tem design, programming and acceptance testing already de-
scribed must themselves be documented if they are to be
fully effective. This is often done by preparing documents
called procedures manuals, operations and user handbooks,
or similar titles. Responsibility for producing the docu-
ments may be assigned to a procedures group in a large ADP
facility. The small ADP facility may call on individuals
to document their particular areas. In either case, the
ADP security planner should participate. He should analyze
the security objectives of the ADP facility as discussed
above to determine the role of the practices or standards
in accomplishment of security goals. Based both on these
security objectives as well as on ADP management goals, a
procedures program should be formulated for the ADP
facility. [Ref. 10: pp. 60-62]
b. Operating System Controls
An operating system is defined as:
An integrated collection of service routines for supervis-
ing the sequencing and processing of programs by a com-
puter. Operating systems control the allocation of
resources to a user and their programs and play a central
role in ensuring the secure operation of a computer sys-
tem. Operating systems may perform debugging, input-
output, accounting, resource allocation, compilation,
storage assignment tasks, and other "system" related func-
tions. Synonymous with terms such as "Monitor," Executive,'
"Control Program," and "Supervisor." [Ref. 4: p. A-13]
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Enger and Howerton state that the following se-
curity features should be included in an operating system.
• The operating system should maintain an unbroken audit
trail. The design should not allow a user to disable
audit controls or to access all system information.
• User jobs should not be permitted to read or write out-
side an assigned storage area, and a user should not be
ablt to access the monitor or supervisor mode.
• Maintenance personnel should not be able to bypass
security controls while performing maintenance work.
At such times the system is vulnerable to errors or
intentional acts of the maintenance personnel or anyone
else who might also be on the system and discover a
vulnerability (for example, microcoded sections of the
operating system may be tampered with, or sensitive in-
formation from on-line files may be disclosed)
.
• When restarting after a system crash, the system should
verify that all terminal locations which were previously
occupied are still occupied by the same individuals. An
operating system crash should not expose valuable in-
formation such as password lists or authorization tables
• The operating system should erase all scratch space as-
signed to a job after the normal or abnormal termination
of the job. It should also record that multiple copies
of output have been made from spooled storage devices.
• Files should not be read or written without having been
opened by a program instruction, and inconsistencies
should not be introduced into data because of simul-
taneous processing of the same file by two jobs.
• The operating system should protect a copy of informa-
tion as thoroughly as it protects the original.
5 . Mandatory Procedures
In accordance with OPNAVINST 5239. 1A, the following
hardware and software security measures are mandatory.
J. 3.4 HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE SECURITY FEATURES. A combi-
nation of hardware and software features is essential to
provide protection for data stored or processed in a
resource-sharing ADP system authorized to process Level I
or II data. While all of the following features may not be
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available in current hardware or software or a combination
thereof, they will be provided at the earliest date that
the state of the art permits. The available hardware/
software features outlined below should operate unabridged
whenever Level I or II data is contained in the resource-
sharing ADP system, and measures will be implemented to
provide special controls over the access to or modification
of such features. Where possible and practicable, such
features should contain two or more independent controls
which would have to malfunction simultaneously for a breach
of system security to occur.
a. The execution state of a processor should include one
or more variables, i.e., "protection state variables,"
which determine the interpretation of instructions
executed by the processor. For example, a processor
might have a master mode/user mode protection state
variable, in which certain instructions are legal
only in master mode. Modification of the protection
state variable will be constrained by the operating
system and hardware such that a user cannot access
information for which the user has no authorization.
b. The ability of a processor to access locations in
memory (hereinafter to include primary and auxiliary
memory) should be controlled. (For example, in user
mode, a memory access control register might allow
access only to memory locations allocated to the
user by the operating system.)
c. The operation of certain instructions should depend
on the protection state of the processor. For ex-
ample, instructions which perform input or output
operations would execute only when in master mode.
Any attempt to execute an instruction which is not
authorized should result in a hardware interrupt
which will permit the operating system to interrupt
and/or abort the program containing the illegal
instruction
.
d. All possible operation codes, with all possible tags
or modifiers, whether legal or not, should produce
known responses by the computer.
e. All registers should be capable of protecting their
contents by error detection or redundancy checks.
These include registers which set protection state
variables, control input or output operations, exe-
cute instructions, or which are otherwise fundamental
to the secure operation of the hardware.
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f. Any register which can be located by the operating
system should also be storable , so as to permit the
operating system to check its current contents
against its presumed contents. (The term "register"
as used in paragraphs e and f refers primarily to
index or general purpose registers rather than an
isolated address of a single storage location within
the computer.)
g. Error detection should be performed on each fetch
cycle of an instruction and its operand (e.g., parity
check and address bounds check)
.
h. Error detection (e.g., parity checks) and memory
bounds checking should be performed on transfers of
data between memory and storage devices or terminals.
i. Automatic programmed interrupt should function to
control system and operator malfunctions.
j. The identity of remote terminals for input or output
should be a feature of hardware in combination with
the operating system.
k. Read, write, and execute access rights of the user
should be verified on each fetch cycle of an instruc-
tion and its operation.
1. The user should not have access to the operating sys-
tem. A program operating in a user mode should be
prevented from performing system control functions.
As much of the operating system as possible should
run in the user mode (as opposed to the master mode)
,
and each part of the operating system should have
only as much freedom of the computer as it needs to
do its job. The operating system will contain con-
trols which provide the user with all data to which
the user is authorized access, but no more. If such
controls are not feasible, output products will be
generated only within the central computer facility
under the cognizance of the ADPSSO. As a minimum,
the operating system will control:
(1) All transfers of data between memory and on-line
storage devices; between the central computer
facility equipment and any remote device; or be-
tween on-line storage devices
(2) All operations associated with allocating ADP
system resources (e.g., memory, peripheral de-
vices, etc.); memory protection; system
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interrupt; and shifting between user and master
protection modes
(3) Access to programs and utilities authorized to
perform the various categories of maintenance
(e.g., operations which affect authorized addi-
tions, deletions, or changes to data) on the
operating system, including any of its elements
and files
(4) All other programs (user programs) so that ac-
cess to data is made via an access control and
identification system which associates the user
and user terminals in the ADP system with the
material being accessed
m. Test and Debugging Programs. For ADP systems author-
ized to process Level I classified data, user appli-
cation programs and systems programs which do not
violate the security or integrity of the ADP system
may be debugged during system operation, provided
that such activity is limited to the user mode. All
other system software development, experimentation,
testing, and debugging will be performed on a system
temporarily dedicated for these purposes.
n. Clear System Procedures. Procedures will be availa-
ble for clearing from the system, or making inacces-
sible, all Level I classified data during operations
without the required protection.
o. Shutdown and Restart. For ADP systems authorized to
process Level I classified data, the operating sys-
tem will provide security safeguards to cover un-
scheduled system shutdown (aborts) and subsequent
restart, as well as for scheduled system shutdown
and operational start-up.
p. Other Fundamental Features. The following features
of the operating system are also considered fundamen-
tal to the secure operation of an ADP system. Un-
authorized attempts to change, circumvent, or
otherwise violate these features should be detectable
and reported within a known time by the operating
system, causing an abort or suspension of the re-
sponsible user activity. In addition, the incident
will be recorded in the audit log, and the ADPSO
notified.
(1) Memory/ sotrage protection. For ADP systems au-
thorized to process Level I or II data, the
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operating system will protect the security of
the ADP system by controlling:
(a) Resource allocation (including primary and
auxiliary memory)
(b) Memory access outside of assigned areas
(c) The execution of master (supervisory) mode
instructions which could adversely affect
the security of the operating system.
(2) Memory residue. For ADP systems authorized to
process Level I data, the operating system will
ensure that Level I data or critical elements of
the system do not remain as an accessible resi-
due in memory or on on-line storage devices.
(3) Access controls. For ADP systems authorized to
process Level I or II data, access to Level I
and Level II data stored within the ADP system
will be controlled by the ADPSSO, as required by
cognizant authority, or by automatic processes
operating under separate and specific controls
within the operating system established through
hardware, software, and procedural safeguards
approved by the ADPSSO.
(4) Labels. For ADP systems authorized to process
Level I classified data, all Level I classified
data accessible by or within the ADP system will
be identified as to its classification and ac-
cess or dissemination limitations, and all out-
put of the ADP system will be appropriately
marked.
(5) Terminal identification. For ADP systems au-
thorized to process Level I data, manual and
administrative procedures and/or appropriate
hardware /software measures will be established
to assure that the terminals from which person-
nel are attempting to access Level I classified
data have been protected and that users are
authorized such access. Where a terminal iden-
tifier is used, for this purpose, it will be
maintained in a protected file.
(6) User identification. Where needed to assure
control of access and individual accountability,
each user or specific group of users of an ADP
system authorized to process Level I or Level II
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data will be identified to the ADP system by
appropriate administrative or hardware /software
measures. Such identification measures will be
in sufficient detail to enable the ADP system
to provide the user only that data and ADP pro-
ducts which the user is authorized to receive.
Application. For ADP systems authorized to process
Level I or II data, an audit log or file (manual,
automated, or a combination of both) will be main-
tained as a history of the use of the ADP system to
permit a regular security review of system activity.
For example, the log should record security related
transactions, including each access to a data file
and the nature of the access (e.g., log ins, produc-
tion of accountable outputs, creation of new data
files, and all files copied). Each accountable file
successfully accessed regardless of the number of
individual references during each "job" or "inter-
active session" should also be recorded in the audit
log. Much of the material in this log may also be
required to ensure that the system preserves informa-
tion entrusted to it. [Ref. 4: pp. J-6 - J-10]
B. DATA SECURITY
Data security is defined as "the protection of data from
accidental or malicious modification, destruction, or dis-
closure" [Ref. 21: p. 8]
.
1 . General Principles
FIPS Pub 31 provides the following guidelines on data
controls
.
Apart from conventional internal controls, the ADP se-
curity planner should particularly verify control and pro-
tection of data files. Care must be taken to see that
information which has been designated as sensitive under
Federal regulations is properly safeguarded when it is
entered into ADP data files. This may require special
handling, segregation or other techniques similar to those
used for national security information.
The ADP security planner should also evaluate physical
handling of data files at all points. He should examine
the flow of data through the ADP facility to identify
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points at the input/output interfaces, during handling,
and during custodial storage, where controls may be needed
to safeguard against possible loss or destruction— and
equally important to assure that a loss will be detected.
The ADP facility should follow defined procedures in case
data is lost. Manual control techniques might include
tape/disk movement control forms, inventory logs, authori-
zation for use and special handling for critical items.
The use of a computer system for control of data files
deserves special consideration if there are a large number
of files. Many vendor supplied tape or disk library man-
agement systems provide logging and control of tapes by
volume, serial number and name; prevent unauthorized de-
struction of a data file; and provide automatic backup fa-
cilities. Such systems handle both on-line and off-line
files.
Similar systems are available to manage a program li-
brary. The typical system allows continual modification
of a program which is being developed while retaining all
previous versions. It protects against unauthorized modi-
fication, and helps with the management of program modi-
fications. Such packages, whether purchased or developed
in-house can be very useful for management and control of
data and program files.
In pre-computer days it was axiomatic to lock up sensi-
tive or important information, ledger books and vital re-
cords in a desk drawer, file or safe when not in use. The
same principle should also apply to valuable computerized
data. The tape library should be locked when unoccupied
and unauthorized persons should be excluded. Data safes
and vaults, and data control rooms should be protected in
accordance with the sensitivity and value of the material
(data) stored within. The exposure to magnetic fields
should be evaluated realistically and reasonable protec-
tive measures taken. Computer printouts should be de-
stroyed in accordance with sound procedures to prevent
disclosure. It does little good to develop extensive se-
curity controls against theft of data from the computer or
programming area and then allow the same information to be
available from waste baskets, loading docks or trash heaps.
The ADP security planner should be sure that data control
requirements are properly reflected in the physical pro-
tection program. [Ref. 10: p. 59]
2 . Mandatory Procedures for ADP Media Security
ADP media are the various substances, material or de-
vices used to store data or information in an ADP environment
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[Ref. 4: p. C-l]. These media include magnetic tapes,
disks, diskettes, disk packs, paper tape, punch cards, aper-
ture cards, cathode ray tube (CRT) displays, hard copy out-
put, core storage units, mass memory storage units, printer
ribbons, carbon paper, and computer output microfilm/micro-
fiche. The security requirements for ADP media are discussed
in Appendix C of Reference 4. The parts applicable to the
Navy Finance Center have been extracted and are included be-
low. Additionally, the applicable portions of Enclosure 14
to SECNAVINST 5211. 5C [Ref. 29], which states the Department
of the Navy guidelines for safeguarding personal information
in ADP systems, are included. The Department of the Navy has
broken ADP media into two basic categories—each of which has
its own applicable security controls.
(1) Working Copy Media—Media that is temporary in nature
(retained for 180 days or less) and stays within the
confines and control of the activity.
(2) Finished Copy—Media that is permanent in nature and
can be released to another activity only if released
by other than electrical means.
a. Classification of Media
Currently, the Navy Finance Center has data with
two different classification levels—Level II and Level III.
(1) Level II Data . Level II data is unclassi-
fied data requiring special protection such as Privacy Act
data. Personal information, which falls under the Privacy
Act, is defined as:
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...information identifiable to an individual that is inti-
mate or private, such as information pertaining to an indi-
vidual's financial, family, social, and recreational
affairs, or medical, educational, employment, or criminal
history; or information that identifies, describes, or
affords a basis for inferring personal characteristics.
[Ref. 29: p. 1 of enclosure 14]
The order goes on to state that access to personal informa-
tion shall be limited to those authorized individuals of DOD
agencies that need the information for the performance of
official duties.
(2) Level III Data . Level III data is all un-
classified data that is not included in Level II data.
Although, technically, Level II data is un-
classified, Mr. Duane Fagg, Program Manager of Security,
NAVDAC, indicated that many ADP installations within the De-
partment of the Navy treat it as classified data and follow
the security procedures for classified data. Therefore, the
following guidelines for security controls, security mark-
ings, and declassifying and clearing procedures will contain
the requirements for both unclassified, Privacy Act, and
classified data.
b. Security Controls
These are the minimum essential security controls
for ADP media. Additional controls, if needed, can be
included.
(1) Unclassified Data . Both working copy and
finished media will be controlled by Navy Finance Center SOPs
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which will ensure that an "adequate level of protection" is
provided.
(2) Privacy Act Data . All intermediate (working
copy) and final ADP products shall be controlled. ADP media,
both working copy and finished, shall be labeled to warn in-
dividuals of the presence of personal information and the
need for proper handling. Procedures shall be established
for accounting for personal information in a computer fa-
cility and for transferring storage media containing personal
information. These accounting procedures shall include ap-
propriate inventory control measures which will be documented.
For each processing period (shift) a designated person will
be responsible for ensuring that the policies for the protec-
tion of personal information are enforced. [Ref. 30: p. 6]
(3) Classified Data . Working copy media will be
dated when created, marked with the highest classification of
any data within, protected and stored in accordance with
OPNAVINST 5510. IF and destroyed in accordance with the same
reference when no longer useful.
Finished media will be marked in accordance
with section 4 of this chapter and controlled and accounted
for in accordance with OPNAVINST 5510. IF [Ref. 30].
c. Security Markings
The security marking procedures for unclassified
and classified data indicated in Section C.3 of OPNAVINST
5239. 1A will be used. Additionally, the below listed security
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marking requirements for Privacy Act Data will be followed.
[Ref. 4: p. C-3]
Any media that contains personal information
subject to the Privacy Act will have the following external
warning: "PERSONAL DATA—PRIVACY ACT OF 1974". If the media
is classified in addition to containing personal information,
a classified label shall be used in lieu of the Privacy Act
labeling. Any one or more of the following methods can be
used for the warning [Ref. 30: para. II. J]:
• Computer generated page markings that conspicuously
identify products as containing personal information.
• Stamps or labels.
• Cover sheets warning that the contents of the product
contain information covered by the Privacy Act. These
sheets would then be attached to the product. Magnetic
storage media would not be subject to this form of
marking.
d. Declassifying and Clearing Procedures
Declassifying ADP media is a procedure to erase
totally and unequivocally any and all classified information
stored on that media. Clearing ADP media is a procedure used
to erase classified information but it is not as thorough as
declassification procedures. Clearing is done when the media
will remain within the facility and is usually done for media
which will be reused. Declassification is required for media
which is to be released outside the facility [Ref. 4: p.
C-5] . Procedures for declassifying and clearing various ADP
media are outlined in Sections C.4 and C.5 of OPNAVINST
138

5239. 1A and therefore will not be repeated here. It should
be noted that these procedures pertain to classified data and
would therefore not pertain to NAVFINCEN unless its Privacy-
Act data was treated as classified data or it later included
classified data in one of its systems. However, SECNAVINST
5211. 5C, Section IV, does prescribe the following technical
safeguards for Privacy Act data.
(1) The use of encryption devices for the sole purpose of
protecting unclassified personal information trans-
mitted over communication circuits or processed on
computer systems is discouraged.
(2) When magnetic media is transferred from installations
which process personal information, steps must be
taken to ensure that personal information is not re-
leased as residue on the magnetic media.
(3) One of the following actions should be taken to pre-
clude the unauthorized recovery of temporary personal
information on magnetic storage media:
Erasure by degaussing or overwriting;
Use of a dedicated pool of magnetic storage media.
[Ref. 29: p. 5 of Enclosure 14]
C. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY
Communications security is primarily concerned with the
attacks upon information in ADP systems where such attacks
are not dependent upon gaining access to protected assets.
It is defined as:
...the protection resulting from all measures designed to
deny unauthorized persons information of value which might
be derived from the possession and study of telecommunica-
tions, or to mislead unauthorized persons in their inter-
pretation of the results of such possession and study.
Also called COMSEC. Communications security includes
cryptosecurity , transmission security, emission security,
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and physical security of communications security materials
and information. [Ref. 4: p, A-5]
Besides preventing unauthorized persons from obtaining
information, the system should also be designed to prevent
unauthorized individuals from entering false data and to re-
duce noise that causes errors [Ref. 19: p, 67]. Patrick
lists the following general principles that should be fol-
lowed to help achieve communication security.
General Principle ; The physical security of the remote
terminal where messages are originated and received is of
prime importance. If the terminal and the communications
leading to it cannot be secured, use the system only for
routine transmission.
General Principle : An unreliable communication system is
an unsecure one. The quality and integrity of each link
and each terminal must be investigated to ensure low error
rates or security cannot result.
General Principle : If intelligent terminals and fully
formulated messages are required to live with an unreliable
communications system, be sure that the features installed
to gain reliability do not also increase the risk of
exposure
.
General Principle : If store and forward message switching
computers are used in your system, audit the design and
operation carefully, as these constitute an additional set
of exposures.
General Principle : If your transmissions are so precious
as to require encryption, engage services of an expert to
assist your systems people. It must be assumed that in-
dustrial spies are experts in their specialty; you must
form a superior team to achieve the protection you seek.
[Ref. 19: p. 68]
1 . Cryptographic Security
Cryptographic security, which is sometimes referred
to as cryptosecurity
,
is used for classified data control and
is concerned with the transformation of the data so as to
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make it unintelligible to any unauthorized receiver not
having the necessary key to retransform it into intelligible
data. This transformation and retransformation of data is
usually accomplished by an encryption device. However, the
use of encryption devices solely for the purpose of protect-
ing unclassified personal data transmitted over communica-
tions circuits is discouraged unless a comprehensive risk
analysis indicates that encryption is warranted [Ref. 29: p
5 of Enclosure 14]. Since it is doubtful that a risk analy-
sis will determine that encryption devices are necessary for
NFC Cleveland, they will not be discussed in this thesis.
Additionally, data encryption is not 100% secure as it is
frequently necessary to deencrypt data when it enters a com-
puter so it can be processed. Thus a security hole is cre-
ated. If further information is desired, the reader is
directed to paragraph 5.5.2 of Reference 6.
2 . Emission Security
Emission security, which is also referred to as
emanations security, is concerned with preventing undesired
signal data emanations from being received and interpreted
by unauthorized persons. As with cryptosecurity , emission
security is primarily used in conjunction with classified
data and therefore will probably not pertain to NFC Cleve-
land. Additional information on emission security can be
found in OPNAVINST C5510.93D.
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3 . Transmission Security
...transmission security is concerned with conducting com-
munication procedures in such a way as to afford minimal
advantage to an adversely interested person who is in a
position to intercept data communictions . " [Ref. 15: p.
139]
Carroll further states that the need for transmission
security is especially important when two or more computers
and two or more remote terminals are connected to form a net-
work [Ref. 15: p. 153] . A number of subjects are included
under the heading of transmission security but two topics are
especially stressed. These are the identification of users
and locations called from and a determination if the user has
the necessary authorization for the information requested or
being entered. When designing or reviewing a communications
system, hardware and software controls should be considered
to perform the following functions:
• Authorize and verify all operator sign-ons.
• Authorize and validate the terminal or node location as
well as the device type.
• Use time-of-day authorization codes or other access
control checks to authorize access to sensitive system
components
.
• Test for message sequencing to protect against the
"record and replay" threat.
• Provide for message rejection and proper notification
if authorization tests are not met.
• Validate routing, addresses, message content, and other
format constraints.




• Employ checksums and other positive assurances that the
message sent was correctly delivered.
• Use time-dependent parameters not included in the plain
text message, or relate responses to parameters hidden
in a previous request.
• In "query and response" systems, use an element not in
the plain text of the query as a factor in the response
to validate it. [Ref. 9: pp. 114-115]
4
.
Physical Security of Communications Materials
Physical security measures have already been dis-
cussed in Chapter V. Procedures to control physical access
should be applied to the following communication devices:
• Terminals and modems;
• Telephone frame rooms where data are transmitted or
received;
• Dedicated communications lines to and from distribution
points;
• Communications switching centers;
• Local and remote concentrators;
• All processing nodes in the network. [Ref. 9: p. 114]
5 Other Considerations
Although not listed as a specific part of communica-
tions security, as defined by DON, communications integrity
should be considered when designing or reviewing a communica-
tions system. If the system can not transmit a message
accurately and in a reasonable amount of time, it may cause
incorrect or untimely data to be processed. The following
techniques designed to detect and correct communication line
errors should be considered.
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• Error detection codes, such as horizontal and vertical
parity checks or polynomial check codes.
• Manually- initiated corrective actions, such as direct
retransmission, retransmission at slower speeds, or
retransmission at a later time.
• Systems-initiated corrective actions, such as automatic
retransmission if acknowledgment is negative (NAK)
.
• Alternative routing schemes, such as those that are a
part of most distributed networks.
• Establishment of a technical control center to focus
communications system control and maintenance activity.
(This approach enhances reliability, centralized per-
formance monitoring, diagnosis, and repair functions.
A technical control center is especially valuable in a
mixed vendor environment; it helps avoid the usual
"finger-pointing." However, due to the highly sensitive
nature of such a facility, particular care must be exer-
cised over personnel selection, physical protection, and
procedures.
)
• Backup and redundancy of essential equipment. The ex-
tent and scope depends on the criticality of the com-
munications function and the topology of the network
(a distributed network has some inherent backup caba-
bility; a hierarchical network is vulnerable to single-
element failures). Ref. 9: p. 114]
6 . Mandatory Procedures
OPNAVINST 5239. 1A does not list any mandatory proce-
dures for facilities processing Level II data. It does,
however, provide a description of a number of available
countermeasures in paragraphs F.6 and F.8 [Ref. 4: pp. F-33 -
F-43] . Additionally, control measures for message input,
transmission, and reception, and accounting are listed in
Chapter 7 of Reference 24. As for other control procedures,
a risk assessment should be undertaken to determine which




The purpose of this chapter is to define an ADP security
contingency plan and explain how one is best developed. ADP
contingency plan development is discussed in Chapter 7 of
OPNAVINST 5239. 1A but it shall be amplified upon in this
chapter. It should be understood that contingency planning
is just a part of the overall ADP security plan.
A. DEFINITION
Contingency planning is an accepted and recommended
management practice which provides for well thought out
responses either to preclude or, at least, to mitigate the
harmful effects of potential disruptive events. Prior to
preparing contingency plans for data processing activities,
it is necessary to perform a risk analysis to determine the
critical ADP systems and to weigh the threats and vulnera-
bilities as they relate to the organization. Potential
emergency situations can then be anticipated, strategies
for coping with them can be developed, and finally, a pre-
determination of expected responses to each type of emer-
gency can be made. Contingency planning should, of course,
include the actions which must be taken in response to
major disasters such as floods and hurricanes. However,
it is essential to remember that due to their greater fre-
quency of occurrence, minor, more mundane events such as
hardware and software failures, and operator errors, cause
far greater disruption of service. Contingency planning,
if it is to be effective, should include the means to pre-
vent, or to recover from, minor disruptions as well as
catastrophic situations. [Ref. 31: p. 3]
B. SUPPORTING REASONS
The growing dependence during the past two decades of
virtually all Federal agencies on ADP resources continues
today at an unprecedented rate. This expanding dependence
increases the importance of plans to prevent loss of ADP
service to vital agency functions and activities.
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Until very recently computers were widely regarded as
simply a faster and more cost effective means of performing
already established manual procedures. Also, when a com-
puter failure occurred, it was possible to revert to the
old manual processes with little more effect on the organi-
zation than inconvenience. Today, however, the computer
must be considered a means of doing what cannot otherwise
be done without it. Further, reverting to manual processes
upon loss of the ADP resources, for whatever reason, is
usually not practical and often quite impossible. It is
critical that management recognize this dependence on the
ADP resources in order to fully appreciate its own role in
contingency planning. The plans should offer adequate as-
surance that any reasonably anticipatable interruption of
an ADP facility's services will not preclude the continued
execution of the agency's mission. [Ref. 31: pp. 3-4]
Besides the logical reasoning in support of ADP contin-
gency planning, there are formal requirements for contingency
planning. OPNAVINST 52 39. 1A requires the preparation, docu-
mentation, testing and evaluation of ADP contingency plans,
at the least, on an annual basis [Ref. 4: p. 7-1] . Other
specific government directives that require contingency plans
for ADP activities follow.
• Public Law 93-579 (Privacy Act of 1974) , Subsection
3(e) (5) requires that agencies maintaining systems of
records subject to the Privacy Act shall: "maintain all
records .. .with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness and
completeness as is reasonably necessary...." Further,
subsection (3) (e) (10) stipulates that agencies shall:
"establish appropriate administrative, technical, and
physical safeguards to insure the security and confi-
dentiality of records and to protect against any
anticipated threats or hazards to their security or
integrity. ..."
• Federal Property Management Regulations (FPMR) . The
General Services Administration (GSA) has published com-
prehensive requirements for ADP contingency planning in
41 CFR, Chapter 101, subparts 101-35 and 101-36, FPMR.
• Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-71,
Transmittal Memorandum Number 1, July 27, 1978 con-
tains a wide range of requirements on computer security
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including contingency planning. In particular, it re-
quires that each agency must include in its security
program policies and responsibilities for assuring that
appropriate contingency plans are developed, tested and
maintained. [Ref. 31: pp. 5-6]
An ADP contingency plan for any size ADP facility should
address, at a minimum, the following three elements:
• Emergency Response—Emergency response procedures to
cover the appropriate emergency response to a fire,
flood, civil disorder, natural disaster, bomb threat, or
any other incident or activity, to protect lives, limit
damage, and minimize the impact on data processing
operations
.
• Backup Operations—Backup operations procedures to en-
sure that essential data processing operational tasks
can be conducted after disruption to the primary data
processing facility. (Arrangements should be made for a
backup capability, including the needed files, programs,
paper stocks and preprinted forms, etc., to operate the




• Recovery Actions—Recovery actions procedures to facili-
tate the rapid restoration of a data processing facility
following physical destruction, major damage, or loss of
data.
To the extent possible, contingency plan documents should
be brief so as to facilitate their usefulness and accep-
tance by the users. The plan should be tested on a recur-
ring basis and modified as changes in the data processing
facility workload dictate. Critical applications should
be operated on the backup system regularly to ensure that
it can properly process this workload. [Ref. 32: p. 6]
C. CONTINGENCY PLAN DEVELOPMENT
Two things are essential to the development of ade-
quate, cost-effective, and workable contingency plans.
First, the mission of the parent organization must be
identified. These usually represent a relatively small
percentage of the total ADP workload. Second, the re-
sources essential to the accomplishment of these specific
functions must also be identified. A formal risk analysis,
as described in FIPS PUB 65, Guideline for ADP Risk Analy-
sis, or other similar methodologies, will provide the data
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from which identification of both critical functions and
critical resources can be derived. Once this is done,
preparation of the plan may be begun in a logical, syste-
matic manner. Generally, the plan is developed in three
parts—Preliminary Planning, Preparatory Actions, and the
Action Plan. [Ref. 31: p. 7]
D. ELEMENTS OF AN ADP CONTINGENCY PLAN
The elements of an ADP contingency plan are as follows:
1. Preliminary Planning (Part One). This part establishes
ground rules for the remainder of the plan, i.e., it
describes the purpose, scope and assumptions relevant
to the plan. It also assigns responsibilities, and
describes the organizational strategy for coping with
emergencies. The strategies selected will, to a large
extent, directly influence the development and amount
of detail in the following two parts of the plan.
2. Preparatory Actions (Part Two). This part contains
sections which describe how the organization is to
respond to an emergency. For example, instructions
should be developed which specify how to maintain the
contents of off-site storage, how to form backup teams,
how to determine applications and system software re-
quirements needed for different situations, and how to
establish communications requirements. This part of
the plan is prepared in as much detail as possible
since it should be read and studied beforehand by those
who ultimately must respond to an emergency.
3. Action Plan (Part Three). This part consists of three
sections which document what to do when an emergency
happens. It is not intended to be a tutorial, but
should state concisely the actions necessary to effect
the organizational strategies which were selected
earlier and documented in part one of the plan. The
three sections of this part are:
a. Emergency Response Actions. This category includes
those actions which employees must take immediately
upon the occurrence of an emergency to protect
lives and other resources. These actions are ty-
pically necessary upon the occurrence of major
events such as tornadoes, floods, fire and earth-
quakes, as well as in instances of more common




Backup Operations Actions, This category includes
those actions necessary to effect temporary opera-
tions at an alternate location when operations at
the home facility are no longer possible for what-
ever reason. These may entail transportation of
files, office supplies, equipment, a variety of
other materials, and the employees to the alternate
site, and the initiation of ADP operations for an
indeterminate period of time.
Recovery Actions. This section should describe
what must be done to restore permanent operations
at the home facility following a disaster or major
disruption of service. Included may be plans to
rebuild the facility, lease alternate facilities
and equipment, etc. [Ref. 31: pp. 8-9]
E. STRATEGIES TO BE USED IN CONTINGENCY PLAN DEVELOPMENT
Strategies that may be used in contingency plan de-
velopment are as follows:
Strategy 1—No Hardware Backup
Some few organizations need an ADP facility to perform
their mission, but will not be seriously harmed if they are
completely without it for periods of time possibly as long
as two weeks. It is the nature of these operations that
they are rarely, if ever, dynamic, transaction-oriented,
communications dependent shops. In these few cases in
which dependence on ADP is not immediate and critical, it
is not unreasonable to assume that the original hardware
can be repaired or replaced at the current or another loca-
tion in time to avoid major loss provided only that other
dependencies, such as people, data, and programs, are
suitably protected through backup procedures. Believing
that backup of hardware facilities is not required is not
sufficient justification for ignoring contingency planning.
Further, a sound risk analysis must support the conclusion
that no backup arrangement is required.
Strategy 2--Mutual Aid Agreements
Mutual aid agreements are at least conceptually possi-
ble when one facility can accept, without serious harm to
its supported organizations, the critical work of another
temporarily inoperative facility. Technically practicable
transportability of work between two facilities requires
that data and programs from one be acceptable to the other
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without other than the most modest change and, preferably,
no change at all. Rehearsals are essential, and it should
be recognized that they are usually costly, and generate
unwelcome disruption to the shop providing backup. The
rehearsals must include full operability of the critical
systems of the facility which is down. These practice
sessions or rehearsals must be thoroughly realistic and
not, for example, depend on the use of any resources from
the inoperative facility for operation at the backup site.
These are very difficult to conduct in a mutual-aid en-
vironment. To assure compatibility with the backup system,
it is highly recommended that critical applications be run
(daily, if necessary) at the backup facility as part of the
normal job stream (with test data, files, etc.) . Quite
often, the site providing the backup support must drop some
of its less than critical workload in order to provide the
support to another facility. Also, the differences in
security requirements between the sites must be considered.
For example, clearance requirements at the backup site
may preclude the entry of operators from the inoperative
facility unless prior clearances have been obtained.
It is difficult at best to make mutual aid arrangements
totally reliable. Changes in either system (a highly
likely occurrence) may instantly render the arrangement
invalid. Further, management shifts may invalidate the
arrangements with only short notice leaving a previously
supported facility without backup.
While mutual aid agreements are conceptually feasible,
they rarely, if ever, prove to be totally reliable. The
penalty to the shop needing support of discovering in time
of need that backup is not actually available is generally
too great to warrant complete confidence in this strategy.
Strategy 3—Contingency Centers
Contingency Centers are facilities established to pro-
vide a location into which an ADP organization which has
lost its own facility can move temporarily to reestablish
its operations, either completely or limited to critical
systems only. These centers may be cooperatively owned by
several organizations to back up the owners' facilities,
or they may be established as profit-making ventures which
sell rights to their use through membership fees, dues, and
other charges. The evolution of these centers is still
quite recent—too recent, in fact, for there to be a large
body of experience to support their workability or to pro-
vide guidance as to the potential pitfalls to be avoided.
Determining the feasibility of using such centers is not
complex, does not seem to have hidden pitfalls, and thus
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should be relatively easy to do if based upon the results
of the risk analysis. There are many situations in which
such centers may well be the most cost-effective route to
go, while there are others in which they are not an appro-
priate means of backup. Again, the decision must be made
on a facility-by-facility basis.
Strategy 4—One Facility, More Than One Location
This is achieved by having ADP in two geographically
separated locations, the smallest of which is large enough
to carry the critical workload for the few days needed to
reestablish the inoperative facility. This strategy does
not imply the installation of excess capacity great enough
to carry the critical work—only the physical dispersion
of the normal capability into two or more locations. The
economic feasibility of this is based on the frequently
confirmed assumption that, for the majority of facilities,
the critical workload is less than 50% (commonly less than
20%) of the total load so that no increase in total ADP
capacity is required. Hardware often does not divide
cleanly into two halves, but there is usually no require-
ment to have precisely 50% at each site. Any split which
will suit the need for processing the critical work at
either location is adequate, provided, of course, that the
backup facility converts its workload to include only its
critical functions.
Realization of all of the potential benefits of the
two-location option requires that full capability to run
critical workload exists at both locations. This generally
requires availability of the full range of essential skills
to be available at each site. This might, but does not
necessarily, mean significant added costs. However, the
feasibility of this depends heavily on the size of the
operation being considered. [Ref. 32: pp. 14-17]
F. COURSES OF ACTION TO BE USED DURING RECOVERY PHASE
The following courses of action should be considered
during the recovery phase of a contingency plan.
1. Repair/Restore Current Facility. ADP Facility
Damaged—Backup Facilities Available for Critical
Processing.
2. Rebuild Facility at Current Site. ADP Facility De-
stroyed, No Backup Facility/Hardware Available.
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3. Build New Facility at Different Location. ADP Fa-
cility Destroyed, Management Not Satisfied with Current
Location. [Ref. 32: p. 17]
G. ITEMS TO BE SUPPORTED DURING CONTINGENCY PLAN
IMPLEMENTATION
The following items must be supported in case of an emer-












9. Power and Environmental Controls
r
10. Documentation.
In case of an emergency, each of the above areas should
be considered and, hopefully, a plan of action for that area
would have been pre-developed.
H. SIZE AND DETAIL OF AN ADP CONTINGENCY PLAN
The value of a plan is not necessarily proportional to
its size. The indiscriminate inclusion of material of
doubtful value in the plan will seriously downgrade its
usefulness to the organization. While no recommendation is
made concerning the length of a contingency plan, most or-
ganizations should find that the plan will fit comfortably
in a regular loose-leaf notebook. Continuous effort will
be required to keep the plan trim and concise, yet suffi-
ciently detailed to communicate the relevant information.
[Ref. 31: pp. 9-10]
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I. TESTING OF THE ADP CONTINGENCY PLAN
One of the more important aspects of successful con-
tingency planning is the continual testing and evaluation
of the plan itself. Quite simply, a plan which has not
been tested cannot be assumed to work. Likewise, a plan
documented, tested once and then filed away to await the
day of need provides no more than a false sense of se-
curity. . . .The test plans should form a formal part of the
contingency plan documentation and be as fully subject to
the review and approval process as the other sections of
the plan. [Ref. 32: pp". 27-28]
A sample outline of a comprehensive contingency plan is in-
cluded in Appendix C.
From the discussion in this chapter, the reader should
understand what an ADP contingency plan is, why it is de-
veloped, and the basic ingredients of a sound ADP contin-
gency plan. Training and emergency exercises that are
affected by contingency planning are discussed in Chpater X
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IX. COMPLIANCE WITH SECURITY DIRECTIVES
A. COMPLIANCE RESPONSIBILITY
The commanding officer, local front line supervisors, and
the ADP security staff are all responsible for ensuring com-
pliance with ADP security directives [Ref. 4: p. 8-1]. It
should be noted that, for ADP security, the term "commanding
officer" includes contracting officers who are responsible




The responsibility to review a command for com-
pliance with security directives is shared by a number of
positions and agencies. Commanding officers, including the
applicable contracting officers, should review their own
agencies at least every three years to ensure compliance with
security directives. In addition to the commanding officer's
review, auditors, Inspector Generals, personnel from the
Naval Investigative Service (NIS) and all other DON agencies
and organizations that are involved in investigations, moni-
toring, review or detection functions at any level include
in their programs the evaluation of ADP security programs at
DON activities [Ref. 4: p. 8-1].
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2 . Elements to be Reviewed
The commanding officer's review should be comprehen-
sive and thorough. Emphasis should be placed on the review
and testing of contingency plans. The following is a minimum
list of items that should be included in the review. Addi-
tional items may be included.
1. Risk assessment review;
2. Contingency plans review;
3. Security test and evaluation review;
4. Accrediation documentation review;
5. Fraud, waste, abuse or theft;
6. Accidental or deliberate disclosure of information to
unauthorized persons;
7. Risk of financial loss;
8. Infringement on personal privacy or acts contrary to
the Privacy Act of 1974;
9. Unauthorized destruction or modification of data;
10. Unauthorized use of DON ADP resources. [Ref. 4: pp.
3-1 - 8-2]
C. SECURITY INCIDENTS
In spite of the best efforts to prevent security inci-
dents—violations of security regulations—they are almost
certain to occur. For NFC Cleveland, there are three types
of security incidents that are likely to occur. These are
disclosures of personal data, major criminal offenses and
minor criminal offenses. These latter two types of incidents
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are often caused by the violation of the Standards of Con-
duct, which provides that:
Naval personnel (military or civilian) shall not directly
or indirectly use, take, dispose, or allow the use, taking,
or disposing of, Government property or facilities of any
kind, including property leased to the Government, for
other than officially approved purposes. Government fa-
cilities, property, and manpower (such as stationary,
stenographic and typing assistance, mimeograph and chauffer
services) shall be used only for official Government
business. [Ref. 33: p. 7]




Disclosure of Personal Data
Whenever personal data protected by the Privacy Act
of 1974 is improperly disclosed, an incident report will be
prepared and submitted in accordance with SECNAVINST 5211.5C
[Ref. 4: p. 8-2]
.
2 Major Criminal Offenses
Major criminal cffenses are defined as offenses
"punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice by
confinement for a term of more than one year, or similarly
framed by federal statutes, state, local, or foreign laws
or regulations" [Ref. 34: p. 1] . All major criminal of-
fenses will be reported to NIS for investigation unless they
are susceptible to administrative resolution without the need
for professional investigative techniques. Matters that
could be administratively resolved by a fact finding body,
informal inquiry or administrative audits and are without
criminal basis would not be major criminal offenses.
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Incidents that could be administratively resolved might have
resulted from accident, negligence, incompetency, or some
similar non-criminally motivated reason. Included as major
criminal offenses is the theft or loss of any serialized
government property worth $100.00 or more; or unserialized
government property worth $500.00 or more. Value is defined
as the greater of current market value or government price
list [Ref. 35: p. 1], It is the commanding officer's re-
sponsibility to immediately report all major criminal of-
fences to the nearest Naval Investigative Service field
component [Ref. 34: p. 1].
3 . Minor Criminal Offenses
Minor criminal offenses are defined as offenses
"punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice by
confinement of 1 year or less, or carrying similar punishment
by federal, state, local, or foreign statute or regulation..."
[Ref. 34: p. 2]. When minor criminal offenses occur the
investigation capabilities of the command should be used.
Examples of these organic investigations are military police,
provost marshals, and security or guard forces. Off base
investigation activities, other than the normal liaison with
local law enforcement agencies, shall be held to a minimum
and should pertain only to the immediate area surrounding the




Any unusual or difficult security problems that occur
during the administration of the security program should be
reported to the Naval Data Automation Command (NAVDAC) . Al-
though it is not mandatory that these reports be signed, a
signature would aid NAVDAC in determining if the problem was
widespread or restricted to a specific system or command.
Reports should be in sufficient detail to concisely describe
the problem and offer any recommended solution. These re-




X. ADP SECURITY TRAINING PLAN
A good ADP security plan is only as effective as the
training plan that supports it. Chapter 10 and Appendix D
of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A are excellent guides to ADP security
training. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to il-
luminate the high points of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A with respect
to security training while integrating security test and
evaluation procedures into the plan.
A. RESPONSIBILITIES
Commanding officers are responsible for taking appro-
priate action to provide their ADP security staff with the
training and experience required. The depth of knowledge
and degree of experience required in the ADP security staff
are dependent on the size and complexity of the ADP en-
vironment and the level of data being processed.
Each member of the ADP security staff (after being
properly trained) is charged with ensuring that activity
personnel are adequately trained in ADP security. [Ref.
4: p. 10-1]
B. FORMAL ADP SECURITY TRAINING
Two 40-hour ADP security courses will be offered in
support of the Department of the Navy security program.
The first 40-hour course will be a basic course covering
ADP security policy, risk assessment, accreditation, and
requirements/plans for contingency planning. The second
40-hour course will be more advanced for GS 334 11/13 ' s
and includes audit/ inspection techniques and procedures and
case studies on performing an internal audit, IG inspec-
tion, and ST&E. It is planned to conduct courses on-site
at the Navy Regional Data Automation Centers. Course in-




The first action that should be taken after security
staff members are identified should be to send as many of
these personnel as possible to these formal training courses.
The greater the depth of knowledge and the more widespread it
is, the stronger the ADP security program at an individual
activity will be.
C. TARGET TRAINING AUDIENCE
The following personnel are included in the target










6. Procurement staff. [Ref. 4: p, D-2]
Basically, anyone that uses or benefits from the facility
should be aware of ADP security. This is why it is important
for the Commanding Officer to actively show his support in
the development of a sound ADP security program.
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D. TOPIC AREAS TO BE COVERED
Suggested topic areas are as follows;
1. General security awareness;
2. User security;
3. Security administration;











15. Contingency /back-up planning;
16. Disaster recovery;
17. Security accreditation;
18. Security Test and Evaluation (ST&E)
;
19. ADP security and Navy interface. [Ref. 4]
These ADP security training areas are more fully devel-
oped in Appendix D of Reference 4. Methods of training and
persons responsible for conducting the training are further
delineated in Figure 10-1 of Reference 4.
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E. NFC ADP SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
What is the environment at the NFC, Cleveland? Like
many other Department of Defense (DOD) activities, security
awareness is only beginning to spread. There is only a small
nucleus of personnel with any professional training in ADP
security. This is why ADP security training with emphasis
on security awareness must be the initial step toward a
realistic ADP security plan at the NFC.
The small nucleus of personnel with some computer se-
curity expertise must be expanded to include a sufficient
number of people to form the first formal ADP security staff
at the NFC. This group must be the experts in ADP security
for the NFC. In order for this group to become experts, they
must first be afforded the opportunity of formal ADP security
training. It is recommended that as many members as possible
of the ADP security staff should attend the aforementioned
40-hour courses on ADP security that are offered by the DON.
Security staff development should not hinge upon the availa-
bility of billets for projected staff members to attend the
formal courses offered by the DON. Other DOD and DON acti-
vities listed in Chapter 10 of Reference 4 will provide ADP
security training assistance upon request.
F. SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL TRAINING MATERIALS
Training provided by external command sources should be
prefaced by some selected readings on the subject of ADP
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security. Establishing a library of readings on ADP se-
curity would be a good goal for the first group of potential
ADP security staff members. In addition to Reference 4 and
its bibliography as potential sources of information, the
following readings and their bibliographies are suggested
for review:
1. A thesis prepared by Philip A. Myers that is titled




The Marine Corps Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Se-
curity Manual (Marine Corps Order P5510.14) that is
dated 2 January 1981. [Ref. 37]
After the initial ADP security staff has achieved suffi-
cient training to give them creditability , it will be their
task to coordinate an active ADP security training plan for
the remainder of the command.
G. ADP SECURITY TRAINING PLAN DEVELOPMENT
There are six basic requirements that should be considered
in the development of an ADP security training plan. Besides
overall ADP security awareness, it has been suggested that
there are five basic requirements that should be considered
for ADP systems that handle or process classified information.
It may be debated that, since the NFC processes only Privacy
Act data which does not qualify as classified, it is felt
that these five requirements may apply to the NFC ADP fa-




An ADP system which is used to process or handle classified
or other definitely categorized sensitive information shall
clearly store and maintain the integrity of classification
or other sensitivity marking labels for all information.
The system shall assure that the classified or other sensi-
tive information is accurately marked when included in out-
put from the ADP system. [Ref. 38: p. 8]
Requirement 2 --Mandatory Security
The computer system must be able [to] enforce the formal
system of information control reflected in the security
classification designation and special handling restriction
set associated with the sensitive information handled or
processed by the ADP system together with the clearance set
associated with the individuals who may request access to
the information. [Ref. 38: p. 9]
Requirement 3—Discretionary Security
The computer system must be able to enforce access limita-
tions placed on classified or other sensitive information
based on identified individuals or groups of individuals
who have been determined to have a Need-to-Know for the
information. [Ref. 38: p. 10]
Requirement 4—Accountability
An ADP system which is used to process or handle classified
information shall make provision for individual accounta-
bility whenever classified information is generated or
accessed. [Ref. 38: p. 11]
Requirement 5—Continuous Protection
The security relevant portions of a trusted computer system
must be maintained under continuous control to assure that
unauthorized changes have not been made which could pos-
sibly subvert the system's ability to control classified
information. [Ref. 38: p. 12]
It is suggested that these five requirements serve as
areas to be considered in the development of the NFC ADP
security training plan. Although the five requirements are
discussed with equal importance, the requirement of
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accountability must be understood by all persons, clearly
established, and appropriate action should be taken when ac-
countability responsibilities are not maintained.
How does Security Test and Evaluation (ST&E) interface
with the establishment of an ADP security training plan?
Before answering this question, we should more clearly es-
tablish the purpose of ST&E.
Security Test and Evaluation (ST&E) is a part of the Ac-
creditation process. The primary purpose for conducting
an ST&E is to obtain technical information to support the
DAA's decision to accredit an ADP activity or network.
[Ref. 4: p. 6-1]
With purpose established, the first step of ST&E requires
individuals with knowledge of the following:
1. ADP security;





7. Personnel, procedural and administrative security;
8. User/customer functions. [Ref. 4: pp. 6-1 - 6-2]
H. TRAINING INTERFACE WITH SECURITY TEST AND EVALUATION
(ST&E)
The list of knowledge required of individuals to perform
a ST&E overlaps with the subjects in a well-developed ADP
security training plan. With the goal of ST&E being ADP
facility accreditation, the importance of a good ADP security
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training plan is more clearly established. With the require-
ment for ADP facility accreditation to be re-established at a
minimum of once every five years [Ref. 4], the importance of
a continually updated active ADP security training plan is
emphasized. An active ADP security training program should
ensure that any ADP facility be able to pass ST&E require-
ments and maintain facility accreditation.
The purpose of this chapter has been to identify subject
areas that should be included in an ADP security training
plan, show the relationship between ST&E and ADP security





The purpose of this chapter is to establish the need for
an effective internal audit program to monitor ADP security.
Internal audit program development and implementation will
be discussed. Further discussion will be provided on pro-
cedures that can be used in preparation for an audit con-
ducted by external auditors.
There are two types of auditors that will be discussed.
They are external and internal auditors. The external
auditor is anyone that is not from the immediate organiza-
tion, the NFC, Cleveland, Ohio. External auditors with which
NFC Cleveland, Ohio would be primarily concerned are General
Accounting Office (GAO) and Naval Audit Service (NAVAUDSVC)
representatives. "Internal audit within the DON is the re-
sponsibility of the Naval Audit Service (NAVAUDSVC)" [Ref.
4: p. 9-1] , but for the purposes of this paper the NAVAUDSVC
will be considered external to the NFC.
OPNAVINST 5239. 1A establishes the relationship between
NAVAUDSVC and GAO where their two primary standards for
audit of ADP systems are the same [Ref, 4: p. 9-2]. This
seems like a logical situation and the establishment of an
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internal ADP audit organization at the NFC with the same
standards would be a natural progression of events.
B. INTERNAL AUDIT
1 . Supporting Reasons
OPNAVINST 5239. 1A clearly states that "external
audit and audit assistance are not intended as substitutes
for continuing review of ADP security" [Ref. 4: p. 9-3]. It
goes on to establish five basic objectives for the internal
auditor. Objective 5 should be of particular interest to
NFC personnel in support of the establishment of an activity
ADP internal audit program. Objective 5 is as follows:
Objective 5. To provide assurance that ADP systems/appli-
cations conform with applicable legal requirements. Early
and continuing auditor review in the design and development
process should confirm compliance with legal requirements
through adoption of countermeasures, controlled responses
to information requests, and conformance with adopted
standards. Examples include State and Federal statutes,
Freedom of Information Act, DOD and DON directives, and
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) . [Ref. 4:
p. 9-4]
The following quote from a GAO report further estab-
lishes why we need a strong internal audit program.
Federal agencies are placing heavier and heavier reliance
on computers, with a proportionate increase in vulnerabili-
ties. The consensus of Government and industry computer
security experts is that computer security audit, as a
function of agency internal audit, should be recognized as
a key element in a system of management control. Agencies
fall short of making this important provision for manage-
ment control. [Ref. 39: p. 48]
In further amplification of the objectives or purpose
of the internal audit function, the following is applicable.
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Internal audit organizations should become involved in the
design, development, and test phases of a new computer sys-
tem as a normal part of the audit function to help ensure
that adequate security is built in before a new system goes
into operation. Since technical controls usually are an
integral part of the whole system, and can not easily be
retrofitted at a later date, these early phases in the sys-
tem's life-cycle are the optimum time for control safe-
guards to be incorporated. Independent internal audit
involvement is highly desirable to ensure that factors to
enhance auditability , audit trails for security, and
quality output are designed and developed into new sys-
tems. Emphasis during these stages may otherwise be on
operational priorities and implementation time goals at
the expense of the above goals. [Ref. 39: p. 49]
2 . Problems in Establishment of Internal Audit Function
With the objectives or purpose clearly established,
why should there be a problem with the establishment of a
viable ADP internal audit organization?
A primary reason for lack of significant internal audit
involvement in computer security was that most agencies'
audit organizations do not have adequate personnel with ADP
expertise. Officials of seven agencies informed us that
their ADP capabilities ranged from no qualifications to
perform indepth security type reviews to limited abilities.
We found little evidence of use of outside contracted
resources to increase internal audit capability. In one
instance, we were told the reason was that the audit group
did not even have the expertise to specify tasks and pa-
rameters within which consultants could operate.
Our September 1977 report on the low incidence of com-
puter audit conducted in executive agencies cited auditors'
lack of technical ADP knowledge as a barrier to performing
effective ADP audit by the organizations whose involvement
was found to be inadequate. We recommended to heads of
agencies that they develop adequate expertise in their in-
ternal audit organizations. We found that previously cited
deficiencies are still prevalent. This is of increasing
concern since agencies' operations are becoming heavily
committed to computers, and computer technology is in a
dynamic state needing constant monitoring and review.
[Ref. 39: p. 50]
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With the mandate to establish an ADP internal audit
program and the problems of establishing a program very
clear, what course of action must be taken by NFC Cleveland,
Ohio to solve its problems and establish a viable internal
audit function? The assumption has been made that the prob-
lems at the NFC are similar to those at other government
agencies
.
3 . Internal Audit Plan Development
The first step that must be taken is to identify the
potential members of an internal ADP audit staff. Once
identified, the professional qualifications of each po-
tential member must be carefully reviewed and deficiencies
in professional expertise should be identified. It is anti-
cipated that obtaining additional professional training for
members of this group will become a high priority item. It
is recommended that the internal ADP audit staff remain au-
tonomous from the command ADP security staff. While good
communication links should be established between the ADP
security and audit staffs, it is felt that the two staffs
must remain visibly separate in order for the audit staff
to maintain an image of credibility and continue to perform
its function objectively. It is recommended that as soon as
possible, even before all members of the audit staff are
identified, that additional outside professional training be
arranged for staff members. It should be emphasized to audit
staff members that additional professional training will be
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an ongoing endeavor in the rapidly changing environment of
ADP. Governmental agencies lack personnel with ADP security
expertise and will continue to lack personnel with expertise
if an ongoing educational program is not established at each
individual command. Who can the NFC obtain assistance from
in the area of audit program development? The NFC may re-
quest assistance from the NAVAUDSVC headquarters or one of
its regional offices [Ref. 4: p. 9-5]. It is also suggested
that as many audit staff personnel as possible should attend
either or both of the DON-sponsored 40-hour ADP Security
Courses [Ref. 4: p. D-l]. Any additional training for ADP
audit staff members in the areas of ADP security or ADP
security audit procedures would be most helpful in the de-
velopment of a good ADP security audit staff.
What action can the newly formed audit staff under-
take while they are receiving additional training? They
should review their ADP system in order to best determine in
their own minds if they feel that their system is secure.
What must a secure system be able to do?
The secure system must be able to identify all attempted
violations—accidental or malicious. Any mismatch of user
or terminal identification, password or lock word, or any
unauthorized request for processing or data requires some
reaction. At a minimum, the system should record the at-
tempt in a log. [Ref. 20: p. 81]
When the audit staff understands the basic meaning
of a secure system, they may then attempt to determine the
auditability of their ADP system. A checklist that may be
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used to determine the auditability of an ADP system is given
below:
Auditability Checklist
1. Are adequate records kept of all attempts to access
proprietary information?
2. Is a record kept of all authorized accesses that
clearly identifies the data accessed, who accessed it,
and when?
3. Is a periodic report of all authorized accesses to top-
priority information or changes to the authorized ac-
cess tables provided to management?
4. Is management provided with timely reports of unauthor-
ized access attempts?
5. Does management use the provided reports?
6. Is the record-retention period adequate for these logs?
[Ref. 20: p. 81]
Obtaining adequate professional training, establish-
ing a common understanding of a secure system and determining
the auditability of their particular ADP security system are
three initial actions that must be considered by a new ADP
audit staff.
A good internal audit program will contain continual
professional training for its members and an active ongoing
audit to continually establish the security of the ADP
system.
A suggested audit cycle format is listed in Table VI
[Ref. 20: p. 94]. This audit cycle is just a sample and
would have to be modified depending on the size of staff,






Preaudit strategy and initial audit meeting 2
Security organization Jj
Perimeter and after-hours security 4
Entrances 1/2
Employee identification 1




Information service functions 3
(Approximately 2 hours per function)
Top-priority document control 2
New product security 4
(2 days per unannounced product)
Trade secrets 4




Data processing organization 1/2
Computer center access control 1/4
Data-access control 3/4









The main thing that should be understood is that your in-
ternal ADP audit program must be an ongoing endeavor that
is conducted by well-trained professionals. The success of
your internal ADP audit program will often determine your






This paper is intended as a guide to be used by the NFC
personnel in the development of a viable ADP security plan.
An attempt has been made to combine the requirements estab-
lished by OPNAVINST 5239. 1A with selected information about
ADP security from other readings and present them in a manner
that might best assist NFC personnel in the development of an
ADP security plan.
The importance of a staff being developed with its pri-
mary purpose being ADP security cannot be overemphasized.
Since ADP security is a support function for the NFC, Cleve-
land, it should be realized that the creation of a staff with
its primary purpose being ADP security will be a problem that
must be confronted. The establishment of an ADP security
staff and their professional training in ADP security is the
first step toward the development of an ADP security plan.
When a trained ADP security staff has been established and an
initial draft made of a command ADP security plan, the on-
going awareness and training of all command personnel will
make the plan a success. Chapters on the development of an
ADP security training plan and ways to prepare for an ADP
security audit have been included.
The elements that should be included in a comprehensive
ADP security plan have each had a chapter devoted to them.
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They include risk assessment, physical security, systems
security and contingency planning. An additional chapter
has been included to discuss the necessary managerial pro-
cedures needed for the implementation of an ADP security
plan.
This paper used in conjunction with OPNAVINST 5239. 1A
should provide adequate guidance for the development of an
initial ADP security plan for the NFC Cleveland. When the
plan has been developed, its success will depend on the com-






Security /Management /Personnel Yes No Partial
1. Is there a written overall ADP system
security plan?
2. Does any type of internal audit effort
exist to determine compliance with
security procedures?
3. Have the resource impacts of site ADP
security requirements been fully
analyzed and identified?
4. Have ADP security resource requirements
been entered into command programming and
budget documents?
5. Do you have a formalized contingency plan?
6. Do your supervisors advise you of a
possibly disgruntled employee?
7. Are all employees cleared to the highest
level of data processed at the installation?
8. Do you recheck employees periodically?
9. Are security and operations personnel briefed
on how to react to civil disturbances?
10. Have appropriate personnel been briefed on the
destruction or safeguarding of classified
material in the central computer facility in
the event the facility must be evacuated?
11. Do you have people cross-trained to cover all
functions?




Building/Facility Yes No Partial
1. Is the building structurally sound?
2. Is the building on solid foundation?
3. Is the building remote from any
earthquake faults?
4. Are building and equipment properly grounded
for lightning protection?
5. Is the computer/ terminals housed in building(s)
which is fire-resistant and constructed of
non-combustible materials?
6. Are there any high risk operations near by?
7. Is battery powered emergency lighting provided?
8. Are computers excluded from areas below grade?
9. Are drains installed on floor above to divert
water accumulations away from all hardware?
10. Do you insist on the elimination of any overhead
steam or water pipes except for sprinklers?
11. Do you have adequate drainage to provent water
overhead from adjacent areas?
12. Do you have adequate drainage under the raised
floor?
13. Are large plastic sheets available to cover
equipment for quick emergency water protection?
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Power Supply Yes No Partial
1. Have you monitored your power source with
recorders to identify electrical transients?
2. If your system requires motor generators, do
you have backup?
_____
3. Do you have a back-up power supply
(diesel/elec. etc.)
4. I3 backup power tested at regular intervals?
5. In the event of power failure do you have
emergency lighting for removal of personnel?
6. Are cipher doors and fire alarm systems backed
up with battery for removal of personnel?
7. Do you have emergency power off at all exits
and within computer center? '
8. Are emergency power offs protected from
accidental activation?
9. Does the emergency power off also disable
the environmental control system?
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Environmental Supply Yes No Partial
1. Is the environmental support system specifi-
cally dedicated to the computer center?
2. Do you have backup air conditioning capability?
3. Are air intakes:
a) Covered with protective screening?
b) Located as to prevent intake of pollutants
or other debris?
4. Is compressor remote from computer room?
5. Are duct linings noncombustible?
6. Are filters noncombustible?





Fire Protection Yes No Partial
1. Is the computer housed in a building which is
constructed of fire-resistant and noncombustible
materials?
2. Is the computer room separated from adjacent
areas by noncombustible fire-resistant
partitions, walls, and doors?
3. Are flammable or otherwise dangerous activities
prohibited from adjacent areas or areas above
or below the computer room?
4. Are ceilings and support hardware (for hung
ceilings) noncombustible?
5. Is raised flooring made of noncombustible
material?
6. Are paper and other combustible supplies stored
outside the computer area?
7. Are file tapes and disks stored outside the
computer area?
8. Are smoke detectors Installed:
a) In ceiling?
b) Under raised floor?
c) In air-return ducts?
9. Do you test the smoke detection system on
a scheduled basis?
10. Does smoke detection equipment shutdown air
conditioning system?
11. Is the computer area protected by:





Fire Protection Yes No Partial
d) Wet pipe (releases water at a set
temperature)?
e) Preaction (may sound an alarm and
delay release of water)?
12. Are operators trained periodically in fire-
fighting techniques and assigned individual
responsibilities in case of fire?
13. Are portable fire extinguishers spread strate-
gically around the area with location markers
clearly visible over computer equipment?
14. Do you hold "fire drills," regularly?
15. Do you have enough fire alarm pull boxes
within the computer areas and throughout the
facility?
16. Does the alarm sound?
a) Locally?
b) At watchman station?
c) At central station?
d) At fire or police headquarters?
17. Can emergency crews gain access to the
installation without delay?
18. Do emergency crews respond in a timely
fashion?
19. Do you clean under raised floor regularly?
20. Do you prevent accumulation of trash in the
computer area?




Fire Protection Yes No Partial
22. Are tapes and disks stored outside computer
room?
23. Do you have adequate supply of firefighting
water available?
24. Are emergency power shutdown controls easily
accessible at points of exit?
23. Does emergency power shutdown include air
conditioning system?
26. Do you have battery-powered emergency
lighting throughout the computer area?
27. If access is via an electronically controlled




Physical Access Yes No Partial
1. Are guards posted at entrances.
2. Do you have a photo badge system for
positive identification of employees?
3. Do you utilize keys, cipher locks, and
other security devices to control access?
a) Are keys, ciphers, etc. changed at
regular intervals and after termination
of an employee?
4. Can an individual gain access without the
knowledge of a security guard or another
employee?
5. Is access to the computer area restricted
to selected personnel?
6. Do all personnel having unescorted access to
the system possess a clearance/special access
authorization equal to or higher than the
highest classification and all categories being
processed?
7. Are all computer operators and system programming
personnel cleared for the highest level and most
restrictive category of classified information in
the system?
8. Is the central computer facility manned by at
least two appropriately cleared personnel at all
times?
9. Do you have a visitor control procedure?




Physical Access Yes No Partial
11. Is in-house service personnel traffic
a) Controlled in vital areas?
_____
b) Supervised?
12. Is a list prepared for authorized vendor
service personnel?
_____
13. Is positive identification required for
vendor service personnel?
14. Are vendor service personnel supervised
while on premises?
15. Are vendor employee background checks verified?
;
16. Are dismissed employees of computer environment
removed immediately, their admission badges picked
up, the necessary guard personnel notified, and
their permissions to the system deleted immediately?




Data Protection Yes No Partial
1. Are files (tape, disk, or card) kept in an
area other than the computer room?
a) Is this area fire-protected?
b) Is access specifically controlled?
2. Is your tape library located in an area secure
from explosion or other dangers?
3. Are all data files maintained within and under
the control of the computer complex rather
than the user?
4. Do you maintain duplicates of all programs and
data files?
5. Do you have a current inventory of such files?
6. Are the duplicate files stored in a separate
building from the originals?
7. Do you maintain duplicates of all documentation?
8. Are the documentation duplicates stored in a
separate building?
9. Do you review your documentation backup period-
ically to ensure its current applicability?
10. Do you maintain any type of backup of source
data for programs under development?
11. Is the duplicate filed in a separate building
from the original?
12. Have you held a "dry run" in the past 3 months
to test the ease and accuracy of your file
backup system?
13. Are changes in programs and documentation
coordinated and approved by the cognizant areas:
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Data Protection Yes No Partial
14. Are changes made only to a reproduced version
of the original program file with the original
left intact?
15. Does your tape and disk accountability
procedure cover:
a) Frequency of use?
b) Frequency of cleaning?
c) Authorized user?
16. Are magnetic tapes and disks filed in an
orderly manner?
17. Are tapes stored vertically?
18. Are tapes kept in their containers except
when in use?
19. Are tape heads cleaned every shift?
20. Have you considered magnetic detection equipment
to preclude the presence of a magnet near your
tapes and disks?
21. Do you provide similar protection for your
tape files while they are in transit to a
backup site, etc.?
22. Do you use storage vaults specifically




Data Protection Yes No Partial
23. Do you have documentation standards which
include:
a) Logic or flow charts?
b) Current listing?
c) Input and output forms?
d) Output samples?
_____ _____
e) Copies of test data?
f) Adequate explanation of codes, tables
calculations, etc.?
_____




Operating System Yes No Partial
1. Are security-override procedures classified
at the highest level and the use of override
closely monitored?
2. Is program debugging of the security system
monitored and controlled?
3. Are all modifications to the operating system
monitored by the security office?
A. Do you "utilize" passwords to identify a
specific terminal and a specific user?
5. Is the password combined with physical keys
or access badges?
6. Are passwords changed frequently?
7. Is the password protection system really
tamperproof?
8. Does the system software restrict a given
individual to specific data files only?
9. Is access to the "keyword" and "lockword" files
restricted?
____
10. Are remote terminals available only to
selected individuals?
____
11. Is access to terminal controlled by:
a) Locked doors?
b) Posted guards?
12. Is the location of the terminal such that
each user's privacy is ensured?
13. Is a monitor program maintained to record all
access attempts to secure or sensitive files?
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Operating System Yes No Partial
14. Are dial-up terminals disabled from
connection to the system during periods
of classified processing?
15. Do you use a software security routine to
monitor illegal sign-on or access attempts?
a) Does this routine notify the operator
via the console?
b) Does this routine provide a hardcopy
record at the end of each shift/day?
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Software Security Yes No Partial
1. Have you restricted access to the essential
programs and software systems on a need-to-
know basis in the prime and backup areas?
2. Do you employ keyword or password protection?
3. Are the essential programs, software systems, and
associated documentation in your Program Library
located in a locked vault or secure area?
4. Have you provided backup files at a secondary
location for both the programs and the associated
documentation?
5. Are programming changes and maintenance well
controlled and documented?
6. Do you restrict terminal users to higher level
languages to prevent their access to machine
language coding?
7. Do you use a software security routine to monitor
attempts to access sensitive files by unauthorized
users?
____ ____
a) Does this routine notify the operator via
the on-line console?
_____ ___
b) Does this routine provide a record of all
such attempts via a printout at day's end?
8. Can your own software systems technologists be
depended upon not to circumvent the normal access
procedures by use of a special coding thu3
violating the integrity of the system?
9. Is a record of all operating system modifications
maintained until at least the next sofware release?
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Software Security Yes No Partial
1. Have you restricted access to the essential
programs and software systems on a need-to-
know basis in the prime and backup areas?
2. Do you employ keyword or password protection?
3. Are the essential programs, software systems, and
associated documentation in your Program Library
located in a locked vault or secure area?
4. Have you provided backup files at a secondary
location for both the programs and the associated
documentation?
5. Are programming changes and maintenance well
controlled and documented?
'
6. Do you restrict terminal users to higher level
languages to prevent their access to machine
language coding?
7. Do you use a software security routine to monitor
attempts to access sensitive files by unauthorized
users?
a) Does this routine notify the operator via
the on-line console?
b) Does this routine provide a record of all
such attempts via a printout at day's end?
8. Can your own software systems technologists be
depended upon not to circumvent the normal access
procedures by use of a special coding thus
violating the integrity of the system?
9. Is a record of all operating system modifications
maintained until at least the next sofware release?
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Audit Controls Yes No Partial
1. Are program changes adequately controlled?
_____
2. Is the log-on procedure secure?
3. Are all options of all programs really tested?
4. Do error reporting and adequate follow-up
procedures exist?
_____
5. Is input data verified against an authorized
user list?
6. Is output data verified against an authorized
user list?
7. Do you spot-check output frequency for possible
misuse of the system?
8. Do you verify all periods of- down time as to
length and reason?
9. Has the facility been evaluated in accordance with
applicable TEMPEST procedures to determine risk?
10. Has all installed ADPE been TEMPEST tested?
11. Are all changes, repairs, and modifications to
TEMPEST modified ADPE controlled so that
equipment emanations characteristics are not
altered?
_____





B.l. SAMPLE RISK ASSESSMENT TEAM CHARTER











Commanding Officer, Navy Regional Data Automation Center,
Norfolk
Risk Assessment Team Charter
(a) OPNAVINST 5239. 1A
(1) Work Plan and Schedule
1. Background
a. Reference (a) requires all Navy automatic data processing
(ADP) activities to perform a risk assessment to determine the
potential and actual threats and vulnerabilities which could cause
disruptions in service or compromise of information. Reference
(a) states that a risk assessment is to be performed whenever
major changes occur in hardware or operating systems software, or
no less frequently than once every five years. Addi t ionallv,
reference (a) outlines those action items to be accomplished when
conducting a comprehensive risk assessment.
b. The major function of this risk assessment is to provide
quantitative information upon which decisions regarding the
selection and imoler.ientation of counterineasures can be based.
Secondary functions include the documentation of assets and the
assignment of priorities to work loads.
2 . Objectives
ment are to:
The objectives of the NARDAC Norfolk risk assess-
a. Determine the current security posture of the facility
b. Recommend appropriate counterrreasures for implementation






SAMPLE RISK ASSESSMENT TEAM CHARTER
3. Risk Assessment Team Charter
a. Risk Assessment Team Leader
(1) Code 30X is designated as the team leader for the
NARDAC Norfolk risk assessment project with the authority to:
(a) Report directly to the Executive Officer on project
matters
(b) Make task assignments to primary and secondary
team members
(c) Request information from all sources within NJ.RDAC
Norfolk
(d) Establish milestones within the framework of the
risk assessment project
(2) It is the responsibility of the team leader to:
(a) Coordinate the activities of team members to minimize
duplication of effort
(b) Provide periodic reports to the Executive Officer
regarding the status of the project
(c) Make recommendations based upon the risk assessment
to correct or improve deficiencies
(d) Consolidate independent studies into a final report
b. Risk Assessment Team Members
(1) The primary team will consist of Coder. 30X, SOX, and 23.
(2) Codes 07, 09L, and 40 will supply secondary team
representatives by name by 5 June 1981 to participate on an as
required basis.
(3) Primary team members for the duration of the project
have the authority to:
^.






SAMPLE RISK ASSESSMENT TEAM CHARTER
(a) Review all internal command and operating procedures
and documentation
(b) Conduct physical inspections
(c) Hold interviews with NARDAC personnel
(d) Make privileged mode computer runs
(e) Establish parameters for accomplishing the project
(4) The responsibilities of the Risk Assessment Team include
the investigation and documentation of all items relating to the
ADP security of NARDAC Norfolk and the conducting of a risk assess-
ment in accordance with Appendix E of reference (a).
4. Deliverable Products . Upon completion of this project, the
Risk Assessment Team will provide the following items:
a. Prioritized Workload Chart
b. Computer/Peripheral Inventory
c. Program Inventory
d. Data File Inventory
e. Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) Computations
f. Threat and Vulnerability List
g. Recommendations for Corrective Action
h. Plant Facilities Inventory
5. Commitment . Personnel from all departments are to provide
the cooperation and assistance required by the Risk Assessment
Team. It is the intent of this project to identify problem areas
so corrective action can be taken, rather than attribute deficiencies
to individuals or departments. It is the command's position that
ADP security requires a commitment by every individual and will
be enthusiastically supported by all.






SAMPLE RISK ASSESSMENT TEAM CHARTER
6. Action . Effective immediately the designated team '.eader
will form the Risk Assessment Team as specified above aid proceed
in accordance with the work plan and schedule provided is enclosure (1)
7. Cancellation Contingency . This notice is cancelled upon receipt
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SECTION I. Basic Data. (Applies to all ADP systems, networks,
and OISs)
1. System Identification:
( ) Office Information System
( ) ADP System
( ) Network
2. System Description: (List all components, main frames,
peripherals, communications processors, encryption devices,
remote devices, network and remote interfaces, etc.)











System Operations Contact for Security:
Name: Code:
Bldg: Room: Phone:






















(Note: Applicable security modes are: Compar tmented
,
Controlled, Dedicated, System High, Multilevel, Limited
Access, as defined in Appendix A of this manual.)








6. Operating System and Standard Applications Software
Identifications:
7. Scope of System: (Check all that apply.)
) Stand-alone and single controlled area (single CPU
with single workstation)
.
) Shared logic and single controlled area (single CPU
with multiple workstations)
.
) Shared logic and more than one controlled area (single
CPU with multiple workstations)
.
) Multiple processors and single controlled area (multiple
CPUs)
.
) Multiple processors and more than one controlled area
(multiple CPUs)
.




8. Total Value of System: $





(Note: Dollar values in Table E-2 can be used as a
guideline for computing value of data files.)









A. Primary Function (s) of the System or Network;
B. Contingency Plan Requirement:
( ) Plan is in existence. Date of plan is
( ) Plan is being developed. Estimated completion
date is
.
( ) Plan is not required because loss of processing
capability for a reasonable period of time would
not adversely affect mission. (For example, 2,
4, 8 hours, 2 days, etc. depending on the criti-
cality of the ADP function.) Provide justification,
Section II. Site Security Profile and Minimum Requirements for
Env:.ronmental and Physical Security. (Applies to all ADP systems,
netv/orks, and OISs.)
1. Vulnerability: Temperature or Humidity Outside Normal
Range.
Operating Countermeasures: (Check all that apply.)
) Adequate heating and controls
) Adequate cooling and controls
) Only designated personnel operate controls
) Functioning temperature and humidity recorder




( ) High ( ) Moderate ( ) Low








2. Vulnerability: Inadequate Lighting or Electrical Service,
Operating Countermeasures: (Check all that apply.)
) Adequate primary lighting
) Adequate emergency lighting
) Adequate periodic checks of emergency lighting
) Adequate primary power and outlets
) Functioning power filters or voltage regulators
) Available backup power
) Other:
Assessment of Risk:
( ) High ( ) Moderate ( ) Low
Vulnerability: Improper Housekeeping.
Operating Countermeasures: (Check all that apply.)
( ) Routine cleaning schedule is adhered to
( ) Cleaning personnel are trained in computer room
procedures
( ) An ADP facility representative is present during
cleaning
( ) Dust contributors are not permitted in equipment
areas (outer coats, throw rugs, drapes, Venetian
blinds, etc.)
( ) Air-conditioning filters are cleaned/replaced
regularly
( ) Floors are polished with non-flake wax using proper
buffer materials or properly damp-mopped
( ) Carpet areas are vacuumed frequently and anti-static
spray is used regularly




( ) High ( ) Moderate ( ) Low







4. Threat: Water Damage.
Operating Countermeasures: (Check all that apply.)
) Water/steam pipes are not located above equipment
) Water/steam pipes are inspected at regular intervals
) Functioning humidity warning system
) Dry-pipe sprinkler system
) Raised floor
) Plastic sheets available to cover susceptible equipment




( ) High ( ) Moderate
Threat: Fire.
( ) Low
Operating Countermeasures: (Check all that apply.)





Training—emergency power down procedures
Trainng— knowledge of fire detection system
Training—use of fire extinguishers
Training—use of fire alarm system
Training—evacuation plan
Training— individual responsibilities in case of fire
Functioning emergency power-off switches
Sprinkler system installed
Balon system installed
Carbon dioxide fire extinguishers installed
Smoke/heat detectors installed
Functioning fire alarm system
Emergency exits clearly marked
Other:
Assessment of Risk:
( ) High ( ) Moderate ( ) Low








6. Vulnerability: Unauthorized Physical Access.
Operating Countermeasures: (Check all that apply.)
Perimeter fence
Security guards
Building secured outside of normal working hours










Close supervision of employees
Indoctrination of personnel in security awareness
Other:
Assessment of Risk;
( ) High ( ) Moderate ( ) Low
SECTION III. Current status of accreditation support documentation.
(Applies to all ADP activities and networks which will be authorized
to handle Level I or Level II data.)
1. All ADP activities and networks which will be authorized
to handle Level I or II data must either be accredited or be
granted interim authority to operate pending accreditation.
Accreditation is based on supporting documentation including a
risk assessment. This section provides a statement of the current
status of the accreditation support documentation. (Check all
that apply.)










Required but no action taken
Not required
)
Security Operating Procedures Handbook
Line diagrams showing interconnection of
components and physical layout
Description of countermeasures in place
Copies of previous accreditation or interim
authority to operate
TEMPEST accreditation request




Contingency Plan test results
Formal Risk Assessment
Other (specify) :
SECTION IV. Countermeasure Documentation for Office Information
Systems. (Applies to all OISs which will be authorized to handle
Level I or Level II.)
1. 01 Is Handling Level II Data.
(
(Check all that apply.)
i The OIS will be authorized to handle Level II data.
A list of the operating countermeasures is attached.
These countermeasures provide proper data protection
and audit trails.
( ) The OIS is a shared logic system with more than one
simultaneous user not having need-to-know for all
data within the system. Password protection or other
equivalent countermeasures are employed for system
access and for individual file access.
( ) The OIS Security Operating Procedures have been
documented and approved.









2. OISs handling Level I Data. (Check all that apply.)
( ) The OIS will be authorized to handle Level I data
under a system high or dedicated mode of operation.
A list of the operating countermeasures is attached.
These countermeasures satisfy security regui rements.
( ) TEMPEST accreditation has been reguested. Reguest
date
.
( ) TEMPEST accreditation has been received. Accreditation
date
.
( ) The OIS Security Operating Procedures have been
documented and approved.
SECTION V. Survey Data. (Applies to all ADP systems, networks,
or OISs.)
1. Current Status: (Check all that apply.)
( ) Operating under accreditation for processing Level
data in security mode of
operation. Accreditation granted by
.
Daied . (Attach a copy of statement c~l
accreditation.
)
( ) Operating under interim authority for processing Level
data in security mode of operation,
Interim authority granted by . Dated
. Expires . (Attach a copy of
interim authority to operate.)
2. Surrey Prepared 3y:
Hami!: Code:
Bldq: Room: Phone:








To the best of my knowledge, the information provided in
this survey and the attached documentation is complete
and accurate.
Signature Date
(Provide a list of all survey team members.)




B.3. EXAMPLES OF ASSETS
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B.4. ASSET VALUATION WORKSHEET





Systeir .\ Operating System and Suoport Proqrams
2. ASSET DESCRIPTION ANO JUSTIFICATION OF IMPACT VALUE RATING) ASSlCNEO.
Ooeratino system and conoiler suDport software foe the System 'A'
timeshacinq system.
Impact of modification was determined to be r.eg 1 iq ible , exceot in those
cases where modification would result in denial of service. Those
fiqures were included under denial of service.
Destruction was based on total destruction of all software and on-sit«-
backuD tapes. These fiqures include denial of service caused bv
destruct ion
.
forty hours is required for delivery and check out of reolacement 0/S
software. 75 users denied service at $12/hour; olus 6 svstem proarammec:
at S14/hour for 16 hours; plus 3 data processing technicians at S8/hour
for 36 hours. Total for the ODera-inq system = $39,936.
Sixty users denied use of the compiler at Sl2/hour for 24 hours: plus
1 system proorammer at S14/hour for 8 hours. Total for the compiler
support software = SI, 832.
Reconstruction of comoiler supoort data based on 613 houri to re-enter
data at S8/hour. Total for compiler support data = $4,944.
Disclosure - n/a.
Denial of service was based on the number of users denied service for
an averaqe service outaqe.
Operating system: 35 users at $12/hour for I hour $420.
Compiler support software: 35 users at $12/hour for . c hours = $210.
Compiler support data - tJ/A.
J IMPACT VALUE RATING BY IMPACT AREA
N^ MODIFICATION £] DESTRUCTION S{?] DISCLOSURE Q) DENIAL OF SERVICE
0PHAV 5 2J9/7 12 821
210

B.5. THREAT AND VULNERABILITY WORKSHEET
OPNAVINST 5239. 1A
AUG 3 1982 9»
THREAT AND VULNERABILITY EVALUATION WORKSHEET
i. THREAT nam£
Alteration of Software
2. DESCRIPTION. EXAMPLES, AM) JUSTIFICATION BASED ON EXISTING COUNTERMEASURES ANO VULNERABILITY.
The ADP system or application software may be altered in an unauthorized
manner. Software may ie modified or destroyed, adversely affecting
the data processed. Software alterations mav result in proaram or
system failure and denial of service to users.
Payroll and inventorv control prooram alterations could result in mcneiarv
loss. Disclosure of trie software itself is not a threat, but software
changes could affect the data being processed, resulting in modification
or disclosure of data.
There have been five incidents in the last six months where unauthorized
software patches have crashed the system for periods uo to a day. File
maintenance software failed twice erasing the master data base. Recon-
struction reauired 6H hours. Default options on the application software
were misproorammed resulting in erroneous processinq. Software generatina
control totals failed causing reruns. The program linkage control
.able software failed, thus preventing authorized programs from accessing
required software modules. Down time amounted to 6 hours.
There are few audit trail features on the svr.tem. Configuration control
procedures have not b^en formally documented. A password system is
used, but passwords are infrequently changed and often commonly Known
or readily available. A lata.- number of personnel have virtually
unlimited access to the system. Users can access the system 24 hours
a day. Software docunentat ion does not Keeo pace with proaram changes.
5 SUCCESSFUL ATTACK FREQUENCY RATING Bt IMPACT AREA.




B.6. THREATS AND THEIR IMPACTS
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B.7. ALE COMPUTATION WORKSHEE
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ADDITIONAL COUNTERMEASURE EVALUATION WORKi HEET
I. EOCKTiRtf'AS.^c r.AvE
Audit Trail i Daily Review by ADPSSO
2 ANNUAL COST
$26 .000
Review system software ($15,000), develop software controls (3S,C]0), and
degradation of system operation with controls in place and system activity
data reviewed daily oy ADPSSO ( S 16 , flOD annuallv). Cost amortizer over 5
years $26,000. Develop software controls to capture system activity djta
(user namf>, loq on/off time, terminal used, files requested, tvp« of access,
output generated). ADPSSO review daily to check for unusual user activity
in the system.




















Modifv Ooe rating System to Permit Termina
of Unsuccessful' Log on Attempts
Improved Jon
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igura t i on Control Procedures
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GUIDELINES FOR DESIGNATING POSITIONS
ASSOCIATED WITH FEDERAL COMPUTER SYSTEMS
A-l. COVERAGE Category
This appendix provides specific criteria and
amplifying guidance for determining the cate-
gory of each position associated with Federal
computer systems. This policy applies to
positions in the competitive service occupied by
Federal civilian employees. Departments and
agencies may wish to adopt simdar policies for
any other personnel involved with, or having
access to data in, Federal computer systems.
A-2. CRITERIA FOR DESIGNATING
POSITIONS
Three categories have been established for
designating computer and computer-related
positions—ADP-I, ADP-II, and ADP-IIL
Specific criteria for assigning positions to one of
these categories is as follows:
Category Criteria
ADP-I — Responsibility for the develop-
ment and administration of
agency computer security pro- ADP-II
grams, and also including direc-
tion and control of risk analysis
and/or threat assessment.
—Significant involvement in life-
critical or mission-critical sys-
tems.
—Responsibility for the prepara-
tion or approval of data for
input into a system which does
not necessarily involve personal
access to the system, but with
relatively high risk for eiTecting
grave damage or realizing sig-
nificant personal gain.
— Relatively high risk assignments
associated with or directly in-
volving the accounting, dis-
CriUria
bursement, or authorization for
disbursement from systems of
(1) dollar amounts of $10 million
per year or greater, or '2) lessor
amounts if the activities of the
individual are not subject to
technical review by higher au-
thority in the ADP-1 category
to insure the integrity of the
system.
—Positions involving major re-
sponsibility for the direction,
planning, design, testing, main-
tenance, operation, monitoring,
and/or management of systems
hardware and software.
—Other positions as designated by
the agency head that involve
relatively high risk for eiTecting
grave damage or realizing sig-
nificant personal gain.
— Responsibility for systems de-
sign, operation, testing, main-
tenance, and/or monitoring that
is carried out under technical
review of higher authority in the
ADP-I category, to insure the
integrity of the system. This
category includes, but is not
limited to:
(1) access to and/or processing
of proprietary data, infor-
mation requiring protection
under the Privacy Act of
1974, and Government-de-
veloped prh ileged informa-






or authorization for dis-
bursement from systems of
dollar amounts less than S10
million per year.
—Other positions as designated by
the agency head that involve a
degree of access to a system that
creates a significant potential
for damage or personal gain less
than that in ADP-I positions.
ADP-III —All other positions involved in
Federal computer activities.
A-3. GUIDELINES FOR APPLYING
CRITERIA TO SPECIFIC POSITIONS
In determining category levels for Federal
computer positions, agency heads should con-
sider not only the specific requirements of the
position, but also the relationship of those re-
quirements to the informational system that
the position services. For example, information
that is not in itself highly sensitive may in
combination with similar, low sensitive data
produce a highly sensitive system. A position,
which involves limited access to and use of
selected systems data for specific purposes dur-
ing limited periods of time in a controlled situ-
ation, may be considered for a lower ADP cate-
gory. Such positions might have less potential
for harm than a position associated with the
system's design,' operation or maintenance in-
volving access to or control of large amounts of
data in the system which, in combination, may
be extremely critical to life or mission.
Application of the criteria for designating
category levels of individual positions normally
does not fit a precise formula. A determination
must be made on the basis of judgment, con-
sidering numerous factors, including, but not
necessarily limited to:
—the degree of supervision or review afforded
the occupant of the position;
—the extent of security and protective
measures in effect;
—the nature of the data being processed;
—the degree to which the data being proc-
essed is accessible by the individual through
outside terminals;
—the extent to which responsibility for viola-
tions or attempted violations of computer
systems security can be established
;
—the extent to which the activities associated
with the position are performed in isolation
from concurrent processes; and
— the degree of accessibility fo other data in
a system through intrusion by telecom-
munications or time sharing.
Based upon these and other considerations,
agencies should define determinants such as
significant involvement, grave damage, and
significant personal gain in terms of the in-
dividual agency mission and the relative risks
associated with the particular system or systems
involved. On a continuing basis, an assessment
of all category designations should be made to
identify any changes in the data available or
the duties and responsibilities of the position
that would cause the position to be placed in a
higher or lower category level.
A-4. SCREENING PERSONS FOR ASSIGN-
MENT TO ADP-I, ADP-II, AND ADP-III
POSITIONS
Heads of agencies are responsible for develop-
ing criteria for screening persons for assignment
to ADP-I, ADP-II, and ADP-III positions.
The OPM's suitability guidelines in Federal
Personnel Manual Supplement 731-1 and the
guidelines in Executive Order 10450 may be
used in developing this criteria. Agencies should
also consider any other factors which have a
bearing on the person's trustworthiness. In-
dividual agency criteria for Federal civilian
competitive service positions may also be used







Opinions vary on what constitutes adequate and complete documentation of
operational computer programs. It is generally agreed, however, that at least four
categories of documentation are -equired if long and complex programs are to oe
significantly changed or suojected to other scrutiny.
The four categories are system flowcharts, detailed program flowcharts, source
programs, and computer runsheets. Still other categories of documentation may
be found when the auditor embarks on an audit of documentation supporting
computer programs. The documentation may 0e placed in 12 different cate-
gories. They are explained here to show the relationship of various forms of doc-
umentation to the four first mentioned. The auditor is cautioned, however, that
each EDP installation may not place the documentation in the precise categories
described here. Some of the 1 2 categories may nave Deen combined, others may
have been eliminated or omitted, and still others may have been added.
1. Cover Sheet. The Durpcse of the cover sheet is to identify the computer pro-
gram by giving such information as program name, program number, purpose fa
brief nontecnnical description of theprcoiem solved by the program), source lan-
guage used (such as COBOL or FORTRAN), EDP configuration that the program
was designed for, programmers name, and date of the program. Even though
helpful, the cover sheet is not an absolute necessity cecause the information it
contains is usually shown elsewhere in the documentation or is easily obtained.
2. Forms Layout. The purpose of this section is to show the content of input and
output documents and reports. If it is not included in the documentation, it is usu-
ally available from other sources, such as current reports and currently used in-
put documents.
3. Definitions. The purpose of this section is to define all symbolic names used
anywhere in the program documentation. Symbolic names are abbreviated terms
that are used in place of longer names, terms, or titles. For example, one of the
input documents in the forms layout section may show a form space and identify
its contents as "TAXDED." Reference to the definitions section might show that
'TAXDED" means Tax Deduction. ' This section may also contain any tables or
other information the programmer feels should be defined. A table might show,
for example, the numoer of depenaents in one column and the applicaPle tax de-




Like the forms layout section, the definitions may be available from other sources
if they are not defined in a separate section of documentation. As an example,
definitions may be recorded on system flowcharts and detailed program flow-
charts (explained later) or defined in the comments contained in the source pro-
gram. Of course, the symbolic names used may have an obvious or easily
determinable meaning. In that case, the definitions may not be essential.
4. System Flowchart. The purpose of the system flowchart is to show the flow
of work, documents, and reports in a specific data processing job. It is designed
to demonstrate how the data processing job is organized from beginning to end.
It is general in nature because it does not specify the detailed and specific com-
puter steps that are necessary for a particular processing run. (This detail is a
function of the detailed program flowchart described later.)
Special data processing symbols are used in a system flowchart, along with sym-
bolic names, previously described, and English language statements to describe
flow of work, documents, and reports. By referring to the system flowchart, pro-
grammers and others can find out how the overall data processing job is organ-
ized, the source of type of input records, the point at which input records are
introduced into the computer for processing, the sequence of the overall process-
ing, all resulting output — such as printed reports — and the ultimate destination
of the output.
This type of information is not usually available from another source unless it can
be recalled by the people who worked on the program or unless it can be recon-
structed from other detailed data processing records or current practices. Recon-
struction can take a great deal of time if the data processing job is a lengthy one.
3esides, it is not a good practice to rely on an individual's memory, because some
important details may be forgotten or the individual may leave the company.
5. Detailed Program Flowchart. Like the system flowchart, the detailed pro-
gram flowcnart uses special data processing symbols, symbolic names, and Eng-
lish language statements. Unlike the system flowchart, however, the detailed
program flowchart shows a step-by-step sequence in implementing a data proc-
essing job so that it can be made operational.
It is from the detailed program flowchart that the programmer prepares the actual
computer program (called a source program) to De compiled and executed by the
computer. Unless the source program is simple and only a few source program
steps are required, a current detailed program flowchart is a valuable tool to the
programmer in making necessary changes at a later date.
Because of its extremely detailed nature, it is important that the detailed program
flowchart be kept current. Otherwise, important and minute details may be for-
gotten and the programmer may find it difficult or impossible to make changes in
the related source program when the need arises. This is particularly true if the
changes are to be made by a programmer other than the one who initially pre-
pared the detailed program flowchart and source program. For some complex
source programs, the programmer may prepare several program flowcharts,
each becoming progressively more detailed until one of them possesses the de-
tail that is necessary for writing the source program. When making program
changes, the detailed program flowchart is almost always used in conjunction




6. Program Description. This section describes how the logic of the source pro-
gram was developed, using the higher-level language (such as COBOL or FOR-
TRAN) and the computer. It is a detailed flowchart in prose form. Sometimes,
because COBOL is near to English, this section is not prepared for source pro-
grams written in COBOL. If it is not prepared, the same information is almost al-
ways available from the detailed program flowchart or the source program, except
without the detailed and sometimes lengthy prose statements which explain why
specific procedures were followed.
7. Source Program. This section contains the actual program as it is written in
such higher-level languages as COBOL or FORTRAN. By comparing the detailed
program flowchart with the actual source program, the programmer or others can
trace each step of the computer through to a final conclusion. In reviewing and
making changes in the programs, the programmer must generally refer to the
source program to determine precisely how the higher-level language statements
were used before the current review and change became necessary.
The detailed program flowchart is useful in determining the purpose of specific
source program statements. Some EDP installations may also follow the practice
of requiring programmers to include English language comments in the source
program to briefly explai n the purpose of each program step. Such comments are
useful and, together with the detailed program flowchart, can provide a clearaudit
trail that shows the step-by-step procedure that was followed in developing the
source program.
Sometimes, English language comments in the source program are sufficient to
permit an accurate review of or change in the computer program. This, of course,
depends upon the extent and clarity of the English language comments, the
length and complexity of the source program, and the extent of the required re-
view or program changes.
If a current copy of the source program is not formally kept as documentation, it
can usually be obtained from punched cards that were used to introduce the
source program into the computer or from other storage devices, such as mag-
netic tape, that may be used to hold the information.
8. List of Test Data. This section identifies the test data used by the programmer
in testing the source program after it was written. The results are shown in the
Test Report (described in item 10).
9. Sample Output. This section contains sample output resulting from the source
program. Examples of output include reports and punched cards. If this informa-
tion is not included in the documentation it is usually easily obtained by referring
to recent output that resulted from EDP processing runs.
10. Test Report. This section explains the results that were obtained when the
source program was tested to determine whether it was operational. If test data
and test reports are not included in the documentation, the programmer can pre-
pare other test data to determine the current effectiveness of the source program.
11. Deck Setup. This section gives the order of the source program card deck.
It is similar to the source program (see item 7), but it is not in as much detail. The
source program is an exact duplication of the computer program in the higher-
level language. The deck setup shows the order of the related card deck, but it is




This section may include such other information as requirements for peripheral
equipment (magnetic tape drives, card readers, and card punchers), the time
limit for the computer program when it is being executed by the computer, and
special control cards needed for a successful run of the job. This information is
also available from the programmer.
1 2. Computer Run Sheet. This section contains information needed by the con-
sole operator for running the computer program, such as the magnetic tapes or
disks to be mounted, the names and usage of all input files, any central process-
ing unit (CPU) console messages that may appear during the run, and any oper-
ator action to be taken as a result of these messages. This information is also
usually available from retained copies of the CPU console messages from pro-



































2 . 1 People
• Complete listing of assigned personnel with address,
phone number, etc.


















2 . 4 Hardware
• Inventory list reflecting vendor, name, address,
etc
.
• Emergency acquisition agreement
• Sample order forms, etc.
2 . 5 Communications
• Current on-site requirements




• List of critical supply items with all necessary
information (e.g., stock numbers for ordering)
• List of vendors who provide supplies
• List/location of supplies needed for backup site
processing
2.7 Transportation
• Requirements for recovery operations/backup site (s)
• Procedures for obtaining emergency transportation
2 . 8 Space
• Current site requirements (lay-out of facility)




• Current site requirements





• List/location of critical documentation needed for
backup site processing
2.11 Other




















NOTE: The exclusion of any item in the examples above does
not imply that further entries may not be required for any
facility. The purpose of the example entries is to suggest,
generally, possible relevant entries for each facility's
contingency plan. Most planners will undoubtedly discover
that in order to provide complete coverage, further expan-
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